It remains a striking phenomenon that Russians have coined their relation towards the continent in the telling phrase “my i Evropa” (we and Europe) thus expressing a lacking sense of belonging towards Europe, irrelevant of whether they live in the European or Asian part of their country. It also remains a striking fact that for many Western Europeans Europe ends at the borders of the European Union (for some Europe even seems to end at the borders of the rivers Oder and Neisse) thus at best they express an indifference towards Central and Eastern Europe.
Polsko niemieckie stosunki dwustronne i ich wpływ na wspólną politykę europejską to motyw przewodni German-Polish European Blog. Comiesięczne odsłony bloga przygotowuje WiseEuropa, we współpracy z Fundacją im. Heinricha Bölla w Warszawie.
Gabriele Freitag[1]
Over the last years the divisions between the EU and Russia have deepened dramatically. But the setting within the European Union has also changed. The pro-European majority in this year’s elections in the Netherlands, France and Germany cannot conceal the fact that the pro-European stance in the European Union is dwindling. Old and new populist parties, on the right and on the left of the political spectrum, are forming anti-EU alliances within the Union and also with Russia. And with the new populist government in the USA, it is becoming ever more evident that the political East-West dichotomy is getting increasingly blurred. The concept of Western democracy itself, though, has certainly not outlived its purpose. Fortunately, neither the EU nor Russia are monolithic entities. This makes the situation more complex but offers chances to reach out to those who are still ready to listen.
Old and new populist parties, on the right and on the left of the political spectrum, are forming anti-EU alliances within the Union and also with Russia. And with the new populist government in the USA, it is becoming ever more evident that the political East-West dichotomy is getting increasingly blurred.
When it comes to EU’s relations towards Russia, there is no need to change strategies and goals decisively but simply to define them more clearly. We are currently witnessing a supposed battle on values which is in fact a conflict about (mutually agreed upon) principles and rules. Russia has launched a militant campaign against a degenerate Gayevropa that mobilizes nationalist forces on the domestic front but also serves as a pretext to depart from the rule of law on the international arena. But this battle on values is not restricted to a contestation between the EU and Russia. The current Polish government, with its prominent anti-Russian rhetoric, shows striking similarities to its demonized foe when claiming to be the true representative of European values while simultaneously discrediting its own democratic institutions and political opponents. Thus, the casus belli and the battle lines are not as clear-cut as the political rhetoric makes us believe.
The current Polish government, with its prominent anti-Russian rhetoric, shows striking similarities to its demonized foe when claiming to be the true representative of European values while simultaneously discrediting its own democratic institutions and political opponents.
In this highly emotionally-charged contestation, the EU as a political body also rather tends to refer to the vague concept of European values instead of talking about its own interests explicitly. In general, these interests do not collide with the claimed values, namely transparency, predictability and justice as prerequisites for peace, democracy, the rule of law and prosperity. Clearly defining its own interests might enhance the EU’s communication and negotiation with outside partners and conflicting parties who tend to denounce EU politics as hypocritical talk. But this offensive approach requires that the interests and values, actions and words be indeed compatible. And the EU is truly vulnerable regarding for instance its own double standards towards countries with a track record of human rights abuses.
What is wanted from the EU and especially from Germany is a more coherent policy towards Russia that acknowledges the anxieties of Central European and Baltic countries like Poland regarding Russian expansionism. This policy should show solidarity within the EU but simultaneously try to reach out to Russia, calling for collaboration in the fields of economy, certain fields of security and people-to-people contact. What is also wanted from the EU is a more explicit stance towards the countries of the Eastern Neighborhood. Why not acknowledge vis-a-vis Russia that there is a competition for collaboration with the countries in the post-Soviet space as long as this competition does not deprive the respective countries of the opportunity to collaborate with both sides? And while detesting any claims towards exclusive spheres of interest, the EU could make it more explicit that Russia itself is of utmost interest to the EU and in particular a prosperous Russia. An articulate and coherent policy is also what pro-European voices in Russia expect of the EU and certainly of Germany.
What is wanted from the EU and especially from Germany is a more coherent policy towards Russia that acknowledges the anxieties of Central European and Baltic countries like Poland regarding Russian expansionism. This policy should show solidarity within the EU but simultaneously try to reach out to Russia, calling for collaboration in the fields of economy, certain fields of security and people-to-people contact.
The EU considers that Russia strives to assert its role as a global player and perceives the EU as a major challenge to its security and ambitions. Due to its own weaknesses, Russia regards unpredictability as a vital instrument of foreign policy. In contrast to this approach, accountability of its own policy is most probably the first and foremost prerequisite of a sustainable EU foreign policy. The prospects of overcoming the conflict with Russia in the near future are weak. And therefore it is all the more important to keep up constant and coherent communication.
It is also apparent that the concept of Europe as a peaceful and tolerant place of cohabitation and namely the EU as its most prominent representative has lost its attractiveness for many people in Russia. Dialogue on different levels to reach out to the people and thus try to counterbalance the anti-European rhetoric of the Russian state media is all the more important – the ultimate goal being a change of perspective from “we and Europe” to “we in Europe”.
[1] Managing director of the German Association for East European Studies
