EU and its members in the conclusions of summits of the European Council unequivocally assessed the Russian aggression against Ukraine as an unacceptable violation of international law. Sanctions regime translated words into action. Contrary to Russian expectations, their open meddling in other countries’ electoral campaigns and info-sphere, and driving wedges between and within Member States has produced meagre results. The Kremlin’s aggressive policy has created more Russia critics than Russlandverstehers.
Ernest Wyciszkiewicz[1]
Still, there have been recurring attempts in the EU, including in Germany, to water down Russia’s responsibility. And so quite often some European and, to a lesser degree, German politicians make a semantic twist and start seeing the Ukrainian conflict as a civil war instead of an inter-state conflict triggered by an obvious aggressor (Russia), or separatists instead of Russia-backed proxy forces. Another group – mainly worshippers of geopolitics – turns a blind eye on Putin’s actions and underlines alleged structural causes of the conflict rooted in Western disrespect towards Russia’s ‘legitimate’ interests and post-Soviet traumas.
There have been recurring attempts in the EU, including in Germany, to water down Russia’s responsibility. And so quite often some European and, to a lesser degree, German politicians make a semantic twist and start seeing the Ukrainian conflict as a civil war instead of an inter-state conflict triggered by an obvious aggressor (Russia).
Nevertheless, political consensus in the EU prevails, though it has been under pressure from certain EU Member States. Poland and Germany, cooperating closely, contributed greatly to the European unity vis-a-vis the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Currently, in the age of Russia under the EU sanctions, Berlin and Warsaw should promote the four R’s: responsibility, risk taking, rules and resources as ruling principles of the EU policy towards Russia and Eastern Europe.
Responsibility. It is not the abstract post-Cold War order that failed in 2014, it is not the European security architecture that crumbled due to Western faults, it is not the deterministic logic of history that led us into the crisis. It is Russia under the command of president Putin that undertook the fully-fledged aggression against Ukraine and breaking nearly every regulation that could have been broken when it comes to the spirit and the letter of international law. Only after Russia takes genuine responsibility for its aggression and delivers real progress on the ground, should there be any talk of EU engagement, including a gradual lifting of sanctions. Even the slightest efforts to ask Russia for concessions by putting part of the blame on the EU or NATO backfire immediately with Russian agitprop turning the argument around in good old doublespeak logic that “War is Peace” and “Aggression is Self-Defense”.
Only after Russia takes genuine responsibility for its aggression and delivers real progress on the ground, should there be any talk of EU engagement, including a gradual lifting of sanctions.
Risk taking. Risk aversion sometimes pushes some of EU’s democratic politicians to get back to “business as usual” with Russia, even though there is no way back. The authoritarian Russian politicians are simply not to be held accountable for misdeeds to their people, so they are more willing to take risks and test the resolve of their more vulnerable partners. This neatly explains why Russia interfered, directly or by proxies, in electoral processes in the West to increase political costs of challenging Russia for incumbents and newcomers. All the while, Moscow has been showing its ideological flexibility. For instance, in case of German elections, Moscow focused particularly on the far left and the far right. Although Russia harmed itself by overacting, it sent a powerful signal that European political culture of risk avoidance is in fact extremely risky. Risk taking in practical terms means not falling into the traps of war scaremongering “nuclear war” or “economic doomsday”. Indeed, the EU sanctions constitute the best exemplification of the successful resilience against this emotional blackmail.
The authoritarian Russian politicians are simply not to be held accountable for misdeeds to their people, so they are more willing to take risks and test the resolve of their more vulnerable partners. This neatly explains why Russia interfered, directly or by proxies, in electoral processes in the West to increase political costs of challenging Russia for incumbents and newcomers.
Rules. Since the reports of the death of the European order are an exaggeration, its principles should be upheld. Russia’s blow to the system of international law is rooted in its preference for informal, tacit agreements among great powers to make the smaller players comply. Yet, the international reality of today is fundamentally different than that of 1815 or 1945, and denying agency to small and midsized states such as Poland is simply unrealistic due to prohibitively high political costs of such actions for those willing to get back to any kind of exclusive great power game. The main powers of the EU, including Germany, should be aware that any sort of “grand bargain” at the expense of Central and Eastern European states might bring a short relief but would actually mean inviting trouble in the future from those willing to grasp the land of their neighbours.
Yet, the international reality of today is fundamentally different than that of 1815 or 1945, and denying agency to small and midsized states such as Poland is simply unrealistic due to prohibitively high political costs of such actions for those willing to get back to any kind of exclusive great power game.
Resources. The Panama and Paradise Papers have turned the spotlight on something that European elites have been well aware of for years, ever since the wealth of countries ruled by dictators/autocrats started to flow through tax havens to the EU. A peculiar financial interdependence emerged between a part of Western political and financial elites and post-Soviet, Asian or African kleptocrats. Obviously, this problem is much bigger than Russia, but it can be a key to EU policy towards that country as well as towards Eastern Europe. This implicit support of corruption and money laundering goes to the very heart of the credibility of the EU in the East, since it discredits its association policy based on acquis communautaire, foreign aid programs or democracy promotion, so important for Eastern Partnership countries. For EU policy toward Russia, real steps in reducing money laundering, illegal tax avoidance or evasion, and eliminating secrecy havens would have tremendous significance as instruments, making it difficult for Russian elites to turn public goods into private gains and, subsequently, to make them more vulnerable to outside pressure. What is even more important, it would increase EU’s resilience to unwanted practices of corruption that have been travelling together with Russian money and pipelines.
[1] Director of the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding
