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GOŚCINNA POLSKA 2022+

Jak mądrze wesprzeć Polskę i Polaków w pomocy osobom uciekającym przed wojną w Ukrainie?

Maciej Bukowski, Maciej Duszczyk (eds.)

HOSPITABLE POLAND 2022+

How to wisely support Poland and Poles in helping people fleeing the war in Ukraine?

ГОСТИННА ПОЛЬЩА 2022+

Як мудро підтримати Польщу у прагненні допомогти особам, що тікають від війни в Україні?

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INTRODUCTION

Maciej Bukowski

Maciej Duszczyk

The support and commitment of Polish society to the Ukrainian cause is undisputable. At the same time, on the wave of enthusiasm and will, it is important to remember about big challenges in such practical spheres as the labour market, education, health care, or housing.

As we write these words, it is more than a hundred days since the renewed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. This is also the eighth year of the Ukrainians' struggle to defend their freedom, democracy and right to self-determination. Indeed, the beginning of the war was not the offensive of the Russian army on Kiev, the east and the south of Ukraine, which began at the end of February 2022, but eight years earlier, with Russia taking control of Crimea and parts of Ukraine's south-eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

As Hannah Arendt noted in her essay 'No Longer and Not Yet', the dramatic moments in our history which give rise to a new reality are often associated with the emergence of an 'in-between' world, existing temporarily, whose transitory character is at the same time unnoticed by contemporaries. In this world, a certain era has already passed, but a new one has not yet been born, and the people living in it do not take notice of any signals of the coming end. According to Hanna Arendt, this was precisely the world of the twenties, suspended between the Great War that ended the 19th century show of powers and the bipolar world of the Cold War that emerged after 1945. The world shaped at the turn of the twentieth century with the collapse of the communist system could also be such a transitional era. Many thought of it as a symbolic 'end of history' in which it was only a matter of time before all European and most of the world's states adapted to the liberal order shaped in the West after the Second World War. In fact, this is what happened in the case of the countries of Central Europe and the Baltic Republics, as well as Ukraine, which, despite a much more cumbersome economic transition, eventually took an unambiguously pro-Western (and in practice pro-EU) reform course after two peaceful democratic revolutions.

Contrary to the hopes (or perhaps illusions) of Western elites and societies, a completely different path has been taken by Russia. After an initial flirt with democracy, the political elite of the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin began, on the one hand, to tighten autocratic control over its own society and, on the other hand, through intensive armaments, corruption of neighbouring elites, propaganda activities and successive, relatively small, armed conflicts, to seek to revise the international order that had been formed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Like people living in the inter-war period, a large part of the population in the USA or Western and Central Europe – both those in which liberal democracy was established in the first half of the 20th century, those who built it up in the 1970s, or those who only re-established it after liberating themselves from Soviet control in 1989 – did not see Russia's revanchist actions as threatening to themselves. Indeed, the economic and military superiority of the European Union and NATO was so overwhelming that even the successive crises that the Western world had to face: the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks, the Great Recession of 2008, the Eurozone debt crisis of 2012, the migration crisis of 2015-2016, or the COVID-19 pandemic, did not shake the self-confidence of the developed countries, for whom any attempt to revise borders seemed unthinkable.

This attitude was only changed by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Although this war was not the first Russian aggression against a sovereign state after 1991, it was the first to set off alarm bells in the offices of Western elites. However, the sound of these bells was relatively faint. Relatively light sanctions were imposed on Russia. Military, financial and institutional assistance to Ukraine – while clearly greater than in the earlier period – still did not fully take into account the possibility of further escalation of the conflict. Indeed, the creeping nature of the war in the Donbass and the pretence created by Russia meant that the majority of Western (including Polish) public opinion did not treat the events in Ukraine as processes that threatened them directly in much the same way as the migration crisis in Southern Europe, the COVID-19 pandemic or the imbalance in the Eurozone as a result of economic troubles in Greece. Democratic politicians focused on domestic problems and did not feel the need to seriously face the challenge of containing Russian revanchism and preventing a full-scale war in Europe whose outbreak was not considered to be very likely. Expenditure on the military did not increase, and the construction of infrastructure increasing the European Union's dependence on gas and, to a lesser extent, oil imports from Russia, continued. Normal relations with Russia were also maintained and its international position was not significantly weakened despite a number of other actions destabilising the world order: actual and

attempted assassinations through, for example, poisoning of several asylum seekers in the West, blowing up of ammunition depots in the Czech Republic, sending Russian armed forces to Syria, which multiplied the number of refugees from that country to Europe, or shooting down of a Dutch passenger plane over Ukraine.

Poland was also passive. Although the national political elite declared awareness of the growing Russian threat more often than many other EU member states, at the same time they took similarly limited, inconsistent, incomplete and delayed preventive measures. Spending on the army increased slightly, but the process of equipment modernisation did not accelerate. Poland began to prepare for independence from gas imports from Russia earlier than other countries, but the construction of the relevant infrastructure stretched over several years, and successive governments were much more willing to support gas-fired power plants than renewable sources or a nuclear power plant: the need for the latter was repeatedly announced but construction works never began. The process of diversifying the supply of liquid fuels has been even slower, and Poland has remained one of the European Union countries most dependent on Russian oil imports.

The lack of determination to act in order to strengthen conflict resilience also concerned the area of migration. Poland refused to support other EU states in accommodating the consequences of the Syrian crisis, ignoring the role played by Russia in its outbreak. Since no similar phenomenon was foreseen to occur on Poland's borders, the formulation of a national migration strategy was abandoned. As a result, Polish regulations on migration policy are scattered – they do not constitute a holistic and systemic approach through which the state could flexibly and appropriately respond to challenges in this area. Meanwhile, Poland has transformed itself from a typical emigration state into an immigration state, where the population of foreigners, even before 24 February 2022, amounted to more than 5% of the total Polish population. When the migration crisis occurred at our borders in 2021 following the hybrid actions of the Belarusian government, probably operating in concert with the Russian Federation, the actions of the Polish services had to be largely improvised and carried out with an inadequately prepared infrastructure, police forces, and institutional framework. On top of this, the much-needed trust between NGOs and the Border Guard was destroyed. Even the positive phenomenon of the post-2014 opening of the Polish labour market to Ukrainian and Belarusian citizens in need of economic support was largely accidental. This is because the very liberal system of employing people from the Eastern Partnership countries was created in Poland not as a response to Russia's actions to suppress the peaceful, pro-Western democratic revolutions in these countries, but as an attempt to solve the problems of the domestic agricultural sector. It was only a coincidence that the system of simplified work permits became an appropriate response to the much larger spectrum of challenges that affected the Polish and Ukrainian economies after 2014.

The turning point in this passive attitude – both of Poland and other OECD countries – was the invasion of Ukraine by the regular Russian army on 24 February 2022. It came as a shock to both ordinary citizens and the political elites of the EU and NATO countries, who understood that the 2014 war was just the first chord of a multi-year conflict between a collective West and a revanchist Russia, and that its outcome could determine the shape of the future, multi-year international order on the continent. Military and economic aid to Ukraine was also supported by backing it up with unequivocal political support. The borders of the European Union have been opened to people fleeing the war in Ukraine, millions of whom (above all, women and children) have crossed the borders of Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Moldova, and Hungary. Unprecedented economic and political sanctions have been imposed on Russia, designed to significantly undermine the country's ability to effectively wage warfare for several years and to make it impossible to provoke a full-scale war in Europe again for many years. After more than three months of hostilities in Ukraine, it is still difficult to assess the extent to which this assistance is sufficient. The resolution of the war is still uncertain, and democratic governments are constantly criticised for acting too slowly or insufficiently, making it very difficult to effectively defend the entire territory of Ukraine and permanently eliminate the Russian threat to Europe.

It is obvious that the role of this report is not to settle military questions or to present a comprehensive analysis of complex economic and international policy issues related to the conflict in Ukraine. However, this introduction was necessary in order to illustrate the multifaceted international situation we have found ourselves in. Our report was prepared by an interdisciplinary group of authors. It draws on the output of the Local Government Roundtable held in Wrocław. The authors of the report focus on Poland and its preparation for the integration of foreigners who ended up in Poland following the Russian invasion of Ukraine between 2014 and 2022, but also on economic reasons or seeking international protection. Obviously, these were mainly citizens of Ukraine (approximately 1.3 million who stayed in Poland before 24 February 2022 and war refugees), but we cannot forget about the presence of a large group of foreigners in Poland who chose our country as a place to study, work, or live. The number of all foreigners residing in Poland can be estimated at around 3.3-3.5 million. This poses a challenge for us not to make the mistakes made by other countries that have previously received large numbers of immigrants. Poland is a country that has become particularly strongly involved in helping Ukraine, both militarily (supplying armaments, providing infrastructure for allies) and economically (logistical, fuel and financial assistance) and socially (accepting refugees, providing multi-faceted assistance). The support and involvement of Polish society for the Ukrainian cause is unequivocal. At the same time, in the wave of enthusiasm and willingness to help, citizens as well as the political elite and administration forget how little time has passed since February 2022 and what big challenges await Poland in the next few or so months in such practical spheres as the labour market, education, health care, or housing.

The long-term stay of many people fleeing the war in Ukraine to Poland and other foreigners, who until now have mainly arrived in private houses/apartments, is after several months of war an increasingly difficult situation for both guests and hosts. Possible solutions – requiring action by the Polish government, EU assistance and the activity of international aid organisations – would be, on the one hand, the liberalisation of the domestic rental market aimed at increasing the supply of housing for Ukrainian citizens residing in Poland and, on the other hand, the construction of modular housing estates in which those without housing could spend the autumn and winter. In the absence of immediate action and an additional influx of war refugees, it will probably also be necessary to relocate some of them within Poland and the EU, and to build – based on prefabrication techniques – large temporary residence centres. However, these should not be equated with the so-called "refugee camps" known from countries such as Greece, Turkey, Lebanon, or Jordan. In the long term, provided the Polish market is integrated, it is possible to fill the additional demand for housing by the market, although this will require a number of reforms, to which chapter three of this report is devoted.

Providing education and care for Ukrainian children living in Poland will also be a huge challenge. In the extreme, up to one million children in need of care and education will need to be covered by these public services. Otherwise it is difficult to expect that the majority of mothers or family members with caring roles will be able to take up employment. Therefore, it is necessary to prepare and finance, in cooperation with domestic, EU and international organisations, above-standard solutions based on three models implemented in parallel. The first solution is that Ukrainian children have to continue, for some time to come, to follow the Ukrainian curriculum, and the aim of the government and local authorities will be to provide the infrastructure for distance learning, as well as to recognise the qualifications of Ukrainian teachers living in Poland so that appropriate school classes can be established (especially in large cities). It will also be necessary to provide certain solutions to integrate Ukrainian children studying remotely in Poland with Polish children. In the second model, preparatory classes could be created for Ukrainian children entering Polish schools in the next school year. As compulsory schooling in Ukraine is one year ahead of compulsory schooling in Poland, spending a year in a preparatory class should not be a major problem, although too many children should not be affected. In the third model, aimed at those Ukrainian children with sufficient command of the Polish language, they should be given the opportunity to attend Polish schools under

the same conditions as Polish children. The decision to choose a particular model should be made by the parents. The issues of educational challenges are discussed in detail in chapter four of the study.

The number of elderly war refugees[1], who require frequent medical care, is relatively small compared to the size of the overall migrant influx. However, it is important to be aware that some of them have not yet been registered in the system, so their percentage may be higher than is currently apparent in the data. The Polish health care system has been heavily affected by the pandemic – many people have postponed their medical appointments. It can be estimated that as a result of the influx of refugees, which includes many children, an additional 1-2 million people will use the Polish health care system. This will entail serious challenges of a financial and organisational nature. This will result in lengthening of queues to GPs, which may be particularly serious in the first autumn-winter season. The health care system (along with the education system) will require particularly large financial and organisational support not only from the Polish taxpayer, but also from the European Union and international charities. It may be necessary to seek support from other EU member states to provide temporary hospitals and to second doctors to Poland for a limited period. It will also be crucial to address communication problems between patients and doctors. These issues are addressed in chapter five of the report.

The presence of Ukrainians on the Polish labour market was already significant before the war. It can therefore be assumed that there should be no problem with the absorption of a few hundred thousand more people on the Polish labour market and the high economic activity of immigrants in the long term. At the same time, achieving employment levels of refugees similar to the native population may be hampered by the fact that this population is dominated by women with children. This may result in an incomplete match between the skills or work experience of refugee women and the needs of the labour market. This also may cause underemployment for low wages, and may discourage some migrant women who are burdened with childcare and unable to find suitable employment. This situation may require a great deal of activity on the part of labour offices and immigrant participation organisations. They will have to prepare training and retraining offers tailored to the professional profiles of Ukrainians, finding funding for this from national resources (Labour Fund), the EU (operational programmes) or from international donors. It will be crucial for employers to organise large job fairs or create virtual platforms to ensure smooth matching of workers with employers. Information on risks such as workplace exploitation, bullying or harassment will also need to be widely disseminated. Chapter two of the report deals with these issues in detail.

Finally, a key challenge in the longer term will be to prevent conflicts that may arise between Ukrainians and Poles as well as between different groups of Ukrainians. This is because such a large influx of foreigners in the short term affects the daily life of the host society – both Polish citizens and immigrants already residing in Poland for a long time. This may cause conflicts. In the short term, due to the uniqueness of the war situation, they can be easily avoided, but tensions are bound to arise over time, increasing especially in certain sensitive areas. In particular, people using public services provided by local governments may experience a deterioration in their standard of living due to the presence of a significant number of war refugees, who will also be able to benefit from state support. A similar situation may also occur in the labour market, with possible negative effects (especially at the local level). These risks need to be identified, monitored and addressed through tailored public policies, including communication campaigns. This topic is the focus of Chapters 7 and 8.

As we have already noted above, Poland is inhabited by an increasing number of foreigners. This needs to be recognised and reflected in the functioning of the Polish administration, both central and local, and in the framework of the laws that are created. It is crucial to streamline administrative pathways allowing foreigners to smoothly deal with all matters related to their functioning in Poland. The key here will be to introduce the

1 The use of the term 'war refugee' has been elaborated on in chapter one of this report.

institution of foreigners' assistants in Polish offices so that they facilitate the process of obtaining the necessary documentation or permits. In legal terms, it is not about creating privileges, but about ensuring the principle of equal treatment, so that no group is discriminated against, but also there is no suspicion that a system of unjustified benefits is being created. The law already in force should also be reviewed to identify and eliminate potentially discriminatory provisions. This issue is addressed in chapter six.

In the late 1990s, the Russian ideologue, Alexander Dugin, published Fundamentals of Geopolitics, where he wrote that for Russia to rebuild its global power, it would have to use disinformation, destabilisation and annexation as tools. According to him, an independent Ukraine stands in Russia's way of becoming a transcontinental superpower, so its annexation is necessary. The book was later used as a textbook at the Russian army's General Staff Academy. Not surprisingly, at the time of the invasion of Ukraine, Russian disinformation activities regarding Ukraine and Ukrainians in allied countries (including Poland) increased significantly. It is in Russia's interest to undermine the internal cohesion of Ukraine's Western allies and to strain the cohesiveness of its support for the country. To this end, disinformation is being used, through which Russia is attempting to reinforce existing social and political divisions and to exploit societal needs to make sense of reality in uncertain times. The nature of these activities and ways to counter them, including the role that European and Polish policy, as well as the activity of international and Polish civil society, should play in this sphere, is described in more detail in chapter nine of the study.

Finally, we would like to thank everyone who has contributed to this report. This group is so large that it would be a risk to mention and rank every single person. In particular, however, we would like to thank the Embassy of Ukraine in Poland, which took over the honorary patronage of this undertaking, the institutions supporting us both financially and substantively, mentioned both in the report itself and in the promotional materials. On our part, we can promise that the publication of the report is only the beginning of our activities. We are looking forward to further cooperation.

1.

IMMIGRANTS, WAR REFUGEES* AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF POLAND

Maciej Duszczyk

Paweł Kaczmarczyk

* In this text, we use the term ‚war refugees from Ukraine' to adequately reflect the specific character of this group. These individuals do not receive refugee status on the basis of the 1951 Geneva Convention. Moreover, most of them do not intend to apply for one of the forms of international protection. Hence, it was necessary to find a different term to describe their status in Poland and in the European Union. The proposed term encompasses very different categories of persons, both citizens of Ukraine and foreigners who, at the time of the outbreak of the war, were on the territory of Ukraine and left it by crossing the border. Thus, citizenship is not relevant here – what only matters is the fact of leaving Ukraine after 24 February 2022. In this text, we use the term ‚war refugees from Ukraine' – however, unless otherwise indicated, we refer to Ukrainian citizens only.

Regardless of future developments, it can be assumed with a high degree of probability that the size of the Ukrainian population in Poland will be much larger than before 24 February 2022. It is the responsibility of the public authorities to respond to the challenge of Poland becoming a country of immigration.

1. Introduction: Poland as a new country of immigration

The outbreak of war in Ukraine has set in motion migration potential of a scale not seen since the Second World War. The magnitude of the influx of pre-war refugees is spectacular, especially in the case of Poland and other countries in the region, which until recently could hardly be described as countries of immigration. It is worth pointing out some contextual factors that (1) explain – to some extent – why Poland has become the main destination country for arrivals from Ukraine and (2) are helpful in predicting and understanding the development of Ukrainian migration and the presence of Ukrainians in Polish society in the future.

Until a decade ago, Poland was not a country of immigration – on the contrary, due to mass emigration to Western European countries, after 2004 the migration balance was clearly negative (Górny et al. 2010; Okólski 2012; King, Okólski 2018). However, this was determined not only by the scale of departure from Poland. The inflow to Poland was also very limited, especially when considering long-term immigration. According to the 2011 Census, the total number of foreigners residing in Poland was estimated at around 110,000. A few years later (in 2015), Eurostat data placed Poland in one of the last places among EU Member States in terms of the share of immigrants in the population. The scale of the inflow was not only noticeably smaller than in Western Europe but even than in other CEE countries.

Immigration to Poland before 2014 had several important qualitative features, echoes of which can still be found today. The first of these features was the very limited number of countries of origin, with a clear dominance of the former USSR area, including above all Ukraine. The second was a clear concentration of arrivals in only a few large agglomerations, with the largest group of immigrants residing in the Masovian Voivodeship, especially in Warsaw (up to 30-40% of all immigrants). Thirdly, in the case of Poland, specific – by European standards – forms of immigration dominated, i.e. temporary and even circular mobility. Fourth, and finally, those arriving in Poland were mostly typical economic migrants (Górny, Kaczmarczyk 2019; Górny et al. 2010).

This picture changed significantly after 2014, the first stage of the war in the eastern part of Ukraine. In a very short period of time, Poland became the European leader in terms of newly issued residence permits and even the world leader in terms of receiving seasonal labour from abroad. According to available estimates, the stock of immigrants at that time went from around 100 000 (2011) to over 2 million (2019) (CSO 2020). The majority of the immigrant population were Ukrainian nationals.

The growing massive scale of immigration from Ukraine was derived from the simultaneous interaction of factors related to the demand and supply side of the migration process (Górny, Kaczmarczyk 2018, 2019; Górny 2017): (1) on the one hand, the war (2014) and the related socio-economic problems in Ukraine created a large migration potential, which was primarily directed to the neighbouring country; (2) on the other hand, the "transformation" of Poland into an immigration country was possible thanks to the rapid economic growth and the growing demand for labour generated by it; (3) the fact that, contrary to the expectations of some observers, the aforementioned potential was not transformed into migration of a humanitarian nature, i.e. (3) the fact that, contrary to the expectations of some observers, the aforementioned potential was not transformed into migration of humanitarian character, i.e. related to the procedure of obtaining the refugee status or international protection, was a consequence of the fact that since 2006, the so-called simplified procedure has been in force in Poland, which enables fast, cheap and easy (i.e. without work permits) access to the Polish labour market for citizens of selected third countries. In practice, this system made Poland a country with one of the most liberal regimes in the EU regarding the employment of foreigners. On the basis of the above three factors, a sector for recruiting foreign workers has emerged in Poland – agency and temporary work agencies – which has further helped the development of immigration from Ukraine by efficiently matching employers with jobseekers.

At least several structural features of the migration from Ukraine to Poland from 2014-2021 are of great importance in the context of the latest influx of war refugees. First and foremost, due to the massive influx taking place in recent years, there was already a large group of Ukrainians in Poland prior to 24 February this year, which can be estimated at around 1.35 million people based on CSO data. This group was highly masculinised and comprised mainly economically active persons (according to estimates, persons of this category accounted for more than 95% of the total). Importantly, there was a peculiar Ukrainianisation of the sphere of immigration to Poland: immigrants from this country clearly dominated in all possible channels of inflow. Data from the Ministry of Labour for 2018-2021 indicate that Ukrainian citizens were the recipients of 71% of work permits, 88% of employers' statements and as many as 98% of seasonal work permits. At the same time, immigration was more evenly distributed across the country than in the period before 2014, with immigrants present in almost all regions of Poland with several important concentration centres around the largest agglomerations. Due to specific forms of migration, i.e. temporary or even circular mobility between Ukraine and Poland, the two countries were connected by well-developed transport routes. Additionally, as in many similar cases, such mass migration was possible not only because of the active involvement of formal and informal labour recruiters, but also because it was strongly driven by well-developed migration networks (Kindler, Wójcikowska-Baniak 2019).

Let us emphasise that such a massive influx of immigrants to Poland took place basically without a coherent and clearly articulated, in the form of a strategic or doctrinal document, migration policy. To some extent, the study entitled. "Migration policy of Poland – current state and postulated actions", which was accepted by the Polish Government in 2012. However, only three years later, this document was cancelled after the change of the ruling coalition, while it has not been replaced by a new one until today. Since then, the migration policy pursued in Poland has been highly fragmented, invariably focusing on liberalising access to the labour market to the exclusion of other issues. Its external expression has become the – often discretionary – decisions of selected institutions (Border Guard, individual ministries), which can hardly be considered coordinated or subordinated to a long-term vision. In addition, Poland did not, in practice, pursue any significant, far-reaching integration policy. Selected aspects of this policy concerned only migrants arriving in Poland for humanitarian reasons and receiving various forms of care, whose role in the overall picture of immigration processes is marginal. What this means in practice is that in Poland no mechanisms to support the process of integrating immigrants into the institutions of the host country have been created, or these mechanisms have had to be created bottom-up, either by selected local governments or NGOs.

2. Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine and the influx into Poland

The war caused by Russia in February 2022 resulted in the largest post-World War II migration of war refugees in Europe, estimated by the UNHCR at 6.8 million people[1]. According to the Polish Border Guard, from 24 February to mid-May 2022, 3.5 million border crossings to Poland and 1.5 million to Ukraine were registered (in both cases, the figures include all border crossings without distinction by nationality and multiple border crossings by the same persons). Figure 1 shows the scale of border traffic between Ukraine and Poland and indicates a spectacular increase in the scale of mobility in the first 2-3 weeks after the outbreak of the war, followed by a stabilisation of the inflow and, since the beginning of May, a positive balance of border crossings towards Ukraine.

1 UNHCR cautions that the figures it provides are estimates rather than accurate data.

Chart 1. Border traffic between Ukraine and Poland, 24 February – 18 May 2022



Source: Own elaboration Duszczyk, Kaczmarczyk on the basis of the Border Guard data

Chart 2. Dynamics of border traffic between Ukraine and Poland, 24 February – 18 May 2022, percentage change compared to previous day 80.0%



Source: Own elaboration Duszczyk, Kaczmarczyk on the basis of the Border Guard data

In addition, the variability of both inflows and outflows is very high, which may reflect the reality of the war, but also indicates that we are dealing with a highly mobile population that is interested in returning home if possible. In addition, there is a positive – albeit weak – correlation between the dynamics of entering and leaving our country (Chart 2). This mobility pattern is somewhat reminiscent of the reality of migration between Ukraine and Poland before the war, which included large numbers of temporary migrants and people moving regularly between the two countries. We still lack data to estimate the scale of this phenomenon, but many indications suggest that some labour migrants continue their journeys despite the war. At the same time, after a period of very high inflow dynamics (the first 3-4 weeks), departures from Poland to Ukraine have been increasing since May 2022. At the same time, due to the uncertainty of the developments in Ukraine, both in terms of the war and economic development, it is extremely difficult to predict whether the short-term migration thus far will not turn into settlement migration.

The above data provided the basis for estimating the population, which was the starting point for the scenarios presented later in this text[2]. A simple comparison of the scale of border crossings indicates a net balance of around 2.2 million people (including in these calculations also a group of people – estimated by us on the basis of expert assessments at around 60-80,000 – who lived in Poland before the outbreak of war and returned to Ukraine to join the army or territorial defence). However, this does not mean that at the end of April 2022 – for this was the date we treated as the baseline – that many of those arriving in Poland were still there. A significant proportion of war refugees treated Poland as a transit country, moving on to other EU countries and – to a much lesser extent – also to Canada, the USA or Israel. On the basis of available registration data from the receiving countries, this number can be estimated at around 800 000 people. At the same time, there were also arrivals in Poland of war refugees from Ukraine who, after a short stay in other countries (mainly the EU), decided to move to a country relatively close culturally and linguistically, or who tried to stay as close as possible to the Ukrainian border[3]. Their number can be estimated at around 70-80,000. In summary, we estimate the number of war refugees residing in Poland at the end of April 2022 at 1.4-1.55 million people, the latter estimate being used to construct the scenarios. This estimate was confirmed by the Secretary of State at the Ministry of Interior, Paweł Szefernaker, in a statement on 31 May 2022.

This influx has one very important feature. Those crossing the Ukrainian border with EU Member States and Moldova are covered by the provisions of the Temporary Protection Directive[4], which grants them numerous rights, making the status of war refugees from Ukraine similar to that of EU citizens in terms of the right to free movement of persons. This is the first time in the history of the EU that the provisions of the Directive have been applied in practice. Thus, voluntary and spontaneous relocation between EU and EEA member states is possible. However, it is important to be aware of the risks involved, especially human trafficking or the use of war refugees in slave-like work. It is therefore important that relocation taking place in this way is monitored and coordinated through intergovernmental cooperation.

2 The calculations presented below refer to the situation in April 2022, while Figures 1-2 describe the situation up to the second half of May 2022. However, our analysis shows that this additional month did not significantly affect the results presented (and we have therefore decided to leave the graphic illustrations as up-to-date as possible).

3 Unfortunately, the estimate presented is subject to a large degree of uncertainty due to the quality of the available data. In the case of Poland, the process of collecting data for the PESEL register was initiated only after some time, in other countries the data is even more rudimentary. In practice, therefore, the data presented are derived from signatory information presented by the governments and institutions of the countries reached by war refugees from Ukraine (websites, social media, press conferences).

4 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof.

Estimates based on data from border crossings can be supplemented by information from the registration process. According to the Law on Assistance to Ukrainian Citizens in Connection with the Armed Conflict on the Territory of Ukraine, Ukrainians register to obtain a Polish PESEL number, which is necessary to gain access to certain public goods and services. As of 31 May, the number of registered war refugees was approximately 1.15 million people, with a demographic structure that was radically different from before the war. More than 47% of those registered were children and adolescents under the age of 18, the majority of whom (around 34% of the total) were aged 3-14. Women of working age were the next largest group, accounting for 42% of those registered. The remainder were mainly older people (aged 60/65+) accounting for around 7% of registrants. Men of working age represented just under 4% of the refugee population. As a result, the population of children and adolescents in Poland increased (in part temporarily) by about 7%, the working-age population by about 2%, and the elderly population by less than 1% (relative values refer to the population of Poland as of 31.12.2021).

Table 1. Age breakdown of war refugees from Ukraine registered to obtain a PESEL number

Category	Number of war refugees	Percentage (of total)
Pre-working age	519 567	47,35%
Children	519 567	47,35%
Working age	503 071	45,85%
Women	460 361	41,96%
Men	42 710	3,89%
Post-working age	74 579	6,80%
Women	63 878	5,82%
Men	10 701	0,98%
Total	1 097 217	100,00%

Source: PESEL

Table 2. War refugees registered in the PESEL database and population of Poland by age (as of 31.12.2021)

		War refugees from Ukraine	Inhabitants of Poland	Percentage share of refugees in a given age category
Pre-working age		519 567	7 298 972	7,12%
	0-2	48 616	1 083 561	4,49%
	3-6	109 017	1 549 831	7,03%
	7-14	255 265	3 222 365	7,92%
	15-18	106 669	1 443 215	7,39%
Working age		503 071	22 295 557	2,26%
	19-24	59 279	2 300 300	2,58%
	25-29	62 123	2 348 271	2,65%
	30-34	90 332	2 784 304	3,24%
	35-39	102 647	3 211 368	3,20%
	40-44	72 886	3 079 795	2,37%
	45-49	47 466	2 742 437	1,73%
	50-54	33 365	2 299 098	1,45%
	55-59	27 493	2 294 188	1,20%
	60-64	7 480	1 235 796	0,61%
Post-working age		74 579	8 567 695	0,87%
	60-64	25 858	1 392 458	1,86%
	65+	48 721	7 175 237	0,68%
Total		**1 097 217**	**38 162 224**	**2,88%**

Source: PESEL

The places of registration clearly coincide with the largest Polish agglomerations, with three voivodeships: Masovian (20% of the total), Silesian (10%) and Lower Silesian (10%) playing the most important role. Consequently, it is these voivodeships that have experienced the greatest increase in population. It is likely to be even greater than that, as shown by the PESEL data. Due to the large queues at the offices registering war refugees, many people chose to register in smaller towns where there were no such queues. War refugees from Ukraine have the highest relative importance in the case of the Masovian Voivodeship (over 4% of the population) and the Opole Voivodeship (close to 4% of the population), but a very similar situation applied to other regions with large agglomerations. This is confirmed by data with a greater level of detail relating to applications at the county level, which clearly identify large urban centres as areas where war refugees have reached (although, it must be emphasised, these are not necessarily the places where they still reside).

Figure 1. Percentage share of war refugees registered in the PESEL database in the total population of a province



Source: PESEL

Figure 2. Percentage of Ukrainian war refugees registered in the PESEL database in the population of a given district



Source: PESEL

Other data are so far quite scarce and very incomplete. For this reason, we will only refer to the data provided by the Warsaw City Hall as the most important place of residence for newly arrived war refugees. According to this data, the number of people who arrived in Warsaw was as high as 700,000 (as of 15 May 2022). Of these, approx. 300,000, with the Warsaw authorities estimating that in the medium term this number could decrease to around 160,000, which would account for 9% of the city's population. Some 110,000 war refugees registered for an identification number. The majority found shelter in private apartments/homes, although the number of people staying in mass accommodation centres was close to 100,000 (cumulative number). The municipal authorities estimated that around 330,000 people had been assisted through the institutionalised support system. The scale of the challenge facing the local authority in the medium term can also be seen from the number of children and young people staying in Warsaw, estimated at 50,000-70,000. The scale of the education challenge will be better known in late July/early August, when parents' declarations as to where they will start or continue their education from 1 September should be better known. At the end of the 2021/2022 school year, as many as 18,000 students, war refugees from Ukraine, were registered in the capital's schools.

1. Future prospects and forecasts

At the moment, it is very difficult to predict what the future of war refugees from Ukraine in Poland (and other EU countries) will be. Their number – like the number of returnees to Ukraine – depends mainly on the events of the war and the future reconstruction of the country. In addition, the EU's policy on enlargement to Ukraine, for example, may change differently, which may also affect the migration behaviour of refugees. The main objective of the forecasting approach based on several variants of developments presented in this section is to estimate the scale of possible challenges that we will have to face as Poland in different variants of developments. However, it should be assumed that in each scenario we will face a higher stock of migrants from Ukraine than before the war.

We estimate the scale of the Ukrainian presence in Poland at the time of developing the scenarios (April 2022) to be approximately 2.9 million. Importantly, this number is the sum of two subpopulations: those who were in Poland before the war (approximately 1.35 million) and those who have arrived since (approximately 1.55 million – as discussed above). This is a key point, as our further estimates refer not only to recent inflows, but also to those people who, due to the war, could not/cannot/will not return to Ukraine and are consequently also affected by the change of situation in their country of origin. Due to the very special demographic structure of the newly arrived war refugees, we estimate that the total migrant population is drastically different from the previously observed, typical labour migration. The baseline situation thus includes a high proportion of women (18-65 years): 40%, children 26% and elderly 2% in the total population of Ukrainians in Poland.

In the next step, we consider three main hypothetical scenarios with approximate scenarios based on general assumptions about the underlying age groups. In all cases, we consider the short/medium term – we estimate the size of the migrant population from Ukraine over the next 12-20 months, i.e. until the end of 2023.

Table 3. War refugees and Ukrainian immigrants in Poland – scenarios of developments

	Starting point (April 2022)		Scenario I		Scenario II		Scenario III	
	Estimated numbers	%	Estimated numbers	%	Estimated numbers	%	Estimated numbers	%
M (18-65)	950 000	33%	1 150 000	37%	850 000	49%	850 000	25%
F (18-65)	1 150 000	39%	1 150 000	37%	650 000	37%	1 350 000	40%
<18	750 000	26%	750 000	24%	200 000	11%	1 100 000	32%
18-65	2 100 000	72%	2 300 000	74%	1 500 000	86%	2 200 000	65%
>65	50 000	2%	70 000	2%	50 000	3%	100 000	3%
Total	**2900000**	-	**3 120 000**	-	**1 750 000**	-	**3 400 000**	-

Source: own elaboration Duszczyk, Kaczmarczyk

In the first scenario (a long exhaustive war), we assume a continuation of the conflict (of varying intensity, scope and scale of operations) for the next few years – e.g. similar to the war over the Donbas after the Russian aggression in 2014, albeit with greater intensity and brutality by Russian troops. This would mean that peace will not be signed in the next 18 months and (large) areas of Ukraine will continue to be under threat. This will mean a -continuous influx of refugees, but also economic migrants to Poland. There will certainly also be numerous temporary and permanent returns to non-war regions, mainly western Ukraine. It should be assumed that as a result of the continuation of the conflict, which will have different phases of quieting and intensification of fighting, the economic situation in Ukraine will be bad, which should stimulate more intensive labour migration than in the past. This means that the structure of the currently observed inflow may change, with an increasing share of men and older people. In this scenario, we assume that the ban on men aged 18-60 leaving Ukraine will be significantly liberalised or even lifted over time. Assuming the above-described factors influencing the -flows and residence patterns of the different demographic groups, this scenario assumes that in the medium term there will be approximately 3.1 million Ukrainians in Poland (economic migrants who arrived in Poland before the outbreak of war and war refugees). The demographic structure will be as follows: 24% children, about 37% women and 37% men (of working age). Approximately 74% of people will be of working age, which means it would be similar to what we have today.

The second scenario (rapid and lasting peace) assumes a peace deal by autumn 2022, which would stabilise the situation in the short term while bringing relatively favourable conditions for Ukraine (territorial, reparations, possibility to join the EU, etc.) in the long term. This would imply a relatively large reduction (within 12 months after signing the peace agreement) in the resident population of women and children, some outflow of men and stabilisation of the elderly population. In this scenario, we assume that the number of Ukrainian citizens on the territory of Poland would stabilise at around 1.75 million, of which 1-1.25 million would be "pre-war" immigrants (mainly men) and 0.5-0.75 million would be war refugees transforming into "post-war" immigrants (mainly women, children and the elderly, to a large extent family members of persons residing in Poland before the war). It is reasonable to assume that mainly people from the east of Ukraine will remain in Poland, as the damage to infrastructure is greatest there and reconstruction will take the longest. The demographic structure would be as follows: 11% children, about 37% women and about 49% men. The adult population of working age would

represent about 86%, which would mean a gradual but rather slow return to the structure of the population living in Poland before the outbreak of war (share of economically active people: over 95%).

Scenario three (devastating war, but with the prospect of peace) is – at the level of assumptions – similar to the previous one, but we assume that the war will also lead to much more destruction in the west of Ukraine, but that a peace agreement will be signed earlier than assumed in scenario one (e.g. in 2023). In this scenario, regardless of the conditions of the assumed peace, an additional influx of children, elderly and women is to be expected, as well as a possible outflow of men (ongoing fighting, reconstruction of the country after the signing of the peace agreement). The scenario predicts an increase in the number of Ukrainians in Poland to approximately 3.4 million (end of 2023). This is due to the potential destruction caused by the war and the partial integration of war refugees in their place of residence, many of whom choose to stay in Poland for the long term. The demographic structure would be as follows: 32% children, 40% women and about 25% men. The working-age adult population would account for about 65%, due to the increased proportion of minors compared to the pre-war (and even baseline) period.

Scenarios two and three assume significant investment in the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure in Ukraine, financed by international aid or reparations. If the funds for this are substantial, this could result in the departure of workers currently employed in the construction industry in Poland. However, Ukraine's GDP will not quickly return to pre-war values. Consequently, labour immigration to Poland and other EU countries will be higher than before the war (with a higher proportion of women). There will also be a reunification of families that are now separated, especially from areas where Ukrainian control will not be restored or bordering them, and those most damaged by the war. In this scenario, the end of refugee-humanitarian migration should be assumed. The period of temporary protection in the EU, granted on the basis of the 2001 Directive, is likely to come to an end. A decision of the EU Council will be required for its extension. Numerous actions by the Ukrainian authorities to induce migrants to return can also be expected.

In the fourth (hypothetical and highly unfavourable) scenario, which is currently unlikely and therefore not used for analysis elsewhere in the study, Russia gains military superiority and eventually occupies a large part of Ukrainian territory. Its citizens, fearing the crimes known from the territories already occupied by Russia, flee en masse to Poland and other European countries. In such a scenario, the number of refugees in Poland could even exceed 10 million, of which around 60% would remain in Poland for the long term. In this scenario, all existing assumptions would have to be changed. Poland and the European Union would be affected by a humanitarian crisis that would require massive administrative relocations within and outside the EU (e.g. to the USA). Basic needs in the form of housing, food, medical care, etc. would have to be met. This scenario, as unlikely in the current phase of the war, has not been analysed and discussed by us in this text, but should be considered as a contingency scenario by European governments, including the Polish government, and international humanitarian organisations.

Chart 3. Scenarios for the development of the migration situation of Poland, number of Ukrainian citizens by age group



Source: own elaboration Duszczyk, Kaczmarczyk

2. Completion

The influx of war refugees from Ukraine is contributing to a change in Poland's status from a country transforming from an emigration state to an immigration state. This transformation is taking place at the fastest pace in modern European history. It must be assumed that, regardless of the outcome of the war and its consequences for the economic development of Ukraine, Poland will become a bi-national country, with an obvious predominance of the Polish nation, but with a growing participation of the Ukrainian nation. This presents opportunities, but also challenges. With the adoption of systemic solutions in the areas of housing, education, labour market, health care and culture in particular, a greater presence of Ukrainians in Poland than hitherto will be beneficial. However, this requires a different perspective on the presence of foreigners in Poland than hitherto.¬ The perception of foreigners residing in Poland as temporary immigrants should give way to the belief that Poland is transforming into a country where the presence of foreigners, especially from Ukraine, is a permanent part of the functioning of the state and society is becoming more diverse than before.

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2.

LABOUR MARKET AND THE ECONOMY

Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak

Robert Pater

Adequately utilising the potential of immigrants, including those fleeing the war in Ukraine, in the labour market will require the reduction of a number of barriers, in particular regarding knowledge of the Polish language and the recognition of professional qualifications.

1. Poland's labour market, demographic and economic situation on the brink of war

For several years now, the Polish labour market has started to experience labour shortages as a result of demographic changes. After 2010, as a result of the low fertility rate observed since the 1990s, the number of people of working age began to decline, while the rapidly growing economy started to create many new jobs. This enabled a significant drop in unemployment (from 9.5% in 2010 to 3.4% in 2021 among people aged 20-64). At the same time, limited access to early retirement and the extension of the retirement age (to its reduction in 2017) has caused many people to extend their working lives (the employment rate among those aged 55-64 increased from 34.1% in 2010 to 54.7% in 2021). Over the same period, the proportion of the population aged 20-64 in employment increased by more than 10 percentage points (from 64.3% to 75.4%), approaching the levels recorded in northern European countries. At the same time, for the first time in thirty years, the demand for labour started to outweigh its supply, translating, inter alia, into a large number of unfilled vacancies (according to CSO estimates, at the end of 2021, it reached almost 140,000) and high wage dynamics (in 2021, wages rose by 8.4%, compared to 6.2% in the previous year). Rapidly rising productivity and ever-improving employment and labour force participation rates indicate that shrinking labour resources are being accompanied by much better utilisation, but the force of demographic change is such that this may not be enough to protect the labour market from labour shortages. Projections indicate that the number of people of working age will decrease by 1.2 million by 2030 and by as many as 5.5 million by 2050, translating into a slightly smaller decrease in the number of people working, unless these deficits are filled by immigration.

Figure 1: The number of people of working age in Poland



Source: CSO, Local Data Bank

Chart 2: Employment rates in Poland



Source: EUROSTAT

The rapidly growing demand for labour, not finding enough workers in the domestic market, has for several years been increasingly directed towards immigrants. A major institutional convenience for employers in this respect is the flexible regulation of temporary work permits allowing the employment of a foreigner based on a very simplified procedure requiring only a declaration of intent by the employer. This system was designed for seasonal work in agriculture, but after 2014 it started to be applied ***en masse*** also in other sectors: construction, processing industry, trade, transport and other services.

The increase in interest in workers in Poland coincided with the outbreak of the first Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014, as a result of which, in a short period of time, Ukrainian citizens became the dominant group of immigrants seeking employment in Poland (we write more on this topic in Chapter 1). According to statistics from the Social Insurance Institution, in December 2021, insured foreigners accounted for approximately 5.4% of the total number of insured persons in Poland, which translated into almost 900,000 employed persons, including almost 630,000 Ukrainian citizens. Together with those working in the shadow economy, the number of foreigners working in Poland at the beginning of 2022 can be estimated at 1.5 million people, or 8.5% of the total working population.

It can therefore be said that the gap resulting from the shrinking working-age population is already being filled to a large extent by immigration.

Chart 3. Number of foreigners, including from Ukraine, insured in Poland



Source: ZUS

2. What changes have been brought by the Russian aggression and the influx of people fleeing the war in Ukraine?

The rapid influx of war refugees from Ukraine following the outbreak of war in February 2022 began to rapidly affect the Polish labour market as well. According to data as of 8 May this year 1.075 million people have obtained a PESEL number, out of a total – estimated – 1.4-1.55 million war refugees, meaning that the majority have already registered. Of those registered, almost half (49.4% or approx. 500,000-750,000) are of working age, 90% of whom are women (see Chapter 1 for details). Making it possible to obtain a PESEL number and the opening of labour offices to refugees seeking work in just a few weeks have translated into a significant increase in the percentage of people who have taken up employment.

Special legislation implemented under the 'Law of 12 March 2022 on Assistance to Ukrainian Citizens in Connection with the Armed Conflict on the Territory of Ukraine' was important for employment opportunities. Data from the Ministry of Family and Social Policy show that, following the introduction of this legislation, the labour market responded quickly to the wave of people fleeing the war, enabling 160,000 Ukrainian citizens to find legal employment by 23 May, i.e. around 29% of the total working-age refugee population. Such a quick response indicates the great importance of the flexibility of the instruments used (platform work) for quick entry into gainful employment – low entry threshold, no need for good language skills, support from partners, etc.

Chart 4. The number of employed Ukrainian nationals and the employment rate in this group is increasing



Source: calculations by Kubisiak A. on the basis of MRiPS data and data.gov.pl

The vast majority of war refugees who took up employment were women, with their percentage among the employed (75%) slightly lower than in the total adult refugee population (90%). As many as half found employment in simple jobs, about 15% as industrial workers and craftsmen, about 10% as service and sales workers, and as machine operators and assemblers. Several thousand people each found employment as office workers, specialists, technicians and other middle staff. In spatial terms, the employment structure of war refugees was dominated by the voivodeships with the broadest labour market: Masovian, Lower Silesian, Greater Poland, and Silesian, which also reflects to a large extent the structure of the cities in which the immigrants ended up and the geographical employment of the native population.

The number of Ukrainian citizens insured with ZUS is also increasing. In March 2022, the number of insured Ukrainian citizens was 667,00 – it was 26,000 more than in February. In April 2022, there was a further increase of 32,000 to 69,000, and the total number of insured foreigners was already 970,000. Ukrainians account for 72% of all foreigners registered with ZUS.

The specific demography of war refugees is worth noting. According to the results presented in the special report of the sociological study "Refugees from Ukraine in Poland", conducted by the EWL Migration Platform, the Foundation for Supporting Migrants on the Labour Market "EWL" and the Study of Eastern Europe at the University of Warsaw, they are mainly relatively young (average age 38) women (93% of refugees) with children. A significant part of them arrived without previous work experience in Poland. At the same time, more than half of them have higher education and were employed in Ukraine as specialists, teachers and workers in the education sector, workers in the service sector and in trade. Thus, the employment structure of those fleeing the war in their first month in Poland reflects their qualifications to a limited extent. The language barrier is a problem; most of them do not speak Polish or speak it poorly or very poorly.

Figure 1. Number of Ukrainian nationals who have taken up employment in Poland under a special law



Close to
160,000
Ukrainian nationals have taken up employment in Poland under a special law

Source: MRiPS, as at 22.05.2022.

Taking up jobs below their qualifications is also explained by the fact that, in the short term, migrant women – who have not yet decided to permanently anchor themselves in the Polish labour market – seek employment in those sectors where it can be taken up – but also abandoned – most easily. This is mainly the case for jobs such as care services or cleaning, which, combined with the large supply of additional labour hands, results in lower wage rates especially in the informal labour market. On the other hand, as a result of the war, a shortage of workers has emerged in some sectors (e.g. logistics, transport, construction) due to the return of some Ukrainian men who were gainfully employed in Poland before the war to Ukraine and their involvement in the defence of the country.

At the same time, two phenomena concerning the employment of war refugees should be noted, as indicated by information gleaned from the labour market. The first is employment by employers offering a kind of 'social employment', as part of a sense of social responsibility, especially at the beginning of the war. People employed in this way often perform low-efficiency jobs that are not essential to the functioning of the enterprise. In the long term, this is impossible to maintain, so it will be necessary to take measures to allow the widest possible group of migrants to find work that not only matches their qualifications, but also one whose productivity is equal to or higher than the costs associated with employment. The second phenomenon is the employment of migrants at sub-minimum wages that do not reflect their real productivity. This is because some employers may exploit the asymmetry of information between them and war refugees as to the employment standards in force in Poland, market rates for a given position or fears about the possibility of losing their jobs.

Despite the continued increase in the employment rate of those fleeing the war in Ukraine, there are concerns about the inevitable saturation of the labour market as the 'easiest' niches fill up and the economic downturn following high inflation and interest rates and energy prices. It is difficult at this point to determine the ceiling at which the capacity for 'easy' absorption of migrants from Ukraine will be exhausted, but it can be assumed that the key test will come in the autumn with the end of the summer season and a possible deterioration in the overall economic situation.

3. Job opportunities for Ukrainian citizens[1]

As the supply of labour increases, so does the offer of jobs, with an indication of the possibility of employing Ukrainian citizens. On the portal pracuj.pl, where the job marking for Ukrainians has been introduced, one can see the interest of employers in the offer for this group. In February 2022, out of 95,893 job offers, 1,332 (1.3%) were labelled for Ukrainians. In March 2022, a total of 107,725 job offers of which 16,847 (15.6%) were labelled, and in April 2022, out of 70,724 total offers labelled for Ukrainians, 13,657 (19.3%) were labelled. The number of offers with Cyrillic in the title was 925 of which 862 (93.1%) were labelled.

Job offers indicating Ukrainian citizens also appeared on other commercial websites. Among fourteen websites: praca.dlastudenta.pl, www.nuzle.pl, www.praca.pl, www.praca.egospo-darka.pl, www.aplikuj.pl, jobdesk.pl, www.gowork.pl, www.jobs.pl, www.goldenline.pl, gratka.pl, www.jober.pl, www.infopraca.pl, www.absolvent.pl, www.karierawfinansach.pl. From June 2021 to April 2022, the number of unavoidable (without deduplication of offers between the above-mentioned portals) offers amounted to almost 2.9 million, including the number of offers for Ukrainians: 15,578[2].

In the Central Job Offer Database maintained by the public employment services, offers for the months of March, April and May (up to 7 May) totalled 95,226, of which the number of offers for which Ukrainian, Russian or Belarusian was indicated in the title or requirements was 2008 (2.1% of the total).

The data, particularly from the pracuj.pl portal, indicate a growing interest among employers in recruiting Ukrainian nationals.

Scenarios for labour market developments

Depending on the scenario of further development of the conflict, the number of people of working age who could potentially seek work in Poland changes. According to estimates, around 1.5 million war refugees arrived in Poland after the outbreak of the war, of which around 750 000 are of working age. In the case of scenario one (smouldering conflict), this number could rise to around 825,000 people. In scenario two (a quick and sustained peace), this number could decrease to 325,000 people, while in scenario three (a longer war and more destruction), the number of working-age migrants could reach 935,000 people. With the recently observed decrease in the number of people of working age, this inflow compensates (depending on the scenario) from 1.5 to 4 years of the decrease in the number of people of working age observed before 2020, so in the longer term there should be no problems with the absorption of refugees in the Polish labour market.

As a result of the labour market policy measures taken (including the recommendations set out above), the following labour market scenarios can be assumed:

- **Non-utilisation of additional resources in the labour market** scenario – an initial increase in migrant employment will be followed by a stagnation or decline in employment, e.g. due to a recession triggered by restrictive monetary policy and high energy and material prices. Some people will find employment in the informal economy (especially in the area of domestic services), earning relatively low incomes, in effect struggling to make ends meet;

1 The authors would like to thank Dr Robert Pater, Professor of UITP and Herman Cherniaiev for preparing the information on job vacancies.

2 We considered an offer to be addressed to foreigners if the offer title or description contained Cyrillic characters or the following slogans: for Ukrainians, for foreigners, Ukrainian, from Ukraine, Ukraine.

- **Persistent labour market segmentation** scenario – migrants will look for work, but mainly in their own occupations – as a result, they will face a higher risk of unemployment, while vacancies will persist in particularly "masculinised" sectors – transport, logistics, construction, employers will nevertheless be looking for workers and in the longer term (especially in persistent conflict scenarios), there will be a partial adjustment and increase in employment;
- **Labour market adjustment** scenario – migrants will seek work and retrain, resulting in a relatively rapid increase in employment, compensating for the observed population losses. In this scenario, the employment structure and the working and wage conditions of migrants will not differ significantly from the native population in a few years' perspective.

Regardless of the emerging scenario, the Polish labour market will need an increasing number of migrants to support filling the growing demographic gap. Therefore, it is important to use the competences of migrants from Ukraine appropriately, through appropriately shaped labour market policies. At the same time, it should be emphasised that the labour market policies pursued should limit the risk of a brain drain from Ukraine, where people and their competences will be needed to rebuild the country after the war.

4. What's next?

In the longer term, it will be crucial for the material situation of war refugees to increase their chances of doing work that is compatible with their competences and that provides adequate access to social security and labour protection in line with current standards. Self-adjustments in the labour market may include, inter alia, the feminisation of certain 'male' occupations, e.g. in the logistics and transport sectors, through the adaptation of immigrant women to work in sectors where there is a deficit. Adequately exploiting their potential, however, will require the reduction of a number of barriers, which include:

- **Language barrier** – most migrants do not speak Polish and getting a job in many professions requires the ability to communicate in Polish;
- **Information barrier** – information on available jobs and vacancies is currently scattered. Some of the information is available in the Central Job Vacancy Database, some is available on various job portals, some offers are additionally collected through various grassroots initiatives to collect information on available jobs;
- **Barrier related to caring responsibilities** – the majority of migrants who came to Poland after the outbreak of war are mothers with children. Their opportunities for labour activation are limited by the need to provide childcare;
- **Competence/qualification barrier** – available job offers often diverge in competence and qualification needs from what competences and qualifications migrants have, making it difficult to match labour demand and supply;
- **Barrier of information asymmetry** – migrants often do not know the realities of the labour market in Poland, as a result they agree to working conditions and wages below the level that is adequate to the position and competences;
- **Barrier to recognition of diplomas** – in the case of regulated professions, the barrier is the recognition of diplomas (medical professions, teachers), as well as the acquisition of skills and knowledge to practice the profession in Poland (e.g. teachers have to learn the core curriculum);

- **Multicultural barrier** – due to the current wave of refugees, but also to the immigration of previous years, a new challenge for many Polish companies will be the increasing multiculturalism of employee teams. This may give rise to conflict situations conducive to stereotyping and affect company performance.

Recommendations

Taking into account the above-mentioned barriers regarding the inclusion of migrants in the labour market, we recommend the following actions:

1. **Implement a skills demand information system** with a particular focus on offers for Ukrainian workers, based on monitoring of job offers available in private (web portals) and the Central Job Offer Database of the PUP.

2. **Implement an information system on the skills supply** of migrant jobseekers, mainly using information collected from district labour offices.

3. **Implement solutions to support the integration of migrants in the labour market**, including language training and acquisition of marketable competences (taking into account the diagnosis of the demand for competences, as well as the skills of migrants), by public and non-public employment services (financed by the Labour Fund, as well as by funds from the European Commission). For more on this topic, see Chapter 8.

4. **Launch and develop instruments to support the financing of training for employed migrants**, targeted at their employers (based on the solutions of the Training Fund and the Development Services Base).

5. **Ensure access to childcare for children aged 0-3** (increase in the scale of the Maluch+ programme, inclusion of migrant children as a priority group), support for recruitment to kindergartens, support for the creation of care places with home-based caregivers from Ukraine, as well as kindergartens using the potential of migrant women from Ukraine (Ministry of Family and Social Policy, local governments). More on this topic in chapter 4.

6. **Implement training in companies on working in multicultural teams** to support the management of diversity, especially national diversity (employers and employer organisations). See Chapter 8 for more on this topic.

7. **Monitoring the risk of "junk" work** by comparing the salaries of employees from Poland and foreigners (National Labour Inspectorate).

8. **Promoting legal employment and counteracting employment in the shadow economy**, resulting in limited access to key areas of social security (Ministry of Family and Social Policy, employment services, ZUS, National Labour Inspectorate).

3.

HOUSING AND ACCOMMODATION

Olgierd Dziekoński

Radomir Matczak

Rafał Trzeciakowski

The challenge of the influx of war refugees will help decisions to improve the housing situation in Poland in the medium term. A comprehensive review and more flexible building law and spatial regulations would allow more housing to be built at a lower cost.

1. Starting point – Poland before the influx of refugees

Over the past 30 years, the number of dwellings per 1,000 people has increased in Poland as per capita income has risen. Against the background of Western Europe, the stock of dwellings is still small, but this is due to a very low starting point. At the end of socialism, Poland had the lowest number of dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants in the region – not only less than the Czech Republic or Hungary, but even than Bulgaria and Lithuania. At the same time, **the rate of housing construction in Poland is among the fastest among OECD countries**. In 2020 and 2021, 221,000 and 235,000 dwellings were built in Poland, i.e. around 1.5% of their total stock. This is more than the OECD (1.1%) and EU (0.8%) averages and almost as much as in Japan, known for its liberal urban planning rules that allow the housing stock to increase so quickly that Tokyo is renowned among global metropolises for its moderate property price dynamics.[1] **Thanks to the high rate of housing construction, their prices in relation to income are growing more slowly in Poland than on average in OECD countries.** Property price dynamics in Poland are similar to the OECD average, but are accompanied by much faster wage growth, which moderates the price to disposable income per capita ratio. Since 2013, when housing prices stopped falling in Poland after the 2007 bubble, the housing price-to-income ratio has improved by 4%, one of the best results in the OECD.

Figure 1. Number of dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants in OECD countries around 1990 and 2020 (or latest available)



Selected OECD countries due to lack of space - considering all of them does not significantly change the conclusions.
Source: Own study based on OECD (housing) and TED (GDP) data

1 Financial Times, Why Tokyo is the land of rising home construction but not prices, Robin Harding, 3.08.2016, https://www.ft.com/content/023562e2-54a6-11e6-befd-2fc0c26b3c60

Figure 2: Housing under construction as a percentage of the total stock in OECD countries in 2020 (or latest available)



Selected OECD countries due to lack of space – including all does not substantially change the conclusions.
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD data

At the same time, **Poland, like other post-socialist countries, is characterised by a shallow housing rental market**. Buying or changing a flat involves significant transaction costs, which may restrict labour mobility (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2013) or delay young people moving out of the family home. Public stock tenancies have similar effects when tenants' rents are heavily subsidised and they cannot easily switch to equally preferential accommodation (Battu, Ma and Phimister, 2008). **Poor regulation of tenancy may contribute to its shallowness in Poland**. This is because standard leases do not provide certainty for landlords to evict a non-paying or destructive tenant, and for tenants to have stability and no hidden costs. The scope of legal restrictions on eviction based on circumstances remains exceptionally wide compared to other OECD countries. The high **fragmentation of the private rental market** also contributes to poor **rental** quality. The inconveniences reported in Rubaszek and Czerniak's (2017) survey, such as the inability to furnish the property to one's own taste and frequent inspections by landlords, are due to the fragmentation of tenancy in Poland. A parent renting a flat intended for a child will rent it in a different way than a corporation with thousands of flats with standardised conditions. The institutional rental market is only just beginning to emerge in Poland. Limiting its development is the lack of a law on funds investing in rental flats, which would allow even small amounts to be invested in rent through the stock market, mobilising additional capital for this market.

Figure 3: Percentage change in the ratio of house prices to per capita disposable income in OECD countries from 2013 to 2020



Source: Own elaboration based on OECD data

Figure 4: Population living in non-owner-occupied housing in the EU in 2020



Source: Own compilation based on Eurostat data

Table 1. Legal restrictions on eviction based on special circumstances in OECD countries in 2021

	Period year	Presence children	Presence incomplete efficient	Other eviction restrictions due to special circumstances
Australia	Not	Not	Not	
Austria	Not	Not	Not	
Belgium	Not	Not	Not	
Canada	Not	Not	Not	
Chile	Not	Not	Not	
Czech Republic	Not	Not	Not	
Estonia	Not	Not	Not	The court may withhold or delay if it is unfair to the debtor, e.g. on the basis of family/economic situation.
Finland	Not	Not	Not	
France	Yes	Not	Not	
Greece	Not	Not	Not	
Netherlands	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes
Ireland	Not	No	No	
Iceland	Not	n.a.	n.a.	
Israel	Not	Yes	Yes	
Japan	Not	No	No	
Colombia	Not	Not	Not	
Costa Rica	Not	Not	Not	Yes
Luxembourg	Not	Not	Not	
Latvia	Not	Yes	Yes	Yes
Malta	Not	Not	Not	
New Zealand	Not	Not	Not	Yes
Germany	Uncertain	Uncertain	Uncertain	A tenant can apply for withholding in the event of a risk of homelessness or in another special case.
Norway	Not	Not (exceptions)	Not (exceptions)	
Poland	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes (pregnant women, bedridden, pensioners meeting social assistance criteria, registered unemployed, incapacitated, other persons defined by the municipal council)**
Portugal	Uncertain	Not	Yes	People 65+ living in the property for more than 15 years.
Slovakia	Not	Yes	Yes	
Slovenia	Uncertain	Uncertain	Uncertain	
Switzerland	Uncertain	Not	Not	The tenant may request an extension of the contract if expiry would cause hardship not justified by the interests of the landlord.
Sweden	Not	Not	Not	
Turkey	Not	Not	Not	
USA	Not	Not	Not	
United Kingdom	Not	Not	Not	
Hungary	Yes	Yes	n.a.	Chronic illness can lead to eviction being withheld.
Italy	Not	Yes	Yes	

Source: Own study based on OECD data (for Poland additionally supplemented by the author)

2. How did the war affect the housing market in Poland?

Duszczyk and Kaczmarczyk (Chapter 1 of this report) estimate that 1.4-1.5 million refugees from Ukraine remained in Poland at the end of April. As of 12 May, 1.1 million had applied for a PESEL number, which entitles them to health and education services, enables them to work and do business, and gives them the right to benefits. Given the expiring rate of successive PESEL applications, it can be assumed that the actual number of refugees remaining in Poland at the moment is closer to the lower end of the estimated range. **Most people fleeing the war in Ukraine are in large metropolitan areas.** Almost one in ten refugee applications for a PESEL number and the same proportion of children's school registrations by 12 and 9 May respectively took place in Warsaw. Counting the subsequent counties with the highest number of applications, almost 20% were submitted in Warsaw, Wrocław, Poznań, Krakow and the Tri-City. Together with the neighbouring counties, this figure rises to 30%. The challenges of accommodating people from Ukraine are thus concentrated in the five largest Polish agglomerations, although at the same time it must be remembered that the largest housing stock in the country is also concentrated there -16% within cities (of which 7% in Warsaw) and 24% in agglomerations. **There is no data on where refugees live nationwide, but locally a non-representative survey was conducted among those waiting with applications for PESEL numbers in the first week of registration.** In the survey, more than 3% of refugees said they were staying in reception centres, which, with around 9,000 beds in these centres in Warsaw, would indicate a total number of refugees in the city of around 279,000. This is close to the estimate of 267,000 refugees in Warsaw based on mobile phones (Wojdat and Cywinski, 2022), which lends credence to the survey results.

Chart 5. Distribution of people fleeing war in Ukraine by district - PESEL applications and school registrations



Source: Own study based on dane.gov.pl

Chart 6. Survey of Ukrainian refugees applying for PESEL numbers in week 1 of registration in Warsaw



Source: Own study based on estimates in the possession of Tomasz Paktwa from the Office of Assistance and Social Projects of the City of Warsaw

Research indicates that the region where refugees initially arrive is important for the integration of refugees (see Chapter 8 for more on this). Some Western European countries have, or have had in the past, policies to disperse refugees based on non-labour market criteria in order to distribute the housing burden more evenly, avoid ethnic enclaves or reduce the burden of locally funded benefits. However much these types of policies may reduce short-term costs, they generate long-term harm for those ending up in weaker labour markets (Komada, Łaszek, & Trzeciakowski, 2022). Refugees ending up in regions with high unemployment rates later, even for many years, have lower earnings, are less likely to have a job (MGller, Pannatier, & Viarengo, 2022; Aksoy, Poutvaara, & Schikora, 2020; Godoy, 2017; Aslund& Rooth, 2007) and are more likely to experience anti-immigrant incidents (Albarosa & Elsner, 2022). Residing in larger ethnic enclaves conversely improves refugees' labour market opportunities (Battisti et al., 2022; Marten et al., 2019; Damm et al., 2009; Edin & Aslund, 2003).

From the point of view of the real estate market, it is particularly important that the large number of Ukrainians working in Poland before the Russian invasion significantly alleviates the pressure on the housing stock from refugees. According to the previously mentioned survey, as many as 45% of refugees remain in the flats of relatives or friends. According to the report, the number of Ukrainians estimated on the basis of mobile numbers (daily population aged 15 and over) in 12 Polish metropolitan areas increased from 937,000 on 1 February 2022 to 1,726,000 on 1 April 2022, i.e. almost doubled. At the same time, however, **very many war refugees from Ukraine are hosted by Polish families**. The government estimates that 600,000 war refugees are supported with PLN 40 per month per hosted person.[2] If we assume, according to the aforementioned survey, that 47% of newly arrived Ukrainians in Warsaw are hosted free of charge by family, friends and strangers (for which a benefit is available), then nationally, 600,000 would give 1.2 million war refugees in Poland. A relatively small number remain in hotels. According to the Warsaw survey, this is about 4% of their total number. This would mean that they occupy about one third of the hotel places in large cities (about 100 000).

2 PAP, Szefernaker: we will extend by 60 days the deadline to pay benefits for helping refugees, 21.04.2022, https:/7samorzad. pap.pl/category/updates/szefemaker-przedluzymy-o-60-dni-termin-wyplaty-swiadczen-za-pomoc-uchodzcom

At the same time, refugees are renting – so far – relatively few flats on their own. In Warsaw, according to City Hall, this amounts to 6,000-7,000 flats.[3] This is half the order of magnitude of the previously mentioned survey and would give 9-10% of Ukrainians in Warsaw with an assumption of 4 persons per flat. At the same time, PKO BP (2022) estimates that there are 1.2 million flats for rent in Poland, so if only 5% of them were located in Warsaw (and in the OLX and Otodom advertising portals Warsaw accounts for 10-30% of the offers), 12% would be occupied by people who fled the war. However, this may be enough to noticeably affect rental prices assuming that only part of the flats are currently unoccupied. In the period from 23 February to 15 April, the decrease in the number of ads in each city on OLX was similar in percentage terms, in the order of 60-70%, so Warsaw still has the highest number of ads. Also in the PKO BP (2022) data, the increase in rental prices in March compared to February was smaller in the larger, more liquid markets – in Warsaw by a dozen or so per cent compared to up to 40% in Łódź.

Chart 7. Number of flats for rent advertised on OLX before and after Russian invasion



Source: Own compilation based on olxdata.azurewebsites.net

3 Declaration at CMR UW webinar https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?ref=watch permalink&v=531063188646935

Chart 8. Housing vacancy in public housing stock in 2020



Source: Own elaboration based on CSO LDB data

Recommendations

Recommendations can be divided into those that will have an effect already in the short term and systemic changes that will improve housing availability in the long term, creating conditions for the accommodation of more immigrant refugees. Among the short-term measures, renovation of vacant public stock, liberalisation of tenancy laws and, if necessary, investment in temporary container towns can improve the situation. On the other hand, in the long term, measures to accelerate the pace of construction will be helpful, including deregulation, building the competence of companies in modular construction, making land blocked for Housing Plus available to private investors, and introducing a property tax to land with local plans, as well as developing the rental market by passing the long-awaited law on funds investing in rental property, comprehensively reforming rental law, and abolishing tax discrimination of rental versus ownership. It would also be important for changes in the functioning of the market to strengthen the role of municipal governments in the construction of the municipal housing stock by introducing a public purpose formula for this type of housing, and to give Social Rental Agencies a more active role in the process of creating and managing the municipal housing stock as a municipal own task.

In the short term, it would be worthwhile to ensure that the supply of rental units is increased from the existing stock:

1. **The renovation of vacant public housing stock could provide additional housing in the short term**. In Poland in 2020, there were around 70,000 unoccupied dwellings in the public stock – mainly municipal, but also state-owned workplaces (e.g. universities), the State Treasury, and Social Housing Associations. They are heavily concentrated in large cities, especially Warsaw (16%) and Łódź (13%). According to a declaration by a representative of the City Hall, Warsaw is able to renovate 1,000 vacant buildings within a year[4]. Taking into account that, according to the Central Statistical Office, there are more than 10,000 vacant buildings in Warsaw's municipal stock and that it is the local authority with the relatively largest financial capacity, the cost and time required for renovations limits the potential of this path. At the same time, the cost of renovating vacant buildings should be covered by the Surcharge Fund through a municipal company.

2. **The preliminary results of the 2021 census revealed significantly more vacant dwellings than previously reported by the Central Statistical Office**. According to the census, however, there were as many as 1,856,000 unoccupied dwellings in Poland on 31 March 2021, so 886,000 more than in the previous 2011 census. Perhaps it is a matter of the still ongoing pandemic (students and some employees were working remotely) or a different methodology (the census was mandatory for all, which raises questions, e.g. about the shadow economy of renting), but according to the President of the Central Statistical Office, these are actual unoccupied vacant dwellings. Although, according to the Central Statistical Office's Labour Force Survey (which may take migration into account better than the classical population), from 2011 to 2021, as many as 881,000 people aged 15 and over declined in Poland, estimating a corresponding loss of 163,000 children under 14 and assuming 2.7 persons per dwelling, this may still be too little to explain the outcome of the census. The publication of further CSO data will perhaps shed more light on the matter as to the location, ownership and type of these dwellings – whether they are not, for example, scattered houses in the provinces, which would require significant investment and are far from larger labour markets. Data on 121,000 vacant homes for 2020 indicated that, although in peripheral areas they represent a higher proportion of the housing stock, in absolute numbers they are highest where the stock is largest, i.e. in large cities – so 75% of them were concentrated in only 20% of counties. Preliminary data from Census 2021, showing 11% of unoccupied dwellings in a total stock estimated at 15,340,100 dwellings, indicates the need to develop a policy towards unoccupied dwellings, which should be recommended for use for either refugees or residents as part of the municipal housing policy.

3. **Further liberalisation of tenancy law – at least in the short term, reducing protection against eviction of war refugees from Ukraine and in the longer term, comprehensive reform**. The government has liberalised in favour of war refugees in Ukraine only occasional tenancy agreements. In such agreements, the tenant agrees to a possible eviction by providing the address of the premises where he or she can possibly move out. War refugees would find it difficult to provide such addresses, so this requirement was rightly dropped for them. However, figures from the Ministry of Finance show that

4 Declaration by Thomas Pactwa at CMR UW webinar https://www.facebook.com/wateh/live/?ref=wateh permalink&v=531063188646935

only 3.5% of rental income settled in 2020 was from occasional rental agreements. This indicates that the vast majority continue to be traditional tenancy agreements, which may discourage renting to war refugees because of the difficulty of eviction and its direct exclusion of children.

Chart 9. Income of taxpayers accounting for rental income in 2020



Source: Own elaboration based on data from MF

Chart 10. Construction companies reporting unclear, inconsistent and unstable legislation as a barrier to business

Source: Own elaboration based on CSO data

4. **The erection of container towns should not be ruled out.** At the moment, it can be estimated that 1/3 of war refugees are hosted as strangers by Polish families – in an optimistic scenario this will last long enough until they find other accommodation themselves, but container towns should not be ruled out as necessary. Such townships were used in Germany and the rest of Europe in the 2015 migration crisis,

as well as in Japan after the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster. This type of housing is not always well perceived, but it can be erected cheaply and quickly, guarantees privacy, and does not generate envy from native residents, while providing an incentive for refugees to seek better solutions on their own in the market. With that said, the development of such complexes should be supported by a public purpose investment formula and covered by infrastructure funding mechanisms under the Surcharge Fund.

5. **Seeking funding from the European Union to build circular modular housing for people fleeing the war in Ukraine.** Unlike temporary housing containers, this involves the construction of fully-fledged prefabricated dwellings, These are built entirely (with full equipment) in dedicated factories and assembled on building sites – assembled into blocks of flats of the required size The European Commission would coordinate an international public-private partnership procurement programme for modular mobile homes, which would be built and occupied in Poland and then moved to Ukraine after the end of hostilities. Housing using such technology is built up to 20-50% faster and 20% cheaper than traditionally (Bertram et al., 2019). Construction can be shortened by up to nine months. They can also be reused in new functions (e.g. conversion from a typical residential building to a student house, senior citizen's home, school / kindergarten or a facility combining these functions) and locations (e.g. physical relocation of a residential building from Poland to Ukraine without losing its functional value).

In the medium term, the rental market should be made more dynamic by:

6. **The enactment of the long-awaited Rental Property Investment Funds Act would mobilise more capital for residential investment.** Currently, investing in rental housing requires significant capital or borrowing to buy an entire flat and leads to a fragmented rental market. Listing real estate investment funds on a stock exchange would allow a broad cross-section of society to invest even small amounts of savings in real estate. Unfortunately, however, at the moment investing in such funds would be taxed twice (first on the fund's rental income and then on the investor's capital income) compared to buying a rental flat on its own.

7. **Comprehensive reform of tenancy regulation.** At present, standard, unnamed contracts do not provide landlords with the certainty that they can evict rogue tenants if necessary, and tenants with the certainty that rent increases will be the result of pre-agreed rules in the contract and that rogue landlords will not pass on additional charges to them. Institutional leases available to companies and occasional leases for individuals were supposed to respond to these problems, but they remain still only a marginal part of the market. An evaluation of their operation would give clues to a broader reform.

8. **Introduce effective tenancy management mechanisms through social rental agencies (SANs).** Disseminate SANs in municipalities by launching a fund to support their establishment (this would support the operational activities of SANs and also act as a guarantor in the event of solvency problems for residents using SAN services). As part of the SAN operation, it would be advisable to publish, following the example of Germany, the rental costs of housing in separate urban areas as public information analogous to land price maps. This would stabilise and regionalise private rental stock.

9. **Abolishing taxation on rental income and instead raising land taxation would remove fiscal discrimination.** Currently, the rent of a tenant renting a flat has to cover the landlord's rental income tax, a tax that is absent when living in an owner-occupied flat. This unnecessarily discourages rental housing and encourages owner-occupation. Studies show that land taxes are much less harmful to the economy than taxes on labour and capital. Kumhof et al. (2021) show that shifting the burden of taxation to them would yield significant economic benefits. Moreover, such a tax gives an additional incentive to make better use of space.

In the longer term, an additional 400,000 to 600,000 housing units will be needed for war refugees becoming migrants (depending on the development scenario outlined in Chapter 1). For this reason, it will be necessary to ensure that the construction of new housing is accelerated through the following measures.

10. **A comprehensive review and deregulation of building laws and zoning regulations would allow more housing to be built at a lower cost.** How much spatial regulation can constrain the pace of housing construction and raise prices is well demonstrated by studies from the United States (Hsieh and Moretti, 2019; Herkenhoff, Ohanian, Prescott, 2018; Ganong and Shoag, 2017; Gleaser et al., 2005) and the United Kingdom (Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016; Cheshire, 2013; Cheshire, 2008; Barker, 2006; Barker, 2004). In Poland, too, construction companies (not only those building flats) have been reporting increasing barriers for a decade. In 2010, only 14% of construction companies reported unclear, inconsistent and unstable legislation as a barrier to their business to the CSO; by April 2022, it was already 52% (Figure 10).

11. **Streamlining decision-making for housing developments, as well as appeal procedures.** Most decisions on development conditions and many on building permits are issued with delays, and in addition, appeals against them (e.g. by neighbours) in administrative bodies and administrative courts can prolong the waiting time many times over, even when there are no grounds for such appeals (Figure 11). Unforeseen delays, especially in a cyclical industry such as construction, increase the risk of investments and thus their costs.

12. **Use of an electronic system for the submission of planning applications and planning decisions allowing for the development of dwellings to collect anonymised data on the state of activity in individual municipalities and districts and publish it online in real time.** In the USA, numerous econometric studies of the impact of construction barriers on housing prices have been produced through the existence of indices of regulatory stringency over time in different jurisdictions. In Poland, there is a lack of such data and thus it is difficult to quantify the importance of individual barriers. Starting to collect data by municipality and publishing their series online will allow Polish researchers to study the topic rigorously and better identify the most important directions for reform.

13. **The construction of more housing would also be helped by allowing land blocked in cities for the construction of Housing Plus to be sold at market conditions or transferred to municipalities.** In particular, however, support for the rationalisation of the housing policy of municipalities would be their active participation in the creation of the municipal land resource provided for in the Act, which could be subsidised through the Surcharge Fund. According to a recent audit by the Supreme Audit Office

(NIK), there are 949 hectares of land remaining in the National Property Stock[5], which would make it possible to build approximately 80,000 housing units – assuming that these areas are indeed suitable for housing investments.

Chart 11. Timing of decisions for housing developments in 2019



Source: Trzeciakowski (2021) on PZFD data from 36 major cities

14. **The lack of local plans requires obtaining decisions on development conditions, which lengthens and complicates the investment process.** For areas covered by approved LSDPs, municipalities should have the right to collect property tax based on the use indicated in the plan. This will bring them an increase in budget revenue, encouraging the development of plans. At the same time, this is expected to encourage property owners (mainly landowners) to develop or resell their property (e.g. for residential purposes).

15. **Strengthening the ability of municipalities to pursue an active policy for the development of municipal housing as defined in Article 7(1)(7) of the Municipal Self-Government Act.** In particular, this should include treating this type of construction as a public purpose investment within the meaning of the Real Estate Management Act, which will allow for the simplification of the localisation process, but will also give the possibility of using the so-called vacant land owned by institutions and entities and not used – for housing or economic purposes. The public purpose formula will also make it possible to acquire land for such construction by sorting out the ownership status. An important element in favour of such activities should be the provision of 100% eligibility for the mechanism of the Surcharge Fund by municipalities or its special purpose vehicles. Providing the possibility for municipalities to be active will allow the trend of building flats in the ownership formula to be broken, opening up proposals for the market of rental flats realised through institutions of Social Housing Initiatives.

5 https://www.nik.gov.pl/aktualnosci/program-mieszkanie-plus.html

3. Vision of the future

War refugees from Ukraine, including those who choose to stay in Poland for the long term, are likely to choose mostly large cities, contributing to making them more dense and increasing the pool of workers for the most productive firms. Productivity is so strongly concentrated geographically in large cities (EBRD, 2019; World Bank, 2009) due to the benefits of agglomeration, consisting of deep labour markets, greater opportunities for subcontractor sharing and specialisation, and rapid diffusion of innovation. The growth of their population in the long term will increase the labour supply for the most productive Polish firms, more than proportionally contributing to economic growth (see Chapter 2 for more on this).

At the same time, settlement immigration can also benefit those medium-sized cities that make an attractive offer of housing and work aimed at people fleeing the war in Ukraine. Their advantage may be a much lower cost of living and greater availability of housing to buy. Their disadvantage is a shallower labour and rental market, but the experience of the earlier wave of immigration suggests that some refugees may also choose smaller centres especially in scenarios involving a larger influx of people as a result of a less favourable course of the war – in their case the absorption potential of the largest agglomerations in the short to medium term may be too small to be attractive to all immigrants. Immigration patterns from Ukraine prior to February 2022 indicate that these medium-sized urban centres will be more, but not exclusively, located in western Poland.

With the proposed reforms, the development of the institutional rental market will accelerate, raising the quality and popularity of renting. The profitability of renting is increasing due to the rise in interest rates, which is prompting some people to postpone the purchase of a flat in favour of continuing to rent, while at the same time refugees from Ukraine are generating additional demand for it. This may prompt foreign real estate investment funds and Polish companies to accelerate development in this direction.

In the longer term, Ukrainians who remain in Poland will generate additional demand for the purchase of flats. PKO BP (2022) estimates this demand at 230,000 dwellings over several years, we estimate it at 400,000 to 600,000 depending on the scenario.

Polish companies will build competence in circular modular housing, which will allow them to build more and cheaper. If an international PPP procurement programme for modular mobile housing for refugees comes to fruition, the new competencies of Polish companies will remain in place once they move to Ukraine. Construction was an important sector providing work for Ukrainian men before the war. Anecdotal examples of Ukrainian men employed in construction in Poland who chose to go to war are confirmed by CSO data on outflows of workers in April. The thriving construction sector can again provide them with well-paid jobs if they decide to return to Poland after the war or in its final phase.

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4.

EDUCATION

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The implementation of educational solutions should be decentralised and allow for many forms. Focusing only on integrating Ukrainian children into the Polish education system is both impossible and unjustified.

1. What is conducive to the effective education of immigrant pupils and do Polish solutions provide a good basis for their support?

Review of studies from other countries showing the importance of language and other barriers to refugee accommodation

Immigrant students in most countries achieve lower results than native-born students. For example, in recent PISA surveys, the difference in reading performance between immigrant and native-born students averaged about 0.4 standard deviations in OECD countries. This gap is somewhat smaller after accounting for socio-economic status and decreases in the second generation, but remains significant and prominent in mathematics and science. An important barrier to learning is language. Pupils for whom the language of instruction is a foreign language and mastered to a degree that is far from fluent, achieve lower results. Maintaining the mother tongue has significant educational and also extracurricular benefits. On the other hand, effective learning at school requires proficiency in the language, so schools with students for whom Polish is a foreign language require additional expenditures to compensate for language skills or to conduct classes and prepare textbooks in the students' mother tongue. Another factor negatively related to performance is the segregation of pupils with different backgrounds between schools. Pupils who attend schools with a predominance of children from immigrant families score lower on average than pupils who attend schools with a predominance of children from non-immigrant families, even after taking into account the education and wealth of their families.

The lower performance of students from immigrant families is thus typically linked to lower socio-economic status, language issues, poorer parental education, and the segregation of immigrant students in specific schools or areas. Interestingly, the survey data suggest that immigrant families, regardless of their country of origin, have high ambitions that translate into higher educational expectations than among non-immigrant students. Immigrant students are less likely to want to finish their education early and are more likely to plan to pursue higher education (cf. Hippe, Jakubowski, 2018). In practice, students from immigrant families face many barriers to realising their ambitions. The most important of these are lower educational attainment, but also segregation based on linguistic deficiencies (e.g. the frequent sending of immigrant students to vocational schools in Germany only because of lower German language scores). The data also show that in schools with a large number of immigrant pupils, their ambitions are just as high, but these schools often have much more difficult teaching conditions and have to meet the greater needs of the pupils, so that their results are not as high as to enable them to continue with their ambitious plans. It is worth emphasising that here, the dominant factor is not the mere concentration of immigrant pupils in specific schools, but the lack of adequate support to solve problems related to, for example, language differences.

In conclusion, access to education at an appropriate level, additional language support and the reduction of segregation are the most important measures to foster equal educational opportunities for immigrant pupils. It is worth emphasising that it is not a question of creating similar conditions for non-immigrant pupils, but of greater support that allows them to simultaneously preserve and expand the culture and language of their people, while minimising barriers to learning.

Description of school admission and funding arrangements

Polish schools often have previous experience of accepting pupils from Ukraine. Practice, however, is often far from the ideal that emerges from friendly-sounding regulations. The situation here is similar to that for pupils with special needs. There is adequate funding at a national level, there are regulations outlining the possibilities for support and yet, in practice, pupils with the same needs can receive very different levels of support depending on the decisions of the local authority and the school and often on the determination of parents. The latter factor is particularly difficult to count on in the case of refugees, who find it more difficult to navigate the thicket of regulations and enforce them.

Firstly, in Poland, every student who lives in a certain area is obliged to study until the age of 18, which means that they should be enrolled in school. A student does not necessarily have to have a PESEL number or be legally a resident in Poland. **The Constitution of the Republic of Poland stipulates that every person residing in the country at a certain age has the right to education.** Thus, there is no restriction related to the legality of residence, documents held, educational level, language, etc. Moreover, the school authorities (local authorities) are obliged to monitor the fulfilment of the compulsory education obligation and thus to inform immigrant families about this obligation and the possibilities for its fulfilment, and if it is not fulfilled, to take appropriate measures. In the case of pre-school education, immigrant children aged 3-6 have the same rights as children permanently residing in Poland and can use pre-school facilities on the same basis. In the case of pre-school education, however, the obligation applies only to 6-year-old children, and children aged 3-5 only have rights to such education, which must be provided by the municipality in their area.

Immigrant pupils are also entitled to free Polish language classes, which, depending on their needs, should be provided by the school in agreement with the leading authority. In addition, schools should organise compensatory classes if differences in the curriculum or in the level of the students' knowledge and skills are identified. It is worth emphasising that these are additional classes and the pupil should attend the standard classes provided for in the teaching plan in parallel. It is therefore an additional burden on the pupil, but such classes are crucial for equalising opportunities for immigrant pupils. In addition, the Education Law (Article 165) gives the possibility to create preparatory divisions for persons "who require the adaptation of the educational process to their needs and educational possibilities". In preparatory divisions, the core curriculum is implemented. The additional learning of the Polish language, as well as the running of preparatory branches are taken into account in the distribution of educational subsidy, increasing the so-called weights by 1.5 and 0.4 respectively. In practice, this means in the current school year that for each student learning the Polish language additionally, the leading body (local government) receives from the state budget approximately PLN 6,000 (standard) + PLN 9,000 (standard x 1.5) = PLN 15,000. A pupil in the preparatory division "adds" around PLN 2,400 to the amount of the subsidy. Such high weights are due to the assumption that Polish learning takes place in small groups, in which it is necessary to employ additional people as teaching assistants. Recent changes introduced by the Ordinance of the Minister of Education and Science of 8 April 2022 amending the Ordinance on the organisation of education, upbringing and care for children and young people who are citizens of Ukraine are to guarantee a minimum of 6 Polish language lessons per week (instead of 2 hours) in preparatory classes for Ukrainian students. This is certainly a change in the right direction. It should be noted, however, that the amount resulting from the high weight assigned in the algorithm for the distribution of educational subsidies to learning the Polish language, which was sufficient to finance 2 hours of the teacher's work, may prove to be insufficient to cover the costs of 6 lessons per week if the group benefiting from this form of support is not large enough. A shortcoming of these solutions is the limitation of these forms of assistance to 12 months and the number of additional lessons. This assistance should be on a larger scale and be permanently inscribed in the Polish system with appropriate funding.

This legal and financial framework, despite its limitations, worked well at a time of low numbers of migrant pupils attending schools over a long period of time, enabling appropriate action to be planned. Schools were not able to respond adequately to the current migration crisis. The problem was mainly the lack of staff to teach Ukrainian students and the lack of immediate financial support, including for infrastructure development. In this situation, incoming pupils were added to existing departments, which in many cases, mainly due to language barriers and the greater needs of new pupils, was inefficient and led to significant educational losses. At the same time, **the legal solutions in place assume the integration and inclusion of war refugee pupils into the Polish education system. Issues of well-being, psychological support (if needed), and care are not sufficiently addressed.**

A large proportion of those fleeing the war hope to return to their homeland quickly. For this reason, among others, many Ukrainian students seek to continue their education in their Ukrainian schools remotely. The Minister of Education and Science, has exempted such persons from compulsory education or schooling. This has practically given principals the possibility to refuse admission of such students to schools. This probably (however, no detailed data is available) deprived the children of care and the possibility of school meals.

The Act on Assistance to Refugees from Ukraine has made it easier to employ non-Polish nationals in the position of teacher's aides by removing the requirement for certification of knowledge of the Polish language. It should be emphasised that persons employed (by the school principal) in the position of teacher's aide are local government employees, not teachers, and therefore have limited duties and responsibilities. It should be remembered that many local authorities subsidise significant amounts of money for the expenses of running schools. On top of this, their income, e.g. from direct taxes, will be decreasing and funding assistance to war refugees may be difficult even taking into account the increased subsidy for children of Ukrainian citizenship legally residing in the Republic of Poland. This is not a situation that allows building a stable support system for Ukrainian students. Temporary solutions should be replaced by full financial support for both students and Ukrainian schools and teachers, including recognition of their competences and inclusion in the system on similar terms as Polish teachers.

Learning the Ukrainian language, history and culture, geography of Ukraine for the Ukrainian national minority in Poland and Ukrainian citizens

At the request of the parents, the head of the school is obliged to organise the teaching of the minority language and, in addition, may also organise classes in the history and culture of the minority, as well as geography or artistic subjects. The parents must submit a relevant application at the beginning of the school year, in September. This possibility applies only to students with Polish citizenship.

Ukrainian is a national minority language in Poland and Polish law guarantees the possibility to teach such a language in Polish schools as well as to establish Ukrainian schools. Both the teaching of minority languages and the operation of national minority schools are detailed in the law and relatively well-funded within the educational subvention. According to data for the 2017/2018 school year in Poland, Ukrainian was taught in 28 kindergartens for 354 children and in 151 primary and secondary schools for 2,602 students.

In Poland, it has been possible to learn Ukrainian as a second foreign language in primary school since the 2012/2013 school year, and from 2019 it is also possible to take the eighth-grade exam. From 2015 to 2021, the number of students learning Ukrainian in this way did not exceed 65 per year nationwide. This state of affairs is related, among other things, to the lack of appropriate textbooks and methodological casing.

For non-Polish nationals subject to compulsory education, a diplomatic or consular post of their country of origin operating in Poland or a cultural and educational association of a given nationality may organise free of charge lessons at school, in agreement with the headmaster and with the consent of the leading authority,

to study the language and culture of the country of origin, if at least 7 pupils are enrolled in the programme. The total number of hours of study of the language and culture of the country of origin may not exceed 5 lesson hours per week. So far, the diplomatic missions of Ukraine have not made use of this possibility, but since February 2022, such lessons have been organised on a small scale, partly with financial support from the Embassy of Ukraine, in Warsaw, Krakow, Poznan and Wroclaw. Only about 250 students have been enrolled in such programmes so far.

Specific challenges related to Ukrainian students

The educational system in Ukraine has a different structure to that of Poland. Compulsory schooling starts at the age of six and is divided into three stages: grades 1-4, 5-9, 10-11(12). The core curriculum, grading system and examination requirements are all different.

Differences in the actual level of the students' knowledge and skills are also important. An analysis of the 2018 PISA data for Ukrainian students and its comparison with Polish students shows significant differences in achievement levels (cf. Hippe, Jakubowski, Gajderowicz, 2022). The PISA survey covered 15-year-olds in 2018 (in Poland finishing and in Ukraine starting secondary school) and is currently the only survey of its kind. In all areas of the PISA survey, Ukrainian students perform less well than Polish students. The differences are large and amount to about 50-60 points, which is a difference corresponding to the effects of at least two years of schooling. The graph below shows that the differences are largest in mathematics.

Figure 1: Comparison of average scores of 15-year-olds from Poland and Ukraine (PISA 2018)



Source: own analysis using PISA 2018 data.

In addition to curricular differences and those related to actual skill levels, there are issues related to the current material conditions of Ukrainian students and additional psychological challenges. Many students have more difficult learning conditions than Polish students. The extent of psychological problems related to the trauma of war and being uprooted from their environment, cut off from friends and family, or the precarious situation of a refugee is also unknown.

As already mentioned, PISA studies show that although Ukrainian students have lower knowledge and skills, their educational ambitions are very high. They are deeply motivated to learn and, for the most part, want to

continue their learning at a tertiary level. This is important information given the problems they may face in achieving these goals in Poland due to curriculum differences, Polish language proficiency requirements (including examination requirements), and other burdens mentioned above. A significant number of Ukrainian pupils also know Polish to some extent, as several tens of thousands of pupils participated in such classes before the outbreak of the war.

2. Forms of guaranteed access to education for Ukrainian children fleeing to Poland from the war

Forms of guaranteed access to education for Ukrainian children fleeing to Poland

In the current crisis, it is not possible to guarantee education for all Ukrainian students in the same form. Nor is it reasonable; on the contrary, one should rather think of several complementary formulas. There are four key factors influencing the need to diversify the forms in which Ukrainian students can receive education in Poland. These are: the huge scale of migration, the limited absorption capacity of the Polish education system, the varied plans for a possible return to Ukraine, and the special needs of Ukrainian children. One must also take into account the attitude of the Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Science, which wants to keep the education system functioning despite the war. This is hugely important for psychological reasons (the state is working, 'we are not giving up') and as a manifestation of resistance against the actions of the Russians in the occupied territories. The occupiers force the schools to switch to the Russian Federation's curriculum and treat opposing teachers extremely brutally[1].

All forms of guaranteed access to education for Ukrainian students should guarantee them:

- The opportunity to maintain national identity;
- The opportunity to learn the Polish language to the extent that they can integrate into Polish society (including entry into the Polish education system, if they choose to do so);
- Mastery of core curriculum content;
- Mutual recognition of acquired education;
- Establishing relationships with Polish peers.

In particular, all proposed solutions should involve encouraging Ukrainian students (and their parents) to learn Polish as a foreign language (also for those planning to return to Ukraine soon). Knowledge of Polish allows them to enter the Polish education system (if they decide to do so) or the Polish labour market (in case they decide to stay in Poland for a longer period of time). Learning Polish as a foreign language must not be confused with an attempt to Polonise refugees, as it is a tool ensuring their ability to function effectively in the host society (more on this subject in Chapter 8).

1 President Zelensky in a speech to the Irish Parliament on 6 April 2022 https://www.irishexammer.com/opimon/commentanalysis/arid-40845590.html

The following are possible forms of guaranteeing education for Ukrainian children residing in Poland, which, with certain safeguards, are able to meet the criteria set out above (the decision on which option to choose should be left to the parents or legal guardians of Ukrainian children):[2]

1. **Teaching in preparatory departments in the Polish education system** – classes should focus on intensive learning of the Polish language, creating opportunities for interaction with Polish students (e.g. through joint activities that do not require knowledge of the language), bridging curriculum gaps and enabling Ukrainian students to maintain their national identity;

2. **Integration into regular classes in the Polish education system** – integration into regular classes should take place with the support of a teacher or an intercultural assistant speaking Ukrainian; it should be supplemented with learning Polish, remedial classes (curriculum differences) and classes enabling the maintenance of national identity, it is possible to use additional tests, e.g. in Polish, introduced by the school principal;

3. **Continuation of online education in the Ukrainian system** – students learning online in the Ukrainian system should be registered in the Polish education system, the educational authorities must take responsibility for these students, in particular for providing them with a stationary opportunity to learn Polish as a foreign language, facilitating remote learning through technological and equipment support, guaranteeing specialised psychological support for students who will need it and the opportunity to interact with Polish students, as well as using the school's common room and canteen;

4. **Continuation of education in the Ukrainian system in its stationary form in Poland** – where possible, due to the concentration of refugees and the availability of Ukrainian teachers, the establishment of Ukrainian schools (teaching in Ukrainian according to the Ukrainian core curriculum supplemented with the possibility of learning Polish as a foreign language) should be supported; this system should be supported by educational authorities, local authorities and the non-governmental sector. This support could be based on formal cooperation agreements between Ukrainian and Polish schools covering (depending on needs and possibilities) e.g. use of premises, social facilities, joint projects, extracurricular activities, etc. The agreements would be the basis for financing costs on the Polish side, e.g. from foreign aid programmes;

5. **Creation of Polish-Ukrainian schools and international branches**2, in which Ukrainian and Polish core curriculum for primary schools and general secondary schools would be implemented simultaneously. It would be possible to implement this form in the existing legal system by introducing specially created curricula, innovations and pedagogical experiments, non-public schools, including those working in the International Baccalaureate (IB) system. This would be more costly than the other options presented here, but at the same time sustainable and promising, regardless of international developments.

2 The proposal for bilingual teachers comes from the English-Spanish practice in New York. At present, the idea of creating 'international classes', i.e. genuinely Ukrainian classes in Poland, admittedly with a different intention, has already been referred from the Senate to the Sejm (print no. 693). The initiative comes from the Reform Support Team of the MOiN of Ukraine and the team working on Ukraine's new core curriculum (including Polish experts).

It is also worth considering mixed (hybrid) solutions combining in-school and remote education and close cooperation in various forms between schools delivering the Polish and Ukrainian curriculum.

Each of the above forms should be safeguarded against the negative consequences of its implementation. Safeguards for each of these forms are described below.

Table 1: Education of foreigners in preparatory departments in the Polish education system

Advantages of the solution:	Weaknesses of the solution:
• possibility of quickly learning the Polish language and entering the Polish educational system (continuing education in a Polish school) • opportunity to develop relationships with Polish peers at school, e.g. through mixed-group activities • subsidy funding provided	• pupils leave the Ukrainian education system (particularly problematic for students in grades 9 and 11) • lack of institutional preparation – curricula and teaching materials • Lack of specialists for teaching Polish as a foreign language
For whom in particular: for pupils in grades 3-8 of a further primary school and grade 10 of a secondary school in Ukraine who do not speak Polish; for pupils whose families plan to stay in Poland	
Necessary safeguards: • teacher or intercultural assistant speaking Ukrainian • guaranteeing pupils additional classes sustaining national identity (Ukrainian language, literature, history, geography), e.g. in the form of additional classes at school conducted in Ukrainian • in connection with the possibility of organising preparatory classes outside school buildings, it is necessary to ensure that these places meet appropriate standards and provide opportunities to establish relations with Polish peers (e.g. through physical education classes or art classes in mixed groups) • maintaining a high weighting in the educational subsidy distribution algorithm • facilitating the process of recognition of qualifications, preparation and pedagogical training and promotion of Ukrainian teachers in Poland	

Table 2: Inclusion in regular classes in the Polish education system

Advantages of the solution:	Weaknesses of the solution:
• possibility of rapid entry into the Polish education system (continuing education in a Polish school) • opportunity to develop relationships with Polish peers (integration and language learning)	• pupils leave the Ukrainian education system (particularly problematic for students in grades 9 and 11) • learning difficulties due to language constraints • less security, stress • hindrance to the learning of Polish pupils and the resulting tensions within the school community
For whom in particular:: for pupils in grades 1-2 of an initial primary school in Ukraine and older pupils who know the basics of Polish; for pupils whose families plan to stay in Poland	

Necessary safeguards:

- availability of a teacher, teacher's aide or intercultural assistant who speaks Ukrainian
- guaranteeing pupils additional classes in Polish as a foreign language (possibly instead of teaching Polish according to the Polish core curriculum)
- guaranteeing pupils additional classes sustaining national identity (Ukrainian language, literature, history, geography of Ukraine in the scope corresponding to the stage of development) e.g. in the form of additional classes at school conducted by Ukrainian teachers in the Ukrainian language
- providing literacy instruction in Ukrainian at the early stages of education
- facilitating the process of recognition of qualifications, pedagogical preparation and in-service training and promotion, Polish language learning for Ukrainian teachers in Poland

Table 3: Continuing online education in the Ukrainian system

Advantages of the solution:	Weaknesses of the solution:
• possibility of completing a class or stage of education in the Ukrainian system and receiving a Ukrainian certificate • reducing the burden on the Polish education system • greater mobility of the whole family (in Poland and worldwide)	• uncertainty as to whether pupils are participating in any education • lower teaching effectiveness • limited opportunities to learn Polish as a foreign language (which will hinder possible later entry into the Polish education system) and lack of interaction with Polish peers • Risk of deterioration of pupils' psycho-physical condition (online learning, lack of contact with peers, no possibility of diagnosing special needs for psychological support) • requires greater parental involvement
For whom in particular: for pupils in grade 9 of primary school and grades 11 and 12 of secondary school in Ukraine; for other pupils whose parents are planning an early return to Ukraine	
Necessary safeguards: • registration of pupils using this form in the Polish Educational Information System according to districting and the entitlement of such pupils to statutory and municipal concessions • support of the online education system by the Polish government (see below) and • planning how pupils using this system can be integrated into the full-time system in subsequent years (in Poland or Ukraine) • guaranteeing students the possibility of learning Polish as a foreign language in a stationary or on-line format (an additional benefit will be the possibility of identifying students who require specialist psychological support) • providing opportunities for pupils to establish relationships with Polish peers, e.g. by organising (afternoon) extra-curricular activities in mixed Polish-Ukrainian groups • ensuring recognition of education in the Ukrainian system through the issuance of Ukrainian school-leaving certificates and recognition of these certificates in Poland • pupils in the system should have the opportunity to participate in summer recreational activities for children and young people involving intensive learning of the Polish language (summer schools or summer half-schools) • provide dedicated funding per beneficiary pupil for local authorities to support integration, supervision, organisation of additional learning and after-school education • Involving Ukrainian teachers residing in Poland to provide on-site support and consultation as needed.	

Table 4: Continuation of full-time education in Poland in the Ukrainian system

Advantages of the solution:	Weaknesses of the solution:
• possibility of completing a class or stage of education in the Ukrainian system • possibility of obtaining a Ukrainian certificate • reducing the burden on the Polish education system • maintaining national identity • facilitating the return to a Ukrainian school • Employment of Ukrainian teachers residing in Poland without the procedure for nostrification of diplomas.	• Difficulties in organising the system (location, Ukrainian teachers, organisation of the school network, funding) and scaling it up • the risk of a lack of interaction between Ukrainian students and their Polish peers • difficulties in recruiting teachers of Polish as a foreign language • Difficulties in pursuing further education or studies
For whom in particular: for pupils in grade 9 of primary school and grade 11 and 12 of secondary school in Ukraine; for other pupils whose parents are planning to return to Ukraine	
Necessary safeguards: • the affiliation of such establishments to Polish schools and the registration of the pupils of these establishments in the educational information system or, alternatively, cooperation agreements with Polish schools • guaranteeing pupils the opportunity to learn Polish as a foreign language • providing opportunities for pupils to establish relationships with Polish peers, e.g. by organising after-school activities in mixed Polish-Ukrainian groups in the afternoons • organisational support by local authorities and NGOs based on relevant agreements and (probably) aid funding	

Table 5: Creation of Polish-Ukrainian schools or international branches

Advantages of the solution:	Weaknesses of the solution:
• facilitate the return to a Ukrainian school and at the same time enable a possible smooth transition to a Polish school • preservation of national identity • possibility of obtaining a certificate simultaneously recognised in both countries • possibility of designing the use of effective teaching methods • possibility of implementing curricula both in a separate school and in individual departments within schools	• stability of operation and the ability to maintain a critical mass of the system dependent on the political situation at the international level • the structure and curricula must be a combination of both systems • the need to rapidly develop and introduce new curriculum and teaching materials, which, while ensuring quality, is a lengthy process • difficulty of organising separate schools • training of Ukrainian and Polish teaching staff • lack of implementation at the secondary vocational school level • very high costs • difficulties in financing a two-system hybrid
For whom in particular: for all Ukrainian pupils; for willing Polish pupils	
Necessary safeguards: • the creation of experimental and pilot branches in order to develop an effective model • legislative safeguards for the model • developing schemes that link the core curriculum, but are not overloaded • ensuring stable sources of funding	

3. Special needs of Ukrainian children fleeing to Poland from the war

School-age children and adolescents who arrive in Poland have special needs. The most important public system that can respond to these needs is the education system (whether students enter Polish schools or remain in the Ukrainian system). At present, there are no results of research conducted on young war refugees in Poland, so it is reasonable to refer to research on the needs of migrant and refugee children and youth conducted in other countries.

The study Refugee Education: Integration Models and Practices in OECD Countries (OECD Education Working Paper No. 203, 2019) identifies three groups of children's needs resulting from the experience of forced migration: emotional, social and learning needs. In the Polish context, the most important seem to be:

EMOTIONAL NEEDS

- rebuilding a sense of security (including a stable framework for functioning in a new situation),
- coping with separation and/or loss (including stress management and social-emotional competence).

SOCIAL NEEDS

- maintaining one's own cultural identity,
- establishing relationships with Polish peers (at school and in the local community),
- a sense of belonging to the class and school community,
- learning about the culture and cultural context of Poland, enabling them to function effectively in their new environment.

LEARNING NEEDS

- gaining language competence to continue learning in Polish or to enter the labour market,
- bridging the curriculum gap between the Polish and Ukrainian core curriculum,
- an understanding of the Polish education system's opportunities for further education and apprenticeship.

In planning for the inclusion of Ukrainian pupils in the Polish education system, the importance of emotional and social needs should be constantly reminded. Due to the structure of the Polish system, it will automatically focus on learning needs, while the inclusion of pupils in the system will not succeed if the school does not **first** respond to emotional needs (for example, managing pupils' fears) and social needs (for example, establishing relationships with peers, cultural adaptation). This is an area for increased activity in the realisation of the so-called educational function of school, which is traditionally weaker in Poland (due to competence deficiencies of educators, shortage of psychologists and school pedagogues and systemic underestimation of this function of school). A particular challenge in this respect will be to strengthen the school's cooperation with parents of Ukrainian students (despite the language barrier) and to ensure the availability of Ukrainian-speaking psychologists and therapists who can work with students who do not know Polish, within the framework of psychological and pedagogical assistance (more on this topic in chapter 8).

An important issue here is possible cooperation with Polish and Ukrainian non-governmental organisations, especially during the summer holiday period, when many Ukrainian children will not have the opportunity to go on holiday, which also provides an opportunity to use this period for adaptation and preparation for the next school year. Such activities are planned by some local authorities (e.g. Warsaw), but they should be of a systemic nature with assured funding, e.g. through competitions organised by the MEiN.

The burden of responding to the new needs of Polish pupils and the needs of Ukrainian pupils will in practice fall on teachers and school principals as well as school pedagogues and psychologists. In order to cope with this challenge, educational staff will need new competences and support in the form of tailored in-service training. The field of in-service training is therefore crucial to ensuring that the education system responds to these needs the best it can.

The response to the new needs of pupils emerging in schools can and should be based on existing institutions and approaches in the Polish education system, in particular the principles of inclusive education. The opportunity to make it more widespread should be seized, especially as it can benefit all students functioning in a Polish school.

A prerequisite for carrying out effective measures for the well-being and integration of children and young people from Ukraine is to convince and involve the whole school community – students, parents, and teachers. To this end, it is worth "invigorating" and making use of the Parents' Councils, whose duty (Article 84 of the Educational Law) is to develop the educational and preventive programme of the school every year. The programme is adopted by the Parents' Council in agreement with the Pedagogical Council. This task is treated routinely and formally, without real involvement of the school community and conscious acceptance of certain arrangements and commitments. In addition, according to the law, in the absence of a document agreed with the Pedagogical Council, one month after the start of the school year, the educational programme is determined (sic!) by the school principal with the approval of the Board of Trustees. In order for schools and parents' councils to undertake this task, an information campaign would be needed with a discussion of the challenges of integrating young people from Ukraine and the measures needed to respond to these challenges. Let us recall that the competence of the parents' council also includes an opinion on the school's financial plan. It is important that these two powers are treated jointly and complementarily.

Recommendations

In a situation where, according to estimates, out of 800,000 refugee children, 500,000 are outside the Polish education system[3], with some (most?) of the war refugees planning a relatively quick return to their homeland, flexible solutions including education in Polish schools and remote and stationary education in the Ukrainian system should be recommended. The priority should be to provide refugees (young and adults) with a sense of security, stability and future prospects, including maintaining education at the highest possible level.

The implementation of these solutions should be decentralised and allow for multiple forms. At the same time, it is necessary to create a system of coordination of activities, ensuring that needs are properly met and resources are used optimally. A necessary condition for effective coordination is the collection of data from, inter alia, the Social Insurance Institution, the Educational Information System, the Ukrainian Remote Education System on the number, places of residence, age (assigned class) of Ukrainian children and youth in Poland. The implementation of new solutions, as well as the evaluation of their effectiveness, should be based on reliable scientific research showing which proposals provide the best educational results, but also foster integration, reduce stress and improve the well-being of Ukrainian pupils.

1. Enable Ukrainian students who are interested in this to enter the Polish education system through inclusion in regular classes and the creation of preparatory branches from 1 September 2022. These

3 Presentation: "Local Government Round Table" Wrocław

solutions should not be transitional, but should guarantee adequate funding for local governments and include all Ukrainian students, including those who came to Poland before the war began.

2. Recognise the continuation of remote learning in Ukrainian schools and base such an arrangement on relevant legislation. Remote learning is less beneficial for students due to lower teaching effectiveness, lack of integration and psycho-physical costs. Legal solutions should be developed to facilitate the creation and financial support, but also pedagogical support, for full-time Ukrainian schools operating in cooperation with Polish schools. Model cooperation agreements between Polish and Ukrainian schools should be developed to support the social integration of Ukrainian and Polish students, the teaching of the Polish language and the provision of facilities, equipment and social programmes (nutrition) in Polish schools.

3. Ultimately, from the school year 2023/2024, the education of Ukrainian students should continue in Polish schools with full support for maintaining national identity on the basis of solutions created for Polish citizens from the Ukrainian minority or in Ukrainian schools, also according to the model for linguistic minorities in Poland or a new model combining elements of the Polish and Ukrainian systems.

4. Using the summer holiday period for children and young people to support Ukrainian students in learning the Polish language, catching up on curriculum differences and establishing relationships with Polish peers.

5. Support for local authorities to prepare school infrastructure to accommodate additional numbers of Ukrainian pupils according to their current place of residence and to cover other costs related to the admission of new pupils.

6. Recognition of the qualifications of Ukrainian teachers. Transitional exemption from the Polish language requirement for teachers taking up work in preparatory classes and the creation of opportunities for intensive learning of the Polish language. Developing the competence of teachers and principals to work with children with war-forced migration experience and to manage a culturally diverse class, as well as teaching and assessment methods adequate to work in a class diverse in terms of subject knowledge and skills and language competence. Training and employing specialists in the study of Polish as a foreign language.

7. Strengthening the system of pedagogical and psychological assistance for Ukrainian students by employing qualified specialists (psychologists and pedagogues) in psychological and pedagogical counselling centres and schools. In view of the shortage of specialists, consideration should be given to a simplified procedure for the recognition of the qualifications of Ukrainian specialists, without the requirement of knowledge of the Polish language – thus, making it possible to provide assistance (stationary or remote) in Ukrainian.

8. Provide, through appropriate financial support to local governments, pre-school care and education to all interested Ukrainian children.

5.

HEALTH CARE AND OTHER PUBLIC SERVICES

Marek Balicki

Adam Kozierkiewcz

The main challenge is to ensure access to primary health care. At the same time, it is necessary to rapidly recognise the professional qualifications of those involved in the health sector in order to maintain the capacity of the system.

1. Health care and related sectors

Health care in Poland, including for those fleeing the war in Ukraine

The health care system in Poland has been the subject of criticism for many years. It is widely perceived to be underfunded, and the problem of staff shortages and organisational dysfunctions has also been recognised for many years.

The life expectancy rate in Poland in 2020 was 76.6 years (four years less than the average in EU countries). The decrease in the value of this indicator by 1.4 years in two years, from 2019 to 2020, is one of the largest recorded in EU countries. The consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic in Poland is – higher than the average value in EU countries – the general mortality rate and one due to preventable causes. In addition, the level of unmet health needs already high before 2020, persisted and worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic.[1] In another OECD report, Poland was ranked second in the number of excess deaths per a population of one million between January 2020 and June 2021. Only Mexico was ahead of us. The number of excess deaths in Poland during this period was 3,600 per a population of one million against an OECD average of around 1,500.

Current state

Ukrainian war refugees have been granted the right to receive national health care under the Law of 12 March 2022 on Assistance to Ukrainian Citizens in Connection with the Armed Conflict on the Territory of Ukraine. From residual data, it appears that several thousand people, including Ukrainian soldiers wounded in the fighting, are in Polish hospitals (a total of about 200,000 hospital beds). Ukrainian patients (mainly female patients with children) are also appearing in outpatient clinics.

Among those fleeing the war in Ukraine are many health care professionals, including doctors and nurses. It has been more than a year since Ukrainian medical personnel were granted simplified access to the Polish labour market for medical professions, and with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian medical personnel have been granted additional temporary entitlements for a period of 18 months, which allow them to be employed on a simplified basis.

Irrespective of the formal requirements, it makes sense to take measures to enable the integration of future Ukrainian employees into the Polish labour market in practice, which involves in particular extending the offer of Polish language training in the area of health care and employment mediation.

At present, there is a lack of systematic research that assesses the nature and severity of health or organisational problems faced by Ukrainian war refugees. Individual observations by Polish medics, doctors and nurses, indicate phenomena such as confusion, high levels of stress and uncertainty among refugees, compounded by poor knowledge of the Polish (or English) language.

The biggest challenges of the current situation arise from the increased demand for health services in a health system that has limited human, financial and organisational capacity. The COVID-19 pandemic has left a so-called 'health debt', which means a specific pool of services that needs to be made up against the Polish population in the coming months. This is compounded by the demand for services from approximately 1.5 million refugees from

1 „Poland. Health system profile 2021" Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris 2022

Ukraine, among whom there are about 6% elderly, about 45% children and adolescents and 47% women, with needs specific to the population group.

Visitors from Ukraine include people with aggravated chronic or acute diseases who require inpatient, highly specialised care, such as oncology patients. A significant number of women require reproductive health services. In this area, differences in the operation of the health care system with regard to the regulation of births or the practice of abortion become apparent. A lower willingness to be vaccinated and deficiencies in this area are observed in the war refugee population, compared to the Polish population.

Rules for the provision of services

It is assumed that all health services and medicine reimbursements for people fleeing the war in Ukraine with entitlements under the Assistance Act will be financed from various national (including the state budget) and international sources, through the National Health Fund.

If a war refugee becomes subject to health insurance and pays the premiums (e.g. as a result of employment), his or her treatment is financed by the National Health Fund on a general basis.

Stays in social welfare homes (DPS) should be financed by aid, to the same extent as for Polish citizens.

2. Health system objectives in relation to war refugees from Ukraine

The overarching objectives of the interventions discussed below are considered to be:

1. Ensuring access to health care and meeting the needs of Ukrainian patients, particularly in primary health care and mental health;

2. Professional engagement of war refugees from Ukraine in the health and care delivery system.

3. Measures to integrate persons fleeing Ukraine into the Polish health care system

TYPE OF ACTIVITIES: STRUCTURAL AND ORGANISATIONAL

Action 1: Information system on health and care services

Objective: To provide information on health and care services

The action consists of launching or developing a system for informing Ukrainian patients (in Ukrainian) about medical and care/social services.

Sources of information:

- telephone helpline – an extension of the NFZ helpline,
- website – development of the NFZ website,
- information points.

A component of the system will be **information points** (information centres on health and care services, OIUMO), widely available in the area of larger concentrations of war refugees from Ukraine, especially at large reception points or in local government units. The scope of activities of the OIUMO will include providing information on both the possibility to obtain health and social care services, as well as on how to set up a trusted profile, IKP, the rules on the use of reproductive health services, and assistance with medical appointments.

The operation of the entire system will be coordinated by a national helpline and website, directing user traffic accordingly.

Estimate

The following is an estimate of the costs of the listed activities under simplified assumptions.

Specification	Size	Multiplied by	Unit cost per month	Cost per year
Hotline	person	50	6 000	3 600 000
Website maintenance	team	1	20 000	240 000
Information centre on health and care services (OIUMO):				
Rental of space	20 m²	20	2 000	480 000
Equipment	set	20	20 000	400 000
Employment	3 persons	20	18 000	4 320 000
Total				**9 040 000**

Schedule

The NFZ helpline currently provides basic information, as does the NFZ website. Further development of these tools is expected.

It will be possible to launch the information centres for health and care services (OIUMO) within 5-6 months of the decision to set them up. It will then be necessary to develop the scope of the OIUMO, identify the source of funding and announce the recruitment of institutions that will be ready to carry out these tasks, which should mainly include local governments and non-governmental institutions.

Action 2: Establishment of primary health care facilities (primary care and gynaecology-obstetrics services) in the Ukrainian language

Objective: Provision of primary care and gynaecology-obstetrics services to Ukrainian patients

The action consists of developing PCP and gynaecology-obstetrics dispensaries with Ukrainian-speaking staff, particularly in the reception phase. The dispensaries will be established as new entities or (more often) as dispensaries within larger POZ facilities near larger concentrations of Ukrainian war refugees. The staff of the dispensaries will be recruited from among Ukrainian language speakers. Doctors and nurses with a temporary licence to

practice will be encouraged to adapt their professional credentials to the standards and requirements set out in national legislation.

It should also be assumed that in the medium term private medical practices or specialised services within the non-public system specialising in the provision of medical services to Ukrainians and people of Ukrainian origin will be established.

The principles of financing will be in accordance with the principles of financing of POZ, in the form of a capitation rate for the services of a doctor and a midwife in POZ, and in the case of gynaecological-obstetrics outpatient clinics, based on the applicable NFZ rates. Also the other principles of operation of these outpatient clinics will be analogous to those in force for Polish citizens.

In order to stimulate the establishment of such dispensaries, grants for their development (equipment) will be helpful. The proposed grant will be PLN 50,000 per dispensary (approximately 2,000 clients).

Estimate

The following is an estimate of the costs of the listed activities under simplified assumptions.

Specification	Size	Multiplied by	Unit cost	Cost per year
Capitation rate of POZ	person	1000 000	180	180 000 000
Capitation rate of a primary care midwife	woman	500 000	45	22 500 000
Annual cost of gynaecological care clinics.	woman	500 000	50	25 000 000
Grants for dispensary equipment	advice centre	500	50 000	25 000 000
Total				**252 500 000**

Schedule

There are currently outpatient clinics in Poland with staff speaking Ukrainian. It takes at least 3-6 months to set up new dispensaries, requiring the signing of relevant contracts with the NFZ.

The launch of the grant system and the disbursement of grant funds is a prospect of approximately one year from the time of the relevant decision.

Action 3: Start distance psychological counselling in the Ukrainian language

Objective: Provision of psychological support at a distance in the Ukrainian language

The action consists of extending the psychological support and assistance offered by the NFZ hotline to include counselling provided in Ukrainian in the form of telephone counselling and video calls.

The action requires the recruitment of people with the above language and psychological competence.

Specification	Size	Multiplied by	Unit cost per month	Cost per year
Annual cost of psychological counselling	person	100	10 000	12 000 000
Grants for dispensary equipment (one-off)	advice centre	100	30 000	3 000 000
Total				**15 400 000**

Schedule

There are currently psychological institutions in Poland with staff who speak Ukrainian. The scale of their activities and availability is unknown.

The establishment of new outpatient clinics, such as those operating as telemedicine, requiring the signing of relevant contracts with the NFZ and possibly the awarding of a technology grant, requires at least three to six months from the time of the relevant decision.

Action 4: Activate psychological and psychiatric counselling (mental health centres)

Objective: Provision of psychological and psychiatric support in the Ukrainian language

The action consists of launching, near the larger concentrations of war refugees from Ukraine, adult mental health centres (CZPs) offering comprehensive and coordinated assistance for mental health crises AND problems at a basic level, either within existing facilities or as stand-alone entities with Ukrainian-speaking staff. The CZPs would operate analogously to the emerging Type B centres.

The CZP will consist of:

- a notification and coordination point (a solution developed as part of the reform of Polish psychiatry),
- a mental health clinic,
- a community treatment team,
- a day ward,
- care coordinators and recovery assistants (trained people with experience of mental health crisis).

One centre will serve 100 000 persons residing in Poland as war refugees from Ukraine. In practice, this means the creation of 4-6 centres, located in the largest cities.

In addition to the CZP for adults, appropriate centres for community psychological and psychotherapeutic care for children and adolescents – reference level I (psychological counselling centres) should be established.

Cost estimate

The following is an estimate of the costs of the listed activities under simplified assumptions.

Specification	Size	Multiplied by	Unit cost	Cost per year
CZP for adults	CZP	5	7 000 000	35 000 000
Community psychological and psychotherapeutic care centre for children and adolescents	Centre for chil-dren and young people	20	600 000	12 000 000
Grants for dispensary equipment	advice centre	25	60 000	1 500 000
Total				48 500 000

Schedule

There are now mental health centres in Poland, launched as part of the reform of psychiatric care. For the most part, they do not employ specialists who speak Ukrainian, which is necessary for such therapy.

The establishment of new centres or the development of existing centres, which operate in inpatient form, requires signing relevant agreements with the National Health Service (NFZ) and the possible awarding of a technology grant, and requires at least three to six months of time after the relevant decisions have been made.

Action 5: Start-up of care centres for dependent persons coming from Ukraine

Objective: Providing care for dependent persons (elderly, disabled, chronically ill)

A person requiring round-the-clock care due to age, illness or disability, unable to function independently in daily life and who cannot be provided with the necessary assistance in the form of care services, is entitled to be placed in a social welfare home. Polish residents under this type of care incur certain costs in this respect, and in the event that they are unable to bear these costs, a maintenance mechanism is activated. In the case of war refugees from Ukraine, such a system of financing these stays seems impossible.

Under the provisions of the Law on Social Assistance, refugees are entitled to social protection coverage in a financial or non-financial form and the cost is borne by the municipality. In the case of war refugees from Ukraine, these provisions do not apply. The proposed solution is intended to support local governments in providing social care for dependents, while at the same time creating a welcoming environment for them, in their linguistic and cultural environment.

Hence, the proposed action is to set up residential social care centres for people fleeing the war in Ukraine. These centres will operate in accordance with the regulations for social care homes (DPS). It may be necessary to introduce specific regulations concerning the procedure for referral to these facilities and some other specific issues concerning staff qualifications.

Specification	Size	Multiplied by	Unit cost per month	Cost per year
Annual cost of care	person	100	48 000	192 000 000
Centre equipment grants (one-off)	centre / 100 persons	40	3 000 000	120 000 000
Total				312 000 000

Schedule

There are currently inpatient social care facilities (DPS) in Poland, started and run by local governments or institutions/private individuals. Most of them do not employ staff who speak Ukrainian.

The establishment of new DPSs, preferably funded from non-budgetary sources, requires signing relevant contracts and possibly the award of a development grant. These activities require at least three to six months of time after the respective decisions have been taken, and a period of one to two years if more extensive investment/adaptation work is required.

TYPE OF ACTIVITIES: SUBSTANTIVE AND ORGANISATIONAL SUPPORT TO HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS

Action 1: Remote on-demand translation services

Objective: To provide assistance in the provision of health care services to people fleeing the war in Ukraine

The action consists of setting up a (video) call centre where trained people will interpret conversations between a doctor (or other medical staff) and a war refugee patient with an insufficient command of Polish.

The service will be free to facilities and patients, funded separately from the health premium. The service will require an adequate number of interpreters, to meet real demand, to provide flexible access to services, and will

be supported by artificial intelligence, AI, over time. It is envisaged that there will be a grant opportunity to launch the service by three potential service providers.

Estimate

The following is an estimate of the costs of the listed activities under simplified assumptions.

Specification	Size	Multiplied by	Unit cost/month	Cost per year
Annual cost of translator	person	100	8 000	9 600 000
Centre equipment grants (one-off)	centre	3	1 000 000	3 000 000
Total				**12 600 000**

Schedule

It will take at least 3-6 months after the decision to launch the service to develop the criteria and launch the competition. Running of the competition and gradually launching the service will take another 6 months or so.

Full functionality should be available within approximately 1-2 years of the decision.

Action 2: Information replacing medical records of Ukrainian patients on the patient.gov.pl platform

Objective: Provide access to basic information on the Ukrainian patient

The action consists of launching a function to collect data on the health status and medical history of war refugees from Ukraine. Data will be collected in the form of a 'Health and illness questionnaire', modelled on the 40+ prevention questionnaire available to Polish patients, in the Internet Patient Account (pacjent.gov.pl).

The questionnaire will be completed by patients or authorised persons. Data from the questionnaire will be expanded with information on medicines and services available on the patient.gov.pl portal. The questionnaire will be completed by patients supported by OIUMO staff (see below).

Data will be available in Polish, Ukrainian and possibly English.

Estimate

The following is an estimate of the costs of the listed activities under simplified assumptions.

Specification	Size	Multiplied by	Unit cost per month	Cost per year
Implementation cost (one-off)	questionnaire	1	10 000 000	10 000 000
Cost of living	centre	1	100 000	1 200 000
Total				**11 200 000**

Schedule

The development of the survey concept, and the corresponding vocabularies in the selected languages, takes approximately six months.

Another six months for implementation in P1, testing and making gabinet.gov.pl, and patient.gov.pl available to users.

Action 3: Use of multilingual medical terminology collections

Objective: Introduction of multilingual electronic health records

This involves the use of collections of formalised medical nomenclature, having a version in electronic documentation systems in Ukrainian, among other languages.

Multilingual naming sets will enable electronic medical records to be maintained in different languages and flexibly translated as required.

Collections of multilingual nomenclature include the following classifications:

- ICD-10 and (following its introduction) ICD-11,
- ATC – terminology and classification of drugs,
- LOINC – Nomenclature of laboratory procedures and other selected health care terms,
- SNOMED – comprehensive terminology for medicine and health care.

Estimate

The following is an estimate of the costs of the listed activities under simplified assumptions.

Specification	Size	Multiplied by	Unit cost	Cost per year
Dictionary translations	concept	500 000	5	2 500 000
Implementation of multilingual dictionaries in P1	dictionary	5	1 000 000	5 000 000
Total				7 500 000

Schedule

Some of the dictionaries (e.g. ICD-10) are already in use and the use of a foreign-language version consists solely of the implementation of formatting with the possibility of replacing equivalent terms with the same code. In this case, the result can be achieved in about 6 months.

In the case of LOINC and SNOMED, it is necessary to carry out or complete the translation and its verification. In this case, it will be necessary to wait about 1-2 years for the multilingual effect.

TYPES OF ACTIVITIES: PROPHYLACTIC

Action 1: Vaccination of children and adults

Objective: To obtain immunity and protection against certain infectious diseases

The activity consists of identifying immunisation gaps in children and adult war refugees from Ukraine, and offering free vaccination. Identification of immunization deficiencies and possible persistent infections will be done as part of the creation of medical records (see Information in lieu of medical records and check-ups for children).

In the case of compulsory vaccination, the same status should apply to both war refugees and Polish citizens.

It is assumed that there are some deficiencies in the vaccination rates of refugee children, vis-à-vis the vaccination calendar in force in Poland. This implies a potential need to supplement them.

Specification	Size	Multiplied by	Unit cost	Cost per year
Number of refugee children	person	500 000	100	50 000 000
Total				**50 000 000**

Schedule

Refugee children are entitled to health care and are relatively frequent patients of PCPs in Poland. Hence, the completion of the vaccination calendar could begin without delay.

Action 2: Check-ups for children

Objective: To reproduce basic medical information about the child and its development

The development of the children of the Polish population is monitored in the form of check-ups carried out by family doctors. Health check-ups are routine, periodic preventive health examinations carried out on every child at specific stages of his or her development in order to assess its correctness. These examinations cover new-borns up to 4 weeks of age and children aged 2, 4, 6, and 10, as well as adolescents aged 14, 16 and 18. The main aim is the early detection of diseases and developmental disorders in order to be able to halt their development early and implement appropriate treatment.

The data from the check-ups are stored in the medical records of the primary care clinic and recorded in the child's health booklet.

Polish GPs do not have data of this kind on children of war refugees from Ukraine. Therefore, check-ups should be ordered for children from Ukraine, starting with an initial examination, regardless of the check-up calendar.

The data should be stored in the P1 system (which allows the collection, analysis and sharing of digital resources on medical events) and then made available to doctors authorised by the child's guardians on the patient.gov.pl and gabinet.gov.pl websites.

Estimate

The following is an estimate of the costs of the listed activities under simplified assumptions.

Specification	Size	Multiplied by	Unit cost per month	Cost per year
Implementation cost (one-off)	questionnaire	1	10 000 000	10 000 000
Maintenance cost/month	centre	1	100 000	1 200 000
Total				**11 200 000**

Schedule

The development of the electronic check-up record concept, and the corresponding dictionaries in the selected languages, takes approximately six months.

Another six months for implementation in P1, testing and making gabinet.gov.pl, and patient.gov.pl available to users.

TYPE OF ACTIVITIES: EMPLOYMENT OF UKRAINIAN PERSONS IN HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE PROFESSIONS

Action 1: Recruitment of Ukrainian-speaking medical staff

Objective: Provide medical and care services to war refugees from Ukraine

The action consists of launching preparatory training for people from Ukraine in the following:

- knowledge of the Polish language,
- professional qualifications.

This includes the recognition of professional diplomas (possibly nostrification). A temporary solution is the employment of specialists from Ukraine for an adjustment period ('assistant' posts).

Estimate

The following is an estimate of the costs of the listed activities under simplified assumptions.

Specification	Size	Multiplied by	Unit cost	Cost per year
Number of potential health and care workers	person	100 000	1000	100 000 000
Number of teaching points	point	500	10 000	5 000 000
Total				**105 000 000**

Schedule

The time needed to launch the above-mentioned activities is related to the necessity of launching competitions for educational service providers, and their contracting, which can be estimated at around six months after the decision on the matter has been taken.

Action 2: Support for placement of people from Ukraine in the health and social care sector

Objective: To provide a flexible mechanism for the employment of Ukrainian persons in the health and social care sector

The action consists of supporting intermediary (assistance) services for the employment of war refugees from Ukraine in the health and social care sector, by coordinating and providing information in addition to the existing offer.

Such services can be provided by labour offices or – on their behalf – by external companies and NGOs, as well as by commercial companies.

The key idea is to provide:

- proper preparation of jobseekers for their duties,
- legality and decent working conditions,
- employment flexibility (hourly, permanent, etc.),
- opportunities for rotation and change of mentee-guardians.

The practical dimension of the abovementioned measures will mean launching a website that is a hub for the services of other institutions, and monitoring and possibly intervening where the market offer is not appropriate.

Estimate

The following is an estimate of the costs of the listed activities under simplified assumptions.

Wyszczególnienie	Wielkość	Krotność	Koszt jednostkowy / miesiąc	Koszt na rok
Implementation cost (one-off)	website	1	100 000	100 000
Monitoring and interventions	person	4	8 000	384 000
Total				484 000

Schedule

The time needed to launch the above-mentioned activities is related to the need to assign the above-mentioned functions to an existing institution, to delegate people to carry out the above-mentioned activities and to carry out work on launching the website.

The entire action can be implemented in about six months from the decision on the matter.

4. Completion

The activities listed above are directed at specific issues, focused on specific objectives, equipped with a very preliminary cost estimate and an assessment of implementation time.

These activities should be assigned to specific implementers, sometimes local government or non-governmental institutions, as well as state institutions (such as the National Health Service).

All the actions listed are important, but their logic is such that they can be triggered individually and independently of each other.

Each of the actions listed represents a potential project/programme, with its budget, management and supervision system, implementation deadlines, etc. In this sense, each of the activities can be presented as a launchable venture for its potential promoters and funders.

At the national level, it would make sense to activate the coordination of these and other health care activities for war refugees from Ukraine. This is advisable due to the multiplicity of initiatives and activities, while being fragmented.

6.

ADMINISTRATION AND LAW

Witold Klaus

Marta Górczyńska

The law in force must take into account the transformation of Poland into a country with a large foreign presence in society. It is necessary to de-bureaucratise work and residence legalisation procedures for all migrants at the central level and to prepare integration policies at the local level, providing a framework for building cohesive and multicultural communities.

1. Introduction

The law is trying to keep up with the changing situation, hence the Law on Assistance to Citizens of Ukraine in Connection with Armed Conflict on the Territory of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the special act – Polish: specustawa), enacted on 12 March 2022, has already been amended by the time of completing the text, and further amendments are in the pipeline. For this reason, in this text, we will not focus on the need for minor and very specific changes to the Polish legislation, but rather on more general issues, i.e. the larger changes that we believe should take place.

We will not focus in the following only on those fleeing from Ukraine, as the administration's actions and legal issues should be designed much more broadly, taking into account other migrants already living in Poland, as well as those who will want to settle in our country and whom the Polish economy will be looking for. There are, however, a few proposed changes in the text that would facilitate the integration of Ukrainian refugees in Poland, which should not be controversial.

2. Current state

Before 24 February 2022, Polish offices could be divided into two main groups. The first, constituting the vast majority of the Polish administration, was the one that did not recognise at all the existence of a separate group, with different needs, which was the migrants residing in Poland. There was a conviction that every person living in Poland must adapt to the conditions of the Polish administration, hence must communicate in the language (not only Polish, but also the official language) and must know and understand the operation and competences of Polish offices. Not only were the officials and clerks not prepared to work with people from other countries (and often therefore from other cultures, including legal ones), but they also had no desire to understand these conditions. They also often used stereotypes or even displayed xenophobic behaviour (Warat 2008; Klaus 2010; Klaus and Frelak 2010; Skrzypczak and Kulik 2011). Operating since 2014, a place such as the Service Point for Foreigners at the Lublin City Hall was therefore a definite exception on the map of Poland (https://lublin. eu/mieszkancy/partycypacja/lublin-dla-wszystkich/cudzoziemiecka-w-lublinie/punkt-obslugi-cudzoziemcow/).

The second group of offices were those specialised in working with migrants. These offices could also be divided into two groups. The first was the social welfare institutions, above all the district family assistance centres, running integration programmes for refugees. However, as these groups have always been small in Poland, there were few officials and clerks prepared to work with them and they were limited to only a few major cities in Poland. The system was therefore built on individuals and their resources and did not constitute a viable system (Frelak, Klaus and Wisniewski 2007; Pawlak 2013; NIK 2015). The second group consisted of the foreigners' departments in the voivodeship offices, issuing residence and work permits, and the Office for Foreigners, which mainly conducts proceedings on granting international protection to foreigners and aliens. These institutions, where petitioners and applicants were mainly persons without Polish citizenship, had been criticised for years for not being adequately adapted to serve this group of persons, including above all the lack of adequate intercultural sensitivity and knowledge of foreign languages among officials and clerks. These offices have traditionally been underfunded and characterised by high staff turnover. In recent years, due to their extensive bureaucracy, they have demonstrated their profound inefficiency in dealing efficiently with the matters they dealt with, leading to delays of many months in issuing decisions (Klaus 2009; Klorek and Klaus 2013; NIK 2019).

Like the offices, Polish law has either failed to notice the presence in Poland of people who do not communicate in Polish or who have a different nationality, or it has developed bureaucratic systems for applying for work or residence, piling up queues in offices, leading to the development of a system of (not always professional and sometimes even fraudulent) external advice on legalising residence and allowing many people to function in a kind of legal limbo (with some form of legal residence and illegal work).

Following the start of the Russian aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the Polish authorities moved rather quickly to build a new legal system for those fleeing the war in Ukraine. Several extremely important elements of it should be highlighted:

- Significant facilitation of border crossing (available to any person) and registration of residence;
- Relying on local authorities to register residence and offer support, resulting in a decentralised system and easier access to offices at the local level, resulting in shorter queues;
- Introduction of long-term residence security for persons who crossed the border after 24 February – obtaining the right to temporary residence in Poland for a period of 3 years without having to fulfil any additional preconditions;
- Offering a wide and varied range of support and benefits to people fleeing Ukraine – unconditional access to the labour market and business opportunities (without any additional permits), the right to social assistance, medical care or education, facilitation in the nostrification of entitlements/diplomas;
- Introducing people fleeing Ukraine into existing systems in Poland and prevent the construction of parallel aid systems – this is particularly true in the areas of employment, health care and social assistance.

This legislation is building a new reality in our country, hitherto unknown – involving a large group of offices in the service of migrants, which until now had little or no experience in this area.

The desire to support those fleeing the war in Ukraine also triggered large amounts of empathy. They quickly realised that people fleeing the war in Ukraine needed to communicate in a language they could understand, so leaflets and information boards in Ukrainian were quickly produced, and interpreters began to be used during visits to the authorities – often arranged by the authorities themselves. On top of this, some local authorities have introduced plenipotentiaries or special officials responsible for coordinating support measures for Ukrainian citizens. These measures, long advocated by experts, were introduced from the bottom up and at an extremely fast pace.

3. Action needed

The current situation, although related to Poland's reception of refugees and war refugees from Ukraine, should lead to a profound rethinking and re-evaluation of Poland's entire migration policy. This is because the planned solutions cannot overlook other, diverse groups of male and female migrants already present in Poland. Among them, it is necessary to point out:

- Fugitives and refugees from Belarus who fled the country directly to Poland or via Ukraine and are only now arriving in Poland;
- Internationally protected persons who reside in Poland;
- Migrants forcibly arriving in Poland via the Polish-Belarusian border;

- Ukrainians who resided in Poland before 24 February 2022 – a large number of people, comprising approximately 1.5 million (CSO 2020), who were treated marginally by the provisions of the speculative law;
- Migrants from other, more distant countries, e.g. Asian, who are already in our labour market or will be in the labour market in the near future for various reasons (e.g. due to the current shortage of men for jobs in e.g. construction or transport, a gap that has so far been filled by Ukrainian citizens).

The design of the actions of the wider public administration, and the revision of legislation to support people with migration experience, must be based on several basic principles:

- Derive from the idea of the inherent dignity of every human being – although this may seem obvious, this principle does not always guide the Polish legislator in drafting legislation. They must not be xenophobic in nature and should take into account the access of all, including migrants, to the entire catalogue of fundamental human rights, including above all the right to privacy and protection of family life, as well as effective judicial review of all decisions made in his/her case. They must also not segregate different categories of people, as this will lead to social tensions;
- The law must have a protective function and pay special attention to people with special needs and who require additional support or protection;
- It is necessary to promote the agency of migrants rather than incapacitate them – to be sure that they are in a position to make decisions about their lives, rather than to bail them out or transfer this power to others (e.g. Polish citizens who receive housing subsidies for refugees);
- Law and administration should play a complementary and supportive role, a servant role so to speak – not an obstructionist role in social processes;
- Measures and new legislation should be based on good identification of the needs of communities, including migrants, and should be created in dialogue with all parties, including those fleeing the war in Ukraine.

Action needed at the legal level

The (in)time Directive1 launched by the European Union is a remarkable success and a hugely important solution (it has been partially implemented into Polish law by the provisions of a special law). However, its scope of application is too narrow. This is because the provisions of the directive launched by the EU Council omit people who were permanently residing on the territory of Ukraine before 24 February 2022, and therefore Ukraine was their main place of life and, although they formally did not have the right of permanent residence in the country, they had been living and working there for many years. This category of persons has been omitted, although it should include persons who had been living in Ukraine for at least 5 years before the outbreak of war. In addition, persons listed in Article 2(3) of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022, i.e. those who are unable to return to their country or region of origin in safe and sustainable conditions, should be granted mandatory protection and not merely optional protection – especially since under other EU return legislation (Directive 2008/115/EC) such persons cannot be expelled from the territory of the European Union in such a situation anyway.

1 The name bivalence is due to the different official translation of the Directive's name (provisional) and the legal institution's "temporary protection" provided for in the Act on granting protection to foreigners on the territory of the Republic of Poland, transposing the provisions of the directive into the Polish legal order.

The European Commission should also implement a mechanism that would prevent the risk of persons fleeing Ukraine and not covered by the (Temporary) Protection Directive falling into undocumented residence. This is because the residence of these persons on the territory of the EU cannot be allowed to fall into undocumented residence due to inadequate legal regulations in individual Member States.

The European Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, should also plan and implement a mechanism for the safe relocation of people fleeing Ukraine between different Member States. The so-called spontaneous relocations currently taking place are not always safe for migrants. However, this type of search for a new place to live in the EU should not be restricted. It should definitely be structured, additional mechanisms should be introduced to increase the safety of the movements of people fleeing war within the EU and data should be collected on it. However, it is worth introducing an additional mechanism alongside it to encourage movement from the territories of countries bordering Ukraine to other Member States, leading to a rebalancing of the support burden between different countries. This system should be based on: cooperation between Member States; voluntariness; provision of full information on the entitlements available to persons fleeing Ukraine in each Member State; seeking to equalise the level of these entitlements across the EU; coordination of travel and support in the search for accommodation; and provision of means of transport in the event of a desire to return to Ukraine.

The Polish government should actively seek and cooperate in the implementation of all the above-mentioned demands.

The Polish special law should also extend assistance to additional groups of people not mentioned in it:

- In its subject catalogue, it should cover precisely the group listed in Article 2(1) and (2) of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382. At present, this catalogue is narrower all the time – it does not include family members of Ukrainian nationals and citizens other than spouses and persons with permanent residence in the country. Otherwise, this leads to the need for duplication of procedures and the construction of a parallel system, run by the Office for Foreigners, for a small group of persons applying for temporary protection on the basis of the Directive rather than the special law;
- On similar terms, support should also be extended to persons with Ukrainian citizenship who arrived in Poland before 24 February 2022. There is no reason to apply different regulations to them – they, too, are currently unable to return to their country of origin (this is especially true for men, who would not be able to leave Ukraine if they returned). The entitlements of the special law should focus on the issues of legality of residence, the right to work and set up a business and the right to health care. The issue of social assistance benefits should be made conditional on actual income – as is the case for Polish citizens and nationals;
- Persons without Ukrainian citizenship fleeing Ukraine should be granted a longer period of legal residence in Poland – this period cannot be only 15 days (as is currently the case), as during this time it is often not even possible to organise a return to the country of origin – if such a return is possible at all.
- The practice of different treatment of persons seeking international protection at different parts of the Polish borders should be ended. Appropriate administrative proceedings should also be initiated against persons crossing the Polish-Belarusian border, including, above all, proceedings for granting international protection, if they declare such a will. In the case of persons not declaring their need for protection, proceedings for an obligation to return should be conducted, with respect for all procedural guarantees. The no-go zone in the border areas should also be lifted and the excessive militarisation of the Polish-Belarusian border should be abandoned. This would free up significant financial and personnel resources to support refugees from Ukraine.

Administrative procedures need to be de-bureaucratised. They have been excessively and unnecessarily extended also in the specustawa. To this end, it is necessary to immediately dispense with the obligation to register the taking up of employment by a person entitled to work without a permit on the basis of the specustawa in the portal praca.gov.pl. Currently, any type of employment is compulsorily reported by the employer to the Social Insurance Institution (registration of any contract, including for a specific task, is mandatory), so this is an unnecessary duplication of registration activities. Similar solutions do not function for any other group of migrants entitled to work without a permit in Poland. Thus, the obligation of additional employment registration overcomplicates the procedure and serves no purpose. It also leads to further problems that will have to be solved in the future. The obligation to take fingerprints during the procedure for assigning a PESEL number from all persons is also incomprehensible. It should not apply to those who have a biometric passport, as this data can easily be read from this document. This would simplify and speed up registration procedures in municipalities.

The whole system of work permits and consequently residence permits in Poland also needs to be restructured and significantly simplified. And yes – this is exactly the moment. The system is unnecessarily extensive and hugely difficult to get through for people from countries other than Ukraine. It is already apparent that there is a need to employ men. Many professions will not be filled by women. And demographic forecasts indicate that the problem of a shortage of working age people in Poland will only grow.

It is necessary to strengthen the protective role of the law and to support the most vulnerable groups. This is primarily about countering labour exploitation and protecting unaccompanied minors. The system currently in place in Poland to counter labour exploitation, especially of migrants, including trafficking in human beings for forced labour, is extremely weak. Strengthening it requires changes in legislation and the expansion of the State Labour Inspectorate. This service should only deal with the protection of workers' rights against the actions of employers who violate these rights and cannot (as is the case now) also play the role of controlling the legality of employment of foreigners and punish them with fines. An employee must not be afraid to turn to the labour inspectorate. It is necessary to significantly expand the competences of this service – to include the possibility of ascertaining the existence of an employment relationship (later possibly challenged in an employment court by employers), control of civil law contracts, support male and female employees in enforcing unpaid wages or other benefits due to them, enable inspection of farms, etc. It is also necessary to significantly subsidise the labour inspection – expanding its structures and increasing the salaries of inspectors. Only this will ensure the real effectiveness of this institution (more on the labour market in Chapter 2).

Greater protection should also be given to unaccompanied minors – a group particularly large in the current war situation. Some favourable solutions have been introduced by the special law, but: (1) they apply only to Ukrainian nationals and citizens, while they should apply to all underage and stranded migrants; (2) they are insufficient – e.g. a temporary guardian is only paid when he or she has more than 15 children in his or her care; there is no support for those caring for fewer children; (3) there are no solutions for professional guardianship of unaccompanied minors in other administrative procedures – similar to those of the specustawa, i.e.. guaranteeing both an adequate level of professionalism/training for those performing this role and remuneration for this work, which is too important to be unpaid.

Changes in the functioning of the administration

Various offices, as we mentioned, have already made the first steps to make their institutions more friendly to people without Polish citizenship – above all to Ukrainians. This is a good direction that should be continued. However, further steps need to be taken in this regard:

- Making sure that basic official information is available in a variety of languages that migrants can understand (just as there is information for the visually impaired in many institutions), which also applies, for example, to instructions for filling out official forms;
- Ensure the presence of interpreters and translators to serve non-Polish speakers – as with sign language interpreters, some may work remotely;
- Provide training for officials and civil servants on working with migrants – for all, but especially for those working closest to them, i.e. those in the social welfare, education, health or employment system, for example;
- Employment of people (preferably with a migrant background – more on this below) in the offices, including those coordinating with migrants and being guides for new residents of the municipality;
- Ensuring that information about the municipality for new residents is available in a language they can understand.

An extremely important element of support is the employment of people with migration experience in offices (more on this in Chapter 8). This includes offices at different levels and offering different services. This is especially important in institutions providing support, e.g. social welfare, schools (or other educational institutions), labour market institutions, health care and cultural institutions, but also the police or municipal guards. This not only gives access to a person with excellent knowledge of the language, but also of the culture and customs, and who therefore inspires more trust among migrants. She or he can also be a guide for other officials. They can also provide a sense of security to new residents, who find it easier to communicate with them on different levels. Fortunately, there have been many people living in Poland over the years, e.g. from Ukraine, who know the Polish language very well and you can benefit from their skills and presence. The specustawa provides legal opportunities (it is worthwhile for them to stay for a longer period of time and apply to all groups of migrants). Some people also already have Polish citizenship, which allows them to be employed in professions where it is required (e.g. in the Police). The employment of people from Ukraine in the current situation is obvious. Locally, however, it is worth considering whether there are other larger groups of residents coming from other countries in the municipality and then also employing a representative of this group. Two elements are key in this process – knowledge of a foreign language (Ukrainian, English or sometimes French – depending on the group and the municipality), but also the fact that there is a person with migrant experience working in a particular office. This builds trust in the place also for other people with such experience. But importantly, it also introduces another perspective to the working culture of the institution itself – that of a person who did not grow up in our society and for whom Polish is not the first language. As a result, they are able to identify problems that are invisible to Poles.

The administration at various levels also needs to recognise this new, not insignificant group of new residents and inhabitants of Poland, which are people with migration experience, and include them in its activities, but also in the system of social consultation. To this end, it must go out specifically to them, inviting them to these activities. Good examples here are the councils of migrants, such as the one operating in Gdansk (https://bip.gdansk.pl/ prezydent-miasta/gdanskie-rady/Rada-Imigrantow-i-Imigrantek,a,2747), but also other bodies composed of representatives of social organisations, in which migrant organisations also participate, such as in Warsaw (https://um.warszawa.pl/waw/ngo/-/branzowa-komisja-dialogu-spolecznego-ds-cudzoziemcow) or Lublin (https:// lublin.eu/mieszkancy/partycypacja/organizacje-pozarzadowe/komisja-dial/kdo-integracja/). Stimulating civic participation and supporting the leaders of new communities are also important activities.

Social organisations have proven the important role they play in society by responding immediately to the influx of people fleeing Ukraine. Unfortunately, the third sector is not strong and stable, with a small number of community organisations in some communities. This is due, among other things, to the way their activities are

financed from public funds by subsidising (and only partially) the projects they carry out. It is necessary to change the functioning of this system and to enable authorities at different levels to simply fund the activities and existence of individual organisations considered important at the central, regional or local level.

As local governments are now running most of the support for people fleeing Ukraine, there is a need for a working framework at the local level for the various offices and other public and non-public facilities. This is the time for local integration policies to emerge, defining the tasks of different actors and how new communities can be built at the local level (see Chapter 7 for more on this).

Cross-sectoral cooperation must also take place at the central level. A cross-sectoral body is needed, bringing together officials from ministries, representatives of local authorities, social organisations and migrant organisations. However, this must not be a façade institution, but a real working group with which the government will consult on its undertakings and which will have a real influence on the directions of action.

Within the government, it is necessary to establish a separate unit to deal holistically with the migration and integration policy of our country. Currently, these tasks are divided between several ministries. And while it is impossible to centralise everything, and individual ministries will always have their own important roles in the process, it is necessary to establish a single body to coordinate this work and set the tone for the state's migration and integration policy (they cannot, as at present, be split between different ministries).

Recommendations

EU level

- Introduce greater surveillance and additional mechanisms to increase the security of spontaneous relocations of people fleeing the war in Ukraine from Ukraine across the EU and collect data on these migrations;
- To plan and implement an additional, complementary mechanism for the planned relocation of persons fleeing Ukraine between different Member States;
- Implement a mechanism to prevent the risk of falling into undocumented residence and extreme poverty for those fleeing Ukraine and not covered by the (Temporary) Protection Directive.

National level

- Extension of the catalogue of persons covered by the spec law (although not to the full extent) to other groups of persons who have fled or cannot return to Ukraine, as well as extending some of the support measures to other groups of migrants, e.g. Belarusians and other refugees;
- De-bureaucratisation of work and residence legalisation procedures – both for people fleeing Ukraine and for other categories of migrants;
- Ensure protection and support for those with special needs or at risk of exploitation – especially in employment;
- Adapting in various ways offices at different levels to serve migrants in a way that is responsive to their needs, including by employing people with migration experience in public administration;
- Preparing and enacting local integration policies at the local level, providing a framework for building cohesive communities and involving various public and non-public institutions in the process;

- Changing the way in which the activities of community organisations are funded – in addition to subsidising individual, commissioned activities and projects, funding the general functioning of the organisation so that it can achieve the objectives for which it was set up;
- Introduce cross-sectoral dialogue and cooperation at every level of government, taking into account refugee organisations from Ukraine.

Urgent measures to be introduced into the Aid Act:

- Extension of the catalogue of persons covered by the spec law (although not to the full extent) to other groups of persons who have fled or cannot return to Ukraine, as well as extending some of the support measures to other groups of migrants, e.g. Belarusians and other refugees;
- Ensure protection and support for those with special needs or at risk of exploitation – especially in employment;
- To plan and implement an additional, complementary mechanism for the planned relocation of persons fleeing Ukraine between different Member States.

7.

GOVERNANCE, GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE FACE OF THE CRISIS

Iwona Ciećwierz

Jacek Michałowski

It is necessary to finance in full the tasks assigned to local authorities and NGOs by the government administration and all expenses related to refugees, including refinancing their living costs.

1. Background – the reality of local government in Poland

The systemic position of the local government is defined by the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. It is determined by the principle of subsidiarity, whose operational instrument is the principle of decentralisation. The experience of the last 30 years shows the great strength and efficiency of the Polish self-government, especially against the background of other Central and Eastern European countries. The European Charter of Local Self-Government[1] indicates that local self-government expresses the right and capacity of local communities to manage and administer an essential part of public affairs within the limits set by law, on their own responsibility and in the interests of their inhabitants[2].

Since the early 1990s, following the enactment of the Act on the Territorial Self-Government of the Republic of Poland[3], regardless of the changing political colours of the central government, public authority in Poland has been gradually decentralised, in the spirit of the provisions of Article 15 of the Polish Constitution: "The territorial system of the Republic of Poland ensures the decentralisation of public authority. The fundamental territorial division of the state taking into account social, economic or cultural ties and ensuring the ability of territorial units to perform public tasks shall be determined by law" and Article 163 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland: "The territorial self-government performs public tasks not reserved by the Constitution or laws for the bodies of other public authorities"[4]. At that time, the competences and scope of tasks performed by the self-governments of particular levels were significantly increased. The independence of local self-government units (JST) in their performance was also successively increased.

A system of local government was thus formed, which, as in most other democratic countries, was based on the principle of dualism – i.e. public administration is carried out by two sectors: government and local government, which means that some local tasks are carried out directly by the government administration subordinated to the relevant ministries, while the remaining tasks are carried out by the local government representing the interests of the local community.

Government administration on the ground is made up of provincial offices headed by the provincial governor and local government administration is made up of 3 tiers/levels:

- in the provinces: marshal offices with the provincial marshal and provincial assemblies,
- in the county: district offices with the district chief and district councils,
- in municipalities: town halls with mayors or municipal offices with mayors.

In addition to the local government authorities, each voivodeship has a Voivode appointed by the Prime Minister. He/she is the head of the unitary government administration, is also the supervisory authority over the local government units and is a higher level authority as defined in the administrative procedure regulations. The Voivode represents the State Treasury within the scope and on the principles defined in separate acts. As

1 The European Charter of Local Self-Government, drawn up in Strasbourg on 15 October 1985, regulates the status of local authorities in relation to the authorities of a state and in relation to the authorities of other states and the local authorities operating in them. OJ. 1994 No. 124 item 607.

2 Articles 15 and 163, Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, Journal of Laws 1997.78.483

3 Articles 15 and 163, Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, Journal of Laws 1997.78.483 3 Act on municipal self-government of 8 March 1990 Journal of Laws 2020 item 713;
Act on county self-government of 5 June 1998 Journal of Laws 1998 No. 91 item 578;
Act of provincial self-government of 5 June 1998 Journal of Laws 2020.0.1668;

4 Articles 15 and 163, Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, Journal of Laws 1997.78.483

a representative of the Council of Ministers, he/she is responsible for the implementation of government policy in the voivodeship area.

COUNTY

The district performs public tasks of a supra-municipal nature. It performs services for the inhabitants in a fairly general way, such as maintaining and running secondary schools as well as libraries and community centres, supervising road construction and repairs, as well as providing social assistance and combating unemployment (District Employment Offices).

GMINA

The smallest and basic administrative unit. The municipality's sphere of action includes all public affairs of local importance. The municipality is responsible for meeting the basic, specific needs of its inhabitants in the following areas, among others: public transport, water supply, sewerage and sewage disposal, social assistance, public education (primary level), spatial order, and environmental protection.

The structure of local government is based on the principle of self-governance and mutual independence, so the individual local government units are in no way subordinate to each other and are independent of each other. This does not change the fact that good cooperation and communication between them facilitates the administration of a given region. Poland's three-tier administrative division was one of the most successful and effective reforms of the 1990s. That is why the idea and practice of Polish self-government was for many years pointed out as a good example to inspire and be implemented in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc. Many theoreticians and practitioners of Ukrainian self-government have used the Polish experience. Numerous Polish-Ukrainian local government partnerships have organised study visits to Poland, project meetings and joint projects to activate Ukrainian local government and non-governmental circles.

The refugee crisis, linked to the war in Ukraine, but also the one that has been accompanying us for almost a year in connection with the situation on the Polish-Belarusian border, is putting many Polish local authorities to a huge test in terms of governance. This is particularly true of municipalities, each of which has a specific management structure. In cities, but also in medium-sized centres, it is characterised by an extensive office structure and division of responsibilities. In smaller centres and small municipalities, where qualified staff is more difficult to come by, very often the responsibilities of several departments are concentrated in the hand of one or two people. In local government conferences, congresses or workshops for representatives of municipalities, the problem of the lack of support for the development of clerical staff in local authorities and the lack of funds for institutional training is often raised on the one hand, and on the other hand the fact that trained staff quickly disappears into better paid jobs. All this results in a 'litany of responsibilities' resting on one person, which, officials stress, translates into workload, professional burnout or frustration and dissatisfaction.

In such a situation of being overwhelmed by additional responsibilities, it is very difficult for officials to safeguard the interests of the 'client'. The war situation and the centrally mandated task of handling war refugees by municipal officials further exacerbates this. Examples are the departments assigning PESEL numbers, to which there were long queues, or the subordinate units responsible for the payment of additional benefits, e.g. the aid of PLN 300 for a war refugee. Already with these simple tasks, the organisational problems and intuitive action of some local authorities, without a unified crisis management system, were evident. NGOs could be a natural

complementary partner for local authorities. At the same time, their activity was, and should be, complementary, and not completely a hand-out in the implementation of the task and securing the needs resulting from the refugee crisis. Local self-governments, like the government, should treat the so-called civil society as a kind of social capital, enabling everyone to use available resources more efficiently and rationally, which in times of crisis, including a shortage of funds, is of vital importance.

2. What has the Russian aggression and the influx of people fleeing the war changed?

In the first weeks after the outbreak of war, the caring for war refugees from Ukraine was taken up by citizens, organisations and local authorities. They took on the main burden of assistance above all in the initial period, providing very important short-term material, social and psychological support to the war refugees. The grassroots initiative of hosting guests in private homes and flats took on a very large scale. NGOs immediately appeared at the border with emergency aid, and in the larger cities and towns began to set up crisis headquarters and the nucleus of reception points. Three months after the outbreak of war, this system is still in place, thanks in large part to volunteers and staff from NGOs and local governments.

Can such a state of affairs, i.e. such a high level of solidarity and activity by Polish society in favour of Ukraine and refugees, be sustained for much longer? The 'Honeymoon' effect is behind us. Problems and challenges of everyday coexistence emerge, around cultural differences, language misunderstandings or possible competition on the labour market. In the long term, the voluntary aid effort will have to be replaced by a more systemic approach supported legally, organisationally and financially by governmental institutions (more on this in Chapters 2,3,4 and 8). It will be the task of local governments and community-based organisations, after the experience of the first three months of the war, to redefine themselves in relation to the central authority and in relation to each other, especially as the end of the war will not be the end of the refugee crisis, which will evolve and with it the needs of aid organisers and beneficiaries of support.

Polish cities and municipalities have found themselves in a new reality that requires a different view of finances in the coming years. In the light of the reduction of local government revenues by tax reforms (the latest social-tax government programme, the so-called Polish Deal), the underfunding of certain outsourced tasks and the weakening global market situation, the financial situation of local governments will be difficult in the near future. Uncertainty for local authorities is also linked to increasing wage pressures, rapidly rising inflation and the multifaceted effects of the war in Ukraine. This is all the more problematic as it is local government budgets that will fund services aimed at war refugees. Therefore, local governments are already reckoning with an inevitable increase in spending on improving infrastructure and services for education, integration, housing, social care, waste management or communication.

Foundations for a rapid response by local governments and civil society to the refugee crisis

- Poland was the first to recognise Ukraine's independence. Since the early 1990s, many Polish organisations have supported the democratic aspirations of Ukrainian citizens, sowing the seeds of cooperation between both countries.

- Activities under the EU's Eastern Partnership programme, in which Sweden and Poland were leaders, including the "sharing of Polish transformation experiences" with Ukraine, have resulted in hundreds of "partnerships" between local authorities on both sides of the border, many contacts between NGOs, or joint business initiatives.
- Estimated at more than one million, a multitude of Ukrainian men and women came to Poland to work or study. Poles and Ukrainians worked together on building sites, studied in the same student groups and were neighbours. This started the process of eliminating mutual stereotypes and built mutual sympathy and a belief that good cooperation was possible.
- The conviction that "Ukrainians are fighting for Poland", because if they had not resisted, the Russian army might already be in Warsaw, resonates strongly in Polish society, where the slogan "for your freedom and our freedom" is an important part of history.
- In contrast to Hungary, in Poland, despite the sentiment towards the so-called 'borderlands' (the territories of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine that were part of the First and Second Polish Republics in the past), there was no significant political force in Poland working for the annexation of Western Ukraine to Poland (contrary to Russian propaganda).

Source: own elaboration

Recommendations

UNION-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS:

1. Development by the European institutions and the Polish government, in cooperation with local governments and civil society organisations, of a long-term plan that covers not only Poland, but also helps to solve the most important problems related to the influx of war refugees from Ukraine at the international level – it is necessary to **create a deployment (relocation) strategy, in governmental coordination (voivodes), continuously agreed and updated with the level of local governments (districts and municipalities) and NGOs**.

2. **Intensifying cross-border cooperation between local authorities and decision-makers.** The refugee crisis is **an opportunity to build new formats for cross-border cooperation and take new initiatives** under the aegis of the EU. It is important to take into account the fact that local and regional cooperation and action is at the heart of all decisions that are taken at the national and international level.

ADEQUATE FUNDING FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT TASKS:

3. It is necessary to **fully fund the government mandated tasks and all expenses related to refugees, including refinancing their living costs**. Clear refinancing rules, access criteria and sources of funding for local authorities are needed.

4. Prompt **launch of funding programmes that will result in prolonged preparedness and proficiency in**

providing needed services in the form of Local Support and Activation Centres for Ukrainian citizens (e.g. on the basis of former reception points).

5. **Support to local authorities from international** refugee **organisations** (grant system) to the extent anticipated by the biggest challenges affecting this community (education and education infrastructure, health and health infrastructure, job placement, integration and disinformation),

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION:

6. Development by the Polish government in cooperation with local governments and social organisations (Interdisciplinary Team on Migration Policy) of principles of crisis management taking into account the flow of responsibilities and tasks between the government – local government – non-governmental organisations, inter alia, in a refugee crisis situation. Identification and division of municipalities according to the type of assistance provided, i.e. frontline municipalities – borderline (direct reception, first contact, registration, securing basic needs), transit municipalities – transit; destination municipalities (with the possibility to receive refugees for a longer period of time, securing all adaptation needs). It is imperative that appropriate financial and institutional support packages are prepared for each of these types of municipalities (more on this in Chapter 6).

7. **The provisions concerning local government employees need to be made more flexible.** The idea is above all to be able to smoothly reassign them to other tasks when issues suddenly arise that require more immediate support from civil servants, e.g. PESEL registration, tasks carried out by social welfare centres.

8. It is also important to **employ people from Ukraine to work in local government administration**, e.g. in service and support positions. This will greatly improve the day-to-day management of offices and the flow of information between local government and residents and refugees (see Chapter 8 for more on this).

INTEGRATION OF PERSONS FROM UKRAINE

9. **Central administration and local governments should introduce inclusive education measures for people from Ukraine.** Both classes on multiculturalism, which, however, may be controversial for some political circles, and widespread education on disinformation, especially on social media, which should not be controversial, would be desirable. Such classes, currently run by NGOs, not only educate and immunize against disinformation but also, in the long term, prevent radicalisation and allow for an understanding of other perspectives (more on this in Chapters 8 and 9).

10. **Securing the cultural needs of the Ukrainian diaspora in local authorities.** It is necessary to prepare local partners for the possibility that Polish municipalities may become multi-ethnic. It becomes a challenge to "manage multi-ethnicity" in such a way as to level out potential social conflicts (good examples: Sejny and Wisła) how to respond to dangerous or unforeseen situations. We need to create a safe social

environment on both sides of the border (more on this in Chapters 2 and 6).

11. We need to **build trust between local communities on both sides of the border and then equip people with the tools** – primarily communication – to respond appropriately to dangerous or unforeseen situations. We need to create a safe social environment on both sides of the border (more on this in Chapters 2 and 6).

12. **Integration in the labour market and prevention of degradation of refugees** through wise and adequate use of their intellectual potential and their skills, according to their competences and professional aspirations (new tasks for provincial and district labour offices; more on this in Chapters 2 and 6).

13. **The legislation on foster care also needs to be amended**. The current ones are out of step with practice – despite amendments to the special law, introducing the institution of a temporary guardian and facilitating foster care – the system is not prepared for such a large number of Ukrainian orphans. Separating children, placing them in untested families, may do more harm than good. This is a challenge to be worked out by the relevant ministry, in cooperation with local governments (district and municipal level) and NGOs (e.g. Coalition for Foster Care, Legal Intervention Association, etc.).

COOPERATION BETWEEN LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND NGOS

14. **Organise systemic assistance for people fleeing the war in Ukraine**, which has so far been grassroots and flowed from local governments or citizens. It would be better and safer for individuals and organisations that carry out similar tasks to join together in community structures. This will be more transparent and credible for the local government and potential external partners.

15. **Launching programmes that would activate the resources of Social Economy Entities**. It is also necessary to carry out the coordination of support, in terms of directing the assistance stream of refugees' self-organisation.

16. **Close links between local government institutions and civil society institutions.** Changes to the rules regarding cooperation with NGOs that do work for war refugees. Better use of NGOs and volunteers in cities and municipalities – it is worthwhile for municipal volunteer bases to be established. The challenge here is to decide who will manage such resources.

17. **Facilitate Polish NGOs' access to domestic aid funds and external funds (EU and other developed countries' funds, private funds)** – at the level of access criteria and simplification of requirements for settling aid projects (in care to maintain transparency of spending). Avoidance of unnecessary bureaucracy. Introduction of the "principle of proportionality of burdens" – take into account whether the administrative obligations imposed on organisations are necessary and do not impede the meaningful functioning of the organisation (more on this in Chapters 4 and 6).

3. A vision for action in relation to the three scenarios:

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS FROM THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL

I SCENARIO
Continuation of the war (with varying intensity, scope and scale of operations)

- The development of a long-term plan by the European institutions and the Polish government, in cooperation with local governments and civil society organisations, which not only covers Poland, but also helps to solve the main problems related to the influx of war refugees from Ukraine on an international level – a deployment (relocation) strategy is needed. Uncoordinated and unplanned arrivals of large numbers of 'new' refugees can cause many smaller or larger crises locally. Among other things, it is worth defining the so-called reception capacity, the target maximum number of refugees per province. Developing a system to continuously monitor the availability of accommodation throughout the country and relocate those fleeing the war in Ukraine to smaller centres in a proportionate manner. This would require close cooperation between the provincial governor and the district/municipality and NGOs.
- Develop clear refinancing rules, access criteria and sources of funding for local authorities.
- The central administration and local governments should introduce educational measures to foster the integration of people from Ukraine.
- Assistance to local governments and NGOs to make up for the lack of funding for basic services serving refugees (education, health, integration, job search, etc.) from international humanitarian organisations in this scenario would be very helpful.

II SCENARIO
Conclusion of a peace agreement by autumn 2022, stabilising the situation while bringing relatively favourable conditions for Ukraine

- Intensifying cross-border cooperation between local authorities and decision-makers. The refugee crisis is an opportunity to build new formats for cross-border cooperation and launch new initiatives under the aegis of the EU.
- Refinancing of refugee maintenance costs for local and non-governmental institutions and citizens.
- In this scenario, domestic resources should be sufficient to serve those fleeing the war in Ukraine.

III SCENARIO
The war will last longer and lead to more destruction

- Development by the European institutions and the Polish government, in cooperation with local governments and civil society organisations, of a long-term plan that not only covers Poland, but also helps to solve the main problems related to the influx of war refugees from Ukraine on an international level – a deployment (relocation) strategy is needed; (similar to scenario I).

- Development of clear rules for refinancing, access criteria and long-term funding from national sources and EU institutions, for local authorities.
- Integration into the labour market and prevention of degradation of refugees, through the wise and appropriate use of their intellectual potential and their skills.
- Organise systemic assistance for refugees, linked into community structures.
- Access by local governments to international aid to make up for gaps in funding for basic services serving refugees (education, health, integration, job search, etc.) in this scenario would be essential.

8.

INTEGRATION POLICY

Maria Baran

Halina Grzymała-Moszczyńska

The policy on integration of foreigners is becoming the most urgent public policy to be agreed and adopted. In line with the idea of integration, the policy should be developed in consultation with representatives of minorities so that it takes into account not only the perspective of Polish society, but also the needs of immigrant groups, in particular war refugees from Ukraine.

1. What is integration?

From the Second World War until 2022, Poland was a rather culturally homogeneous country (cf. Alseina et al., 2003). The situation began to change from the second decade of the 21st century, when economic immigrants from Eastern Europe arrived in Poland in greater numbers. By the end of 2021, Ukrainians accounted for almost 57% of the total number of foreigners settling in Poland, and although the number of Ukrainians choosing long-term residence over temporary migration has been increasing in recent years, which was a trend in earlier years (Office for Foreigners, 2021), it was not until the war in Ukraine and the influx of people fleeing the war in Ukraine that Poland started to become a culturally pluralistic country.

We are now facing a huge challenge, and the matter is made more difficult by the fact that the Polish government has never had a real policy on migrant integration and multiculturalism management. The biggest danger we see in the current situation is that nothing will change on this issue, i.e. that despite increasing cultural pluralism and a huge influx of forced migrants, the government will not take sufficient action to integrate them into Polish society.

The policy of managing multiculturalism has a reflexive effect on the public mood and expectations of the host society towards immigrants, i.e. the ideology that prevails in a given society. Whether and how Poland will pursue a policy of integration towards war refugees will certainly affect Polish-Ukrainian relations. In order for a multicultural orientation to develop, the following prerequisites are necessary: a widely established acceptance of cultural diversity as a social value (e.g. within the presence of a positive multicultural worldview), a relatively low level of prejudice (e.g.: minimal ethnocentrism, racism and discrimination), positive reciprocal attitudes between ethno-cultural groups (e.g. no specific intergroup hatred), a sense of attachment to or identification with the larger society of all individuals and groups (Berry, 2006). Thanks to the low cultural distance between Poland and Ukraine, some of these conditions are met, but the situation may be changing dynamically, not only as a result of the government's real aid measures or lack thereof, but also the narrative of politicians and the media. The tendency to treat migrants or refugees as tools of political struggle can very easily lead to the displacement of war refugees from Ukraine from the category of 'guests' perceived with kindness and compassion to troublesome 'strangers' deprived of social support, subject to various types of exclusion and exploitation in the labour market.

Drawing on the MIPEX indicators[1] (Migrant Integration Policy Index) and MPI (Multicultural Policy Index, Banting and Kymlicka, 2006-2012), it should be emphasised that integration policy means that the government takes active steps to integrate ethnic minorities into social and public life (community participation in the daily life of a pluralistic society) while supporting these minorities in maintaining their own cultural heritage (continuity of culturally diverse communities), and the institutions of the state evolve to reconcile the needs of all social groups. It should be emphasised that, according to this approach, immigrants adopt the public values that are valid and commonly shared in the country, and therefore respect the democratic laws and values in force. Moreover, integration is a two-way process: for it is not a matter of immigrants merely conforming to the host majority, but rather a mutual process for the coexistence of different ethnic groups in a mutually beneficial way.

Research shows that the higher the MIPEX rates, the more immigrants: feel a greater sense of belonging with the host society, have higher levels of trust, report lower discrimination (Koopmans et al., 2005; Wright and Bloemraad, 2012) and there is a smaller gap between the wages of immigrants and members of the host society (Nieto et al., 2013). Integration costs money, but its absence is much more expensive. Countries with the lowest MIPEX ratios, such as China, Russia and Saudi Arabia, are countries with no integration policies and immigrants

1 The MIPEX index can be very helpful in understanding the most important directions of integration efforts. It is particularly worth looking at the areas in which Poland is assessed most critically by MIPEX analysts, namely: enabling immigrants to participate in political life, education, health care and access to the labour market.

are often deprived of basic rights. In such countries, immigrants are seen as strangers and a threat, resulting in xenophobia, lack of positive cultural contact, lack of integration and social exclusion of minorities.

It would be a big mistake for the Polish government to continue with its current policy ('equality on paper', MIPEX, 2020), i.e. no real integration policy, including a programme to manage multiculturalism in Poland. If multiculturalism is perceived and accepted only as the tolerated presence of different cultures in society, and the government does not promote inclusivity through programmes that reduce barriers to the equitable participation of minorities in society, integration becomes impossible and two or more distinct groups start to function within society, leading to segregation (Berry and Ward, 2016).

Another potential mistake to be avoided could be attempts to push assimilationist policies that aim to limit the expression of immigrants' cultural values. Integration should not be confused with assimilation, which consists of measures aimed at the complete absorption of minority groups into the mainstream in such a way that the minority groups eventually disappear (so their cultural continuity is interrupted and absorption is the only condition for their acceptance in society). Assimilation is a coercive policy which, leaving aside all objective reasons to its economic and social disadvantage, would, in the context of Ukraine's war for independence, be not only unethical but doomed to total failure.

2. The role of the low cultural distance between Poland and Ukraine

Ukraine and Poland are countries with a very low cultural distance, which is a great advantage of the current situation, as cultural differences should not be a major obstacle to integration. The differences between Poland and Ukraine are not drastic, there are no conflicts of values that need to be addressed and potentially antagonise the two communities. Absent here is a dilemma that has not been positively resolved in Western Europe: how to integrate citizens from countries with a large cultural distance while respecting the cultural norms of the newcomer communities?

On the other hand, with a low cultural distance, one can expect that one of the dilemmas that will replace the discussion on potentially conflicting cultural values will be the question of implementing or enabling Ukrainian institutions in Poland. Given the specifics of the current migration and its potentially temporary nature, it would have to be done first and foremost: 1) inclusively, i.e. by including Ukrainians in the processes of deliberation on specific action strategies, 2) by ensuring the continuity of their identity and thus, consequently, the continuity of institutions in the form they prefer (e.g. on the basis of exceptions in Polish law rather than changing the entire Polish law), 3) at the same time offering a platform for cultural exchange and facilitating cultural contacts between Poles and Ukrainians (allowing them to enter the Polish system, but on flexible terms adapted to their needs).

Research suggests that the greater the similarity between the migrants' culture of origin and the culture of the country of settlement, the easier the acculturation process and therefore fewer social problems and higher well-being of migrants (Ward and Searle, 1991). Paradoxically, cultural proximity is also a challenge. In the host country, but also among migrants, there may be a misguided and damaging belief that since the two countries are similar, migrants will seamlessly, naturally find their way into society and integrate themselves. Nothing could be further from the truth. The big risk is that, due to cultural proximity and language similarity, both sides will not make the necessary efforts to integrate. The worst possible scenario is that the government decides that nothing needs to be done and the problem will solve itself. Poland, faced with yet another migration crisis, cannot afford to

make the mistakes of the 'West' and recognise that 'somehow it will be done' and that the laws of the free market will spontaneously regulate the relations of the majority society with the national minorities.

A low cultural distance is not synonymous with the absence of cultural differences which, even if small, should not be underestimated. Awareness of the existence of cultural differences and understanding them is important for Polish-Ukrainian relations, but also for appropriately addressed actions aimed at integrating Ukrainians into Polish society and preventing potential conflicts and misunderstandings.

Examples of differences that will need to be tackled could include gender equality and the role of women and men in society. Data from the 2020 World Values Survey shows that Poles are more positive about gender equality in education, politics and the labour market than Ukrainians. Ukrainians were more likely than Poles to agree with the statements: university is more important for a boy than a girl (22.7% of Ukrainians agreed vs. 9.8% of Poles), men are better as CEOs than women (40% of Ukrainians agreed vs. 19.7% of Poles), pre-school children suffer when their mother works (54.8% of Ukrainians agreed vs. 50% of Poles). These differences point to a potential challenge with the economic activation of Ukrainian women in Poland. Especially the last belief will need to be addressed, i.e. the Polish government coming out to meet the needs of Ukrainian mothers and creating conditions where mothers have the belief that they can combine work with access to good and quality out-of-home care for their children[2]. A good solution, adopted by the government and reported by experts and NGOs, is the creation of care facilities (club-type), paid for by the Polish state, to be aimed at Ukrainian children and run by Ukrainian mothers who do not work and do not plan to work outside the home and look after their own children anyway. The advantage of such a form of childcare is not only that it is a solution that does not overburden already overburdened Polish nurseries and kindergartens, but also that it prevents tensions between Poles and Ukrainians in the face of competition for a scarce good, i.e. a place in a state/city nursery or kindergarten. At the same time, it is a solution that would enable Ukrainian women who want to be economically active to enter the labour market.

Another potential challenge may be different practices, i.e. commonly accepted ways of behaviour in a given culture, which, when trying to transfer them from Ukraine to Poland, may lead to misunderstandings and sometimes even legal troubles. Such different practices may be related, for example, to differences in corruption in Poland and Ukraine. The Corruption Perceptions Index (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2021) is higher for Ukraine (56/100, ranked 42nd out of 180 countries) than for Poland (32/100, ranked 11th out of 180 countries). As many as 10% of Poles admit to having given a bribe in the past 12 months compared to 23% of Ukrainians. On the other hand, common practices do not necessarily entail their acceptance, e.g. many young Ukrainians went abroad, including to Poland, to study before the war. They were often motivated by the fact that although in Poland they have to pay to study at a private university, they receive a good education in return, whereas in Ukraine it was quite common practice to buy a diploma.

One dimension that differentiates individual countries is the question of the strength of social norms, i.e. the attitude to rules and regulations and the degree of acceptance vs. severity of punishment of deviations from them (so-called tight vs. loose cultures, Gelfand et al., 2011, 2021). Poland, research shows, is one of the countries with a rather loose approach to social rules and norms, which translates, among other things, into poorer coping in difficult situations such as pandemics and disasters. However, it turns out that in the case of Ukraine, the cultural rigidity index (1.6) is lower than for Poland (6), which can, as in the corruption example illustrated above, lead to surprise at the strictness of the enforcement of certain laws or rules and misunderstandings on this ground. It is therefore important to name the differences that exist, of course in a way that does not stigmatise, and to educate, e.g. adaptation training.

2 In the case of this statement, the differences between Ukraine and Poland are small, which means that in general the government should address the issue of pre-school care and access to it to such an extent that all citizens feel that career is not incompatible with motherhood.

Through research conducted in the working environment of Poles and Ukrainians (Malota, 2017), it is possible to identify differences and potential difficulties in this area. For example, although hierarchical organisational structures are prevalent in the case of institutions in both countries, Ukrainian respondents were more likely than Polish respondents to indicate hierarchical management. The existence of more equal and partnership organisational structures was indicated by 29% of Poles and only 16% of Ukrainians, and a partnership style of management by: 43% of Poles and 12% of Ukrainians. Both Polish and Ukrainian employees are characterised by collectivism, e.g. they prefer to work in a team rather than individually and often help each other, but in the case of Ukrainians, this happens to a greater extent. Ukrainians also, more often than Poles, transfer relationships from work to the private sphere. Communication patterns are also different. Poland is also more monochromatic compared to Ukraine, which means being more punctual and sticking more closely to schedules. All these differences can pose challenges when it comes to delegating responsibilities, giving corrective feedback and generally being satisfied with Polish-Ukrainian cooperation. Education and training to sensitise both sides to possible areas of difference are therefore important. Those employing Poles and Ukrainians should introduce employee sensitisation training on these issues to prevent conflicts and foster mutual understanding.

The above exemplary differences may challenge Polish-Ukrainian relations both directly (influencing behaviour and leading to misunderstandings) and indirectly, when cultural differences are used to stigmatise, stereotype and even dehumanise Ukrainians in Poland by anti-immigration groups and/or as part of a disinformation war. It may also be a mistake to 'overlook' cultural differences due to fear of stereotyping Ukrainians. Such excessive fear of naming and pointing out existing differences while only emphasising existing similarities is an illustration of ethnocentrism (the so-called 'minimisation of differences', Bennett, 2004) and leads to the proverbial 'sweeping of issues under the carpet' until they grow into such a problem that conflict is inevitable. Such a flashpoint could be, for example, the issue of the popularity of anti-vaccine movements in Ukraine (Cope et al., 2021).

Another challenge in the case of neighbouring countries is their shared and often antagonistic history, due to the common border. In the case of Poland and Ukraine, this axis of discord includes Volhynia, the "Vistula" campaign or, for example, the crime in Sahryń. Potential antagonisms need to be directly addressed and extinguished. On the one hand, it is worth supporting initiatives to discuss facts and their interpretation and, on the other hand, educational initiatives based on cultural contact which lead to the highlighting of various, including positive, aspects of bilateral relations, and not just the most tragic ones.

3. Polish-Ukrainian relations

The willingness to provide even temporary shelter to refugees largely depends on their origin: studies have revealed a preference by Poles for immigrants with a low cultural distance, i.e. mainly Ukrainians compared to those from the Middle East (Penczek et al., 2016) or Africa (CBOS, 2015; 2018). Other studies have indicated that Poles are generally less prejudiced against women than men (Stefaniak, 2015), which may partly explain the generally positive attitude of Poles towards female war refugees from Ukraine.

Since 2014/2015, when increased labour migration of Ukrainians to Poland began, the frequency of cultural contacts between Poles and Ukrainians has also increased. This has led to increasingly positive relations and a decrease in prejudice between citizens of both countries (Bulska, 2022). Research indicates that a large proportion of Ukrainians and Poles emphasise their mutual cultural proximity and do not perceive negative cultural stereotypes, which bodes well for further relations. If they did appear, they were related to historical symbolism (more so among Poles than Ukrainians) or negative experiences at work (Koval et al., 2021). Research from 2022, before

the outbreak of war, indicates that Polish society is less prejudiced against Ukrainians than it was as recently as 2017. Ukrainians are now seen as more friendly, competent and moral (Bulska, 2022).

The huge grassroots aid spurt of Poles indicates a high empathy and sense of solidarity with Ukrainians. However, it is known from research on social support that the initial phase of mobilisation in a crisis is soon followed by the so-called deterioration of social support (Kaniasty and Norris, 1995), i.e. people stop helping or do not help as much as they did immediately after the threat appeared. There is also frustration and disappointment with insufficient or inadequate help. It is important that in the current situation, firstly, the government becomes more involved in programmes to help Ukrainians in Poland and, secondly, that it does not lose sight of the Poles most in need. If there is no systemic assistance and relief for Poles, it is very possible that there will be hostility towards those fleeing the war in Ukraine.

The burn-out of grass-roots social support can be prevented by a different organisation of assistance, which would at the same time foster integration and prevent possible abuses. We propose to create a volunteer offer: a) for Polish families, b) for pupils and students. On the Norwegian model, a long-term volunteer programme could be set up, in which several willing families take responsibility for helping one Ukrainian family living in a particular locality. This requires both a declaration (and a contract) of how much time and to what extent each family in such a support network could devote to helping a particular family. Similarly, following the example of the Erasmus programme and cultural mentors, a volunteer programme for Polish school students ('buddy system') could be prepared, in which several Polish students, as in the programme for families, would declare the long-term extent of their support for a specific Ukrainian student (this could be spending time together, engaging in hobbies, drawing in a group of friends, sports, walks, etc.).

It is important that students are 'rewarded' in this programme, if only with an opinion that could be taken into account when applying for university and/or work.

Despite the generally positive attitudes of Poles towards Ukrainians, it is important to realise that there is a part of Polish society which has negative attitudes towards war refugees. Since changing attitudes in such a case, if at all possible, is extremely difficult, the focus should rather be on prevention. This means, on the one hand, educating that part of society which has not yet expressed antagonism (classes on multiculturalism in schools: for students as well as staff; introducing multiculturalism into the curriculum of universities educating people who will cooperate with clients/patients from Ukraine; training in companies, social campaigns, etc.) and, on the other hand, reacting very resolutely and quickly to all manifestations of discrimination and hate speech. Legislation, anti-discrimination policies as well as close monitoring of the situation and prevention of hate speech are important here.

4. Psychological challenges of refugeeism

Changing the country of residence is a challenge in itself. It often involves a loss of status, having to learn everything and build a support network virtually from scratch, which in turn can lead to the so-called acculturation stress. This stress can be compounded by experiences of discrimination and prejudice. In the case of forced migration, this situation is compounded by the need to cope with loss and traumatic events. The current migration is therefore diametrically different from the economic migration between 2014 and 2021. It is not only the demographic, but above all the psychological aspects of refugeeism. Some refugees, i.e. people who have been forced to migrate and who have often experienced trauma, lost possessions and loved ones, may develop various types of mental disorders that require treatment. Therefore, access to rapid and free psychological assistance is

extremely important in this case. It is essential that refugees have access to help in Ukrainian, and therefore to psychologists who speak that language. Ideas about providing therapy through an interpreter may fail. Due to the previous economic migration from Ukraine, it can be assumed that Ukrainian experts are present and working in Poland and have competence in crisis intervention and psychotherapy. It is also possible that such specialists came to Poland as refugees – it is an urgent matter to identify them. It would be possible to set up consultation points for psychological support for people from Ukraine and employ Ukrainian psychologists in them (knowledge of the Polish language would not be necessary here).

Prevention should also be taken care of. In a crisis situation with people fleeing the war, social support acts as a buffer against negative psychological consequences and also has a positive effect on socio-cultural adaptation. It should be made possible for Ukrainians to form and function within mutual support groups – at a minimum by providing space for this (e.g. in schools). However, it is very important that the government does not reduce its aid measures to the issue of Ukrainian self-help only – without other systemic measures, this solution will not be sufficient (for more on this see Chapter 5).

Looking ahead, it should be anticipated that when the war ends, some of the men currently fighting will want to come to Poland to join their families. The Polish state should make family reunification possible in this situation. However, one should be aware that the trauma of war can lead, among other things, to combat and operational stress in veterans, which poses both a direct challenge for the victims themselves and their families, as well as a social challenge. Given the difficult situation with access to psychiatric care in Poland, there is an urgent need to implement and train social workers to support war veterans.

It is important to realise that not every refugee will develop mental health problems as a result of trauma. This has implications for the problem of stigmatising refugees – those fleeing war are not people with mental illness. Another danger of categorisation concerns the treatment of all Ukrainians, also economic migrants to Poland before 2022, as war refugees. This group includes people who, like refugees, are afraid for their relatives and family left behind in Ukraine, people who have lost loved ones, and people who actively help people coming to Poland. At the same time, these Ukrainians may be affected by a secondary loss of the social status they have already developed, when they start to be suddenly and universally treated as needing help and failing to cope. They may feel psychological distress on the one hand and loneliness on the other, due to the fact that they do not want to burden their guests with their own problems, which may seem trivial in the face of escaping the war. Such people also need support – not only financial, as do the Polish families involved in helping them, but also psychological support.

With such a large aid movement and large-scale grassroots efforts by Poles, education about aid itself is also necessary: making Poles aware that aid works when it meets the needs of the people concerned and when it does not overwhelm. Rather than bailing refugees out, support should be provided to help them do things themselves. Equally important is answering the questions: how to support people who have experienced trauma, and how to take care of themselves and their well-being?

The situation is further complicated by the nature of forced migration, which is associated with a high hope for an imminent return to the home country – such anticipation of the possibility of returning home may additionally hinder involvement in social life in Poland and reduce motivation for integration. This is all the more risky as it is not known if and when such an opportunity to return will ever arise.

Refugees need a sense of normality, i.e. daily routines: engaging in work, going to school, making friends, etc. Research suggests that it is the stressors of everyday life that explain most disorders, such as depression or functioning problems in people who have experienced trauma (after Anczyk and Grzymała-Moszczynska, 2021). Helping people fleeing war should be preceded by an analysis of what the pressing need or difficulty is and the removal of this obstacle, which is often environmental support. In many cases, the most effective interaction

directed at refugees is not so much to try to treat the psychopathology known as PTSD, but to strengthen families and communities, to enable them to function normally (including work and a roof over their heads), which may in turn have a greater impact on the support received by refugee children (Anczyk and Grzymała-Moszczyńska, 2021). Systemic measures to facilitate access to the labour market, educational facilities and health care are therefore important: research indicates that the distress of refugee children caused by exile, social isolation and discrimination combined with the need to care for younger siblings and/or parents e.g. with disabilities is often a greater burden than the experience of war itself (Porter and Haslam, 2005; after Anczyk and Grzymała-Moszczynska, 2021). Equally important is the offer of joint forms of recreation for Ukrainians with other Ukrainians, but also for Ukrainians and Poles (so-called bonding and bridging capital) – such initiatives are already emerging, but need to be introduced on a wider scale. A completely basic issue is to inform refugees about where, for example, there are green areas in the neighbourhood, whether and which cultural offerings they can use free of charge or at a reduced fee, and to provide such offerings. Here, an illustration of such good practice can be found in the activities of Krakow or Warsaw, where Ukrainians can enter museums for free or for a symbolic zloty, and many institutions organise free workshops for Ukrainian children – there should be more such initiatives.

5. Language and education

Especially in the context of forced migration, all integration measures should be built around competences. It is very important to provide refugees with tools that enable them to gain independence and a sense of agency. Such a tool is first and foremost language, which on the one hand enables integration (Polish) and on the other enables the maintenance of one's own cultural identity (Ukrainian). Integration activities should therefore focus on learning the language (more on this in Chapters 2, 4 and 5).

Intensive Polish language courses are needed for Ukrainian war refugees. Academic centres teaching Polish as a foreign language have the tools and knowledge of how to do this. It would also be possible to include participants in postgraduate studies in glottodidactics in this form of education. The principle of "small groups and interactive classes" requires a large number of staff and finances, and the intensity of full-time teaching could exclude the possibility of a full-time job in the first period, so we recommend online classes in which one teacher can lead several smaller, interactive groups.

In the situation of forced migration, when refugees often feel distress, it is very important to provide them with formal and legal security, at a minimum, if only by providing a clear package of information on the rights and realities related to their stay in Poland (how to receive a PESEL number, how does it affect possible further relocation, what assistance benefits are available, or what is the access to health care and education?). It is very important to make the informational scope of access to medical care more realistic. GPs are often confronted with entitlement attitudes, e.g. one person from the Ukraine signs up for an appointment and several come because they are also ill. As a result, they push scheduled Polish patients for more hours out of the queue (more on this in Chapter 5). Quick access to all types of organisational information can have a positive impact on the sense of security and personal control, as well as preventing potential Polish-Ukrainian conflict and resentment. This type of information should be provided in Ukrainian and at the earliest possible stage of contact between Ukrainians and Polish officials – optimally still at the border or at least at specially established consultation centres – but then refugees should be given clear information at the border to report to such centres.

War refugees from Ukraine should also find it easier to function in Polish offices. Assigning a PESEL number, applying for benefits – these are matters that refugees have to deal with very soon after arriving in Poland,

and thus still often without knowledge of the Polish language. Therefore, the language in the offices should be adapted to Ukrainian needs (more on this in Chapters 6 and 7). It is very important to remember that the Ukrainian alphabet is derived from the Cyrillic alphabet. Therefore, the documents (including medical as well as school documents) with which refugees arrive in Poland are in practice illegible for many Poles under the age of 50. The optimal solution would be to employ Ukrainian-speaking staff in the offices. Another idea, probably more feasible in the short term, would be to create translation call-centres (Polish-Ukrainian), which could be used by Ukrainian and Polish employees (in offices, but also in health care institutions). The idea of employing 'on-call' translators on a large scale is taken from the Norwegian experience – the same translator can serve many doctors and/or officials. Moreover, such a service, which is an alternative to open bilingualism in public places, would not create potential conflicts between Poles and Ukrainians.

It should be emphasised that so far the main area of Polish-Ukrainian interaction has been the work environment (Koval et al., 2021). Now it will most likely be the school, which is why it is so important to target systemic measures in these areas, especially in education, as schools bring together not only children, but also their parents (more on this in Chapter 4). The school has a real chance to become a platform for Polish-Ukrainian integration, especially as Ukrainian parents emphasise that "(...) children's attendance at Polish schools is a key element of their integration into Polish society and hope for a better future." (Cope et al., 2021, p. 24).

In order to support the children and their families in this, we propose, first of all, to employ, on a large scale, in schools and kindergartens attended by Ukrainian children, so-called intercultural assistants, i.e. people whose task is to support foreign children and their parents in education, but also in integration with Poles, solving current problems, informing about opportunities and mediating in case of potential difficulties. Intercultural assistants could be Ukrainian women, ideally – already speaking Polish and familiar with Polish realities. Their task would be both to support Ukrainian children and parents, but also Polish teachers or administrative staff.

The experiences of Roma assistants show that while it is relatively easy to introduce assistants into schools, it is much more challenging to get them into a position in the school that would allow them to function in a friendly and supportive environment. Training on multiculturalism could be helpful: not only for assistants, but also for other teachers – so that they do not see these newcomers as a threat, but as support, and so that assistants are in constant contact with teachers and head teachers. Training for Polish teachers is also essential. This is important because without the right knowledge, even with good intentions, teachers can harm children. For example, it happens that teachers encourage parents to speak Polish to their children at home and encourage their children to do so "because it will be easier for the child". Teachers should know that the Ukrainian language is one of the few areas of stability for these children when everything else has been lost. In addition, trying to push the Ukrainian language out of the home is a way of exerting assimilation pressure (see Chapter 4 for more on this).

The integration of refugee children should be based first and foremost on enabling them to learn the Polish language quickly and effectively through intensive and residential language courses (with extended hours and with an adapted teaching method for learning Polish as a foreign language), as well as continuing to learn Ukrainian and other subjects, e.g. Ukrainian history – these classes would be open to all applicants, including Polish pupils. In addition, lectures on disease prevention and health care should take place during these classes. This is particularly important given the differences in health care, including mandatory vaccinations, between Poland and Ukraine.

It is equally important to introduce multiculturalism into the curriculum by creating activities aimed at children, where they would be sensitised to cultural differences, challenge ethnocentrism and learn about multiculturalism and openness, as well as learn ways to develop cultural sensitivity and empathy (such as perspective-taking). In addition to education, prevention is important: it is worth disseminating projects to monitor and combat school

violence such as Resql[3]. At the same time, it is also worth developing them in Ukrainian, which would significantly lower the barrier to use the application by teachers of Ukrainian students.

It is also very important to introduce more education on multiculturalism, the psychology of migration and acculturation and intercultural psychology in the training of psychologists, pedagogues and all teaching specialisations, so that professionals in these areas acquire competences for working with students and clients from other cultures. Currently, such competences are lacking and it happens that the lack of the necessary contextual knowledge – both of migration and of cultural differences – leads to errors in, for example, psychological diagnosis and judgment. It also happens that leading authorities add Ukrainian children to groups of Polish children with special educational needs working with a support teacher. These teachers are not able to work with children from a different culture, but the leading authorities of schools are very keen on such solutions because they do not require the hiring of new teachers.

It is very urgent to create support groups for Polish teachers working with Ukrainian children. Many of these teachers face disregard and undermining of their competence from the school when reporting any problems. Such groups should operate online and bring together teachers not from the same school (due to potential conflicts), but from different schools.

A separate challenge is the support and education of children staying in Poland without parents: this group includes not only orphan children, but also children deprived of parental care. This challenge existed before, but now the number of Ukrainian children in boarding schools may increase, especially when mothers return to Ukraine to, for example, take care of the elderly or people with disabilities who did not have the opportunity to escape the war. In such a situation, refugee mothers may decide, for safety reasons, to leave their children in Poland. A situation in which a child has tutors working in shifts and does not live with parents or a legal guardian can be very difficult for developmental reasons (e.g. developing a healthy attachment style). It is therefore necessary, on the one hand, to improve the qualifications of the teaching staff in boarding schools in the field of war trauma, as well as to offer forms of group support for these children, which entails the introduction of additional full-time positions, by employing, for example, Ukrainian female psychologists in these institutions.

In order to realise the ideas outlined in this text, a governmental multicultural management programme is necessary, without which all integration efforts will be fragmented and much less effective. The migrant integration programme should address the current needs of war refugees, but also the broader migrant groups present in Poland. In line with the idea of integration, the policy should be developed in consultation with representatives of minorities so that it addresses not only Polish needs, but also the needs of these groups. The creation of such a programme by the government would facilitate the implementation of specific policies at the local level. Moreover, a clear and coherent programme would make it possible to prevent possible crises in the future.

3 Resql is a state-of-the-art app and innovative system to support schools in addressing peer violence. Website: www.resql.pl

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9.

DISINFORMATION AND CYBERSECURITY

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In uncertain times, there is a growing fear resulting from a misunderstanding of reality. This fear is exploited by Russian disinformation, which offers easy-to-understand, simplistic interpretations of reality and makes it easier to find meaning in these events. In this way, Russia attempts to reinforce existing intra-national social and political divisions, to weaken hostile states and to strain their alliances.

1. Russian disinformation prior to the invasion of Ukraine

In 1997, Russian ideologue, Alexander Dugin, published Fundamentals of Geopolitics, where he wrote that for Russia to rebuild its global power, it would have to use disinformation, destabilisation and annexation as tools. According to Dugin, an independent Ukraine stands in Russia's way of becoming a transcontinental superpower, so its annexation is necessary. "Dugin's 'Fundamentals of Geopolitics' was used as a textbook at the Russian army's General Staff Academy.

It is in Russia's interest to weaken the internal cohesion of its enemy states and to strain their alliances. To this end, disinformation is used, through which Russia attempts to reinforce existing social and political divisions and exploit societal needs to make sense of reality in uncertain times (cf. Box 1). Russia's actions are reinforcing the general decline in Western societies' trust in the media (Edelman Trust Barometer 2022).

The opportunity to influence society through social media was quickly spotted by the Kremlin. Russian disinformation activities are systemically supported and inspired by the authorities. By April 2022, the European External Action Service's East StratCom task force had recorded and verified almost 14,000 instances of pro-Kremlin organised disinformation[1].

According to a Rand Corporation analysis (Paul, Matthews 2016), the distinguishing features of Russian propaganda are:

- Large scale and outreach through various channels/platforms;
- Speed, continuity and repeatability;
- Lack of attachment to objective reality;
- Lack of attention to consistency.

In addition to the activities of Russian disinformation, other political actors – foreign (e.g. China during the pandemic), but above all internal – also benefit from the opaque nature of social media. While the activities of foreign actors are unequivocally judged negatively and subject to observation and analysis, the activities of internal actors on social media are seen as part of the political debate, although they can have sordid effects, such as the attack on the Capitol on 6 January 2022. With exceptions, neither the services nor the social media platforms in Poland limit the disinformation activities of internal actors.

Even before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, there was a significant amount of anti-Ukrainian content on social media. Probably some of it was inspired by Russia, while some of it was certainly created by Polish nationalist circles and ordinary citizens. From a 2019 report by the Association of Ukrainians in Poland. (Tyma et al. 2019) found that 41% of social media statements in Poland about people from Ukraine were negative in nature, and most are divided by a shared history. The CBOS cyclical survey of attitudes of Polish citizens and nationals towards other nations (CBOS 2022) shows an improvement in attitudes towards people from Ukraine, although as recently as 2019, 41% of respondents declared aversion to their neighbours, today it is 25%. Unpublished qualitative research conducted by the Prof Bronisław Geremek Centre Foundation in 2020 confirmed the potential of anti-Ukrainian narratives – people participating in focus groups unprovoked drew attention to the 'problem' of the presence of people from Ukraine in Poland.

1 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/

Box 1. Disinformation as a social phenomenon that Russia exploits

Fear and a disturbed sense of security have always been exploited by propaganda, and its tools – disinformation, hate speech, pointing to an enemy you only need to defeat to feel safe – have served authoritarian governments, political leaders and ethnic or religious leaders around the world. Nowadays, both politics and war use disinformation for their own purposes: to increase power, to undermine the positions and attitudes of opponents, to create fear, to weaken the will to fight or the will to cultivate and guard values, and, as a result, for social polarisation.

What has changed in recent decades is the information environment. In the era of mass media, a few actors (controlling the media; press, radio and television) were able to dominate the entire narrative sphere. In the age of social media, not only can everyone be a broadcaster of content, but also 'everyone can see something different'. Politics and war are run by someone, so a complex network of actors, personal and institutional creators of disinformation on an industrial scale (the 'disinformation industry' characterised in Oxford Internet Institute reports) is created. In addition, the ecosystem of information circulation itself, if only due to the volume of content and the vagueness of the algorithms, has become opaque and ephemeral (difficult to grasp and therefore difficult to analyse). These features are perfectly capable of being exploited by circles interested in leapfrogging the status quo within democratic countries, supported by the special forces of authoritarian countries headed by Russia. An example of Russia's activities in democratic processes in other countries is the Kremlin's proven involvement in the US elections and the Brexit referendum.

They make use of one of the basic human needs that emerges especially in violent, uncertain times: making sense of events. This is because functioning in a world that one does not understand induces a sense of anxiety, as one then loses a sense of control over one's own life. As Polish sociologist and cultural studies scholar Marcin Napiórkowski put it (Napiórkowski 2018): *Every institution confronting conspiracy theories, every brand measuring itself against negative consumer mythology, and every doctor or official fighting against pseudo-medical movements, quickly find that contemporary mythology is the real hydra. One debunked theory is replaced by three others, and in addition, the process of debunking itself is subject to secondary mythologisation – "after all, they wouldn't fight it so much if there wasn't something to it". Pseudo-scientific theories often win out over science precisely because they offer a very attractive vision of the world in which everyone can feel like a hero (...). On the other hand, a world without myths would be a world without meaning. No one would want to live in a reality that is devoid of them.*

In addition, mass disinformation about COVID-19 vaccination based mainly on conspiracy theories has reduced the trust of citizens in the mainstream media and in politicians (the Edelman Trust Barometer shows this). It can be speculated that the experience of the pandemic has increased the public's susceptibility to conspiracy theories. The observed shift in the main axes of expression from anti-vaccine to anti-Ukrainian by many social media accounts may confirm such a development. It is also possible that we are dealing with organised disinformation that has changed the object of interest or both at the same time.

The situation of war, migration on a scale unprecedented in modern Poland, the increasingly difficult economic situation, which followed immediately after the biggest health crisis in a century, build fertile ground for various, including radical, narratives. Disinformation, creating a sense of doubt, creating fears and inciting resentment and hatred, can lead to an exacerbation of relations with the Ukrainian community and thus undermine the effectiveness and weaken the conditions for implementing the process of integration of Ukrainians and Poles.

The migration/refugee crisis has meant that the harmful mechanisms, processes and policies present before the war pose an even greater threat to social cohesion and security for all groups living and residing in Poland.

2. Targets of anti-Ukrainian disinformation following Russia's invasion of Ukraine

As a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Poland is becoming a multi-ethnic society at an accelerated pace. All scenarios presented in the introduction to the report assume an increase in the number of Ukrainians in Poland from 700,000 to 2.5 million people. Some of them also assume a sanction-induced deterioration of living conditions in Belarus and, as a result, increased migration also from its territory. One of the goals of Russian disinformation in such a situation will undoubtedly be to fuel conflicts and divisions between the various nationalities living in Poland.

Looking back from the beginning of Putin's aggression against Ukraine and the first hours of the great refugee wave of Ukrainians (mainly women and children) to Poland, the following phenomena and dominant themes, among others, can be observed in the disinformation space[2]:

1. **Stirring up resentment against people from Ukraine on a social and economic level,** so as to create a feeling of unfair and inferior treatment of Poles:

- War refugees from Ukraine will bring polio disease to Poland (news and analysis of 5.04.2022);
- Police officers (Subcarpathian region) go around houses with census extracts (and thus violate data protection rules in order to extort aid for Ukrainians) and look for places to place refugees (from 15.04.2022);
- PESEL is the granting of citizenship, and in a short while, by voting, Ukrainians will change politics in Poland and, as displaced persons, will displace Poles from many social and professional positions (of 07.04.2022);

2 The examples shown are taken from analyses by 'Demagog.PI' and OKO Press, mainly from the first two weeks of April – where precise explanations are provided as to why the reported news is untrue.

- The Planetarium in Zielona Góra offers all screenings in Ukrainian, which makes their access unequal for Polish children (of 08.04.2022);
- The law against the Poles (statement of Father Marek Baek on gloria.tv on the channel "Television of Christ the King" of 21.03.2022): the rich Ukrainians themselves are coming to Poland, and only from the western part of the country, they get help, and Polish families will find themselves in a worse material situation and Ukrainian families in a privileged one;
- Graph comparing the amount of benefits or value of services available to Ukrainians and Poles (falsified part of data on the monetary value of support) with caption: "which family is a category 2 citizen in their own country?" (launched with other messages in the last days of March 2022, according to Anna Mierzyńska, OKO Press);
- Injustice in access to health care services: Ukrainian families are guaranteed access to services in the health care system, which will result in longer queues for Polish families (there are isolated negative signals about hindering access to health care for Poles, although they spread relatively quickly through various media channels, the "whispered message" is strong);
- A small proportion of Ukrainian children and young people benefit from Polish education (although so much is said about the need for support) – according to the Ministry of Education of Ukraine, 540,000 children benefit from remote learning offered by Ukraine (this official information from the end of April – began to gain unfavourable comments questioning the sense of the Polish effort for Ukrainian children in the sphere of education, if Ukrainians are "so ungrateful" (28.04.2022);
- Ukrainians, even without qualifications, can work in Polish schools and universities weakening the position of Poles (of 06.04.2022).

2. Inciting resentment towards people from Ukraine in the perspective of having to defend 'Polishness':

- Display of the Ukrainian flag (on the Warsaw City Hall) evidence of the occupation of Poland (information and analysis of 7.04.2022);
- Information (repeated despite denials since 2015) about the Jewish background of President Andrzej Duda (Aaron Fejgenbaum) and that his grandfather (Mychail Duda) was a Bandera (dated 8.04.2022);
- Spreading the fear of war (why get so involved in solidarity with the Ukrainians...) by launching, for example, viral information (a photo of the Russian embassy in Warsaw with smoke rising at the back) that Russians are burning documents in the embassy, which would mean that – as in Kiev – there could be Russian aggression against Poland in a week's time (information from Twitter of 22.03.2022);
- The spreading of fear of nuclear war appears in disinformation sporadically as an echo of statements by the Kremlin, and mainly Putin, to reinforce each time the sense of fear of war and its dangers (according to a March/April IPSOS survey for 27 countries – 77% of Poles feel threatened by war, every other Pole feels such a threat as a personal one, and only 13% of Poles would like Polish troops to be sent to Ukraine) (from 28.04.2022);
- Undermining the tragedy of the war in Ukraine – since, according to disinformation reports, 1 million Ukrainians returned to their homes for the Easter holidays, this means that the war in Ukraine is being exaggerated (meanwhile – 1 million have returned since the beginning of the war/mainly men, and 136,000 people crossed the borders during the holiday period according to the Border Guard);
- Israel has seized land in Ukraine in order to establish a state there (it is referred to in disinformation messages as 'Heavenly Jerusalem') moving it from Palestine, also annexing the Galician part of Poland in the near future (of 06.04.2022).

3. Already emerging fields of tension and disinformation narratives

The examples mentioned are only a sample of the disinformation that emerged in Poland after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and is still ongoing. Disinformation campaigns undermining the socio-cultural integration efforts of Poles and Ukrainians at this special historical moment are yet to be initiated. However, the main threads of possible action are already being outlined:

- At the very beginning of the war, there was no strongly developed pro-Russian stance in the disinformation messages, although many signals now indicate that the theme of undermining Russia's attack on Ukraine (claiming it was untrue) and blaming the West as the perpetrator of the conflict and war is gaining ground. On the one hand, this is a reflection of the Kremlin's official stance – it is the West that provokes and therefore a defensive war was necessary (Lavrov at the end of April, Kirill, Metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox Church, Putin's 09.05.2022 speech in Red Square). On the other hand, it is the result of the activation of Polish extremist groups who, moving from closed forums, openly support Putin, not least because he can, as they write, deal with the "Ukrainian bandits" historically and mentally responsible – in their view – for the "Volhynia slaughter" (OKO Press, Agnieszka Jędrzejczyk);
- Analyses of the spread of disinformation following the revelation of the Bucha murder and the rocket attack on the Kramatorsk railway station make it clear that the Russian narrative is designed to make the public believe that the Bucha tragedy was a murder staged by President Zelenski for the purpose of provocation (either the murder was carried out by Ukrainian troops or it was the actors who participated in the Bucha staging) and actions to disavow Putin – a similar explanation for the destruction of the Kramatorsk railway station (Anna Mierzynska, OKO Press, 10.04.2022);
- Various analyses show (Anna Mierzyńska, OKO Press) that intensely online anti-vaccination groups are changing the focus of their action – to anti-Ukrainian;
- In many cases, false information and the building of negative emotions towards Ukrainians are intertwined with traditional online trends: anti-Semitism, racism, defence of Polishness against threats, etc., which brings them closer to the character of the world created by nationalists (this is described in the report of the 'Never Again' Association of 07.04.2022). The case of the action of nationalists in Przemyśl against refugees from Ukraine with a different skin colour, at the end of February 2022, shows that the professional spreading of rumours, the use of a rich network of accounts, network support, the spreading of videos showing people with a black skin colour with a knife as dominating the crowd of visitors to Przemyśl, the appeal to the city's community to organise civic patrols to defend women and children, fostered the transformation of a small-scale disinformation into a local eruption of resentment and hatred based on manufactured fear;
- Appearing since the end of April 2022 (OKO Press, Agnieszka Jedrzejczyk), the strong trend in Russian propaganda combining anti-Nazism with anti-Semitism (!) is an attempt to combine the two related strong types of emotion into one – in order to justify its own (extreme) actions as defensive and win acceptance for, for example, the suggestion to declare a state of war and general mobilisation in Russia;

- There is a clear coupling of disinformation flowing from the traditional media (e.g. local media in the Subcarpathian region) with its dissemination through social media, and this also applies to new portals which convey pro-Russian narratives in Polish, filling the space left by banned Russian channels (Russia Today etc.). The initiative of government agencies to close certain websites as law-breakers (necessary, although belated and on a small scale) does not fully solve the problem, because new editions of websites, accounts, platforms are immediately created, servers are moved to other territories, etc., so as to continue to spread anti-Ukrainian disinformation, inspired by Russian sources;
- There is a strong trend to build up beliefs and stereotypes that the material and status position of Ukrainians is and will be better than that of Polish families, which in the course of time may become a significant trigger for a large-scale conflict. Such a message is created both by "ordinary citizens" susceptible to this type of stereotyping and appears on the approximately 10,000 fake accounts that have recently been created (Iga Dzieciuchowicz, OKO Press, 27.03.2022);
- The danger of using the migration of Ukrainians to Poland to stir up further forms of disinformation and propaganda pressure, separating Poland from the European Union. Already today one can see the activity of some politicians contrasting the great involvement of Poles in helping Ukrainians with the role of the European Union (including the Commission) allegedly inefficient in decision-making. Some politicians make calls for the EU to "do something", and when the EU "does it", some present the EU as not providing financial support for the aid Poland provides to Ukraine and Ukrainians, and some encourage outright non-payment of the EU contribution as a kind of compensation for the alleged lack of this support (contrary to the facts that the EU financially supports many activities undertaken in Poland to help Ukraine).

4. Possible future fields of tension, fields of disinformation and narratives dividing Poland and Ukraine

Already, it is possible to characterise the visible fields of potential tension that disinformation campaigns and tools can radically magnify:

- A possible tendency to treat the presence of Ukrainians in Poland on a larger scale as an opportunity for their assimilation, as opposed to integration processes, which could undermine the ambition and aspirations of the Ukrainian community for its own separateness and identity (during the war, Ukraine defends its independence and identity), on the one hand, and on the other, would be to strengthen Poland's national sovereignty;
- Possible pressure to limit the use of the Ukrainian language in Poland by refugees, reducing it to the area of their private affairs – with clear pressure to replace bilingualism (which should be the accepted norm in the current situation) with an obligation to use Polish: administrative forms, inscriptions in institutions, information about health services, education without the possibility of learning Ukrainian, etc.;

- Pushing to the periphery of the issues to be resolved, all issues related to religion, the distinctiveness of ministry in the Catholic and Orthodox rite (a problem so far completely unrecognised), the most extreme version being pressure to, for example, attend Catholic religion classes in schools without taking into account the cultural difference (possible indirect coercion preceded by a disinformation campaign in certain communities);
- Taking advantage of the geographical location of the Ukrainian community: their location in, for example, dispersed metropolitan areas (lack of ghettoisation), whose inhabitants are initially more open to otherness, reduces their susceptibility to disinformation, whereas their presence in small towns, as well as areas geographically inhabited by social groups with an initially higher level of aversion to migrants or Ukrainians per se, may lead to an increased susceptibility to negative disinformative emotions (e.g. referring to the memory of the Volhynian massacre). It is conceivable that disinformation campaigns targeting local micro-communities, carrying a stoke of negative emotions and conflicts, although it must be admitted that the distribution of Ukrainian refugees overlooks these territories, they are more likely to look for places in central and western Poland;
- References are made to the sphere of issues related to the apparent deficit of understanding of equality in Poland, which can lead to the generation of attitudes towards Ukrainian women present in Poland, as permeated by a conservative approach based on a paternalistic, extremely masculine way of understanding the world (radical language of hate speech and disinformation could turn Ukrainian women into aggressively attacked victims, online but also in reality – as expected by spreading false information about a Ukrainian woman who allegedly seduced the husband of a woman offering her hospitality);
- The use of issues related to the availability of certain public services, as well as the amount of social benefits, which is crucial for everyday life and concerns material allowances, access to the health care system, housing, all educational services – including compensatory ones, and in certain situations access to the labour market (this may particularly concern women). In these areas, doubts may arise, multiplied by misinformation and inconsistent with the facts, and even the creation of resentment towards Ukrainians – that they are treated better, that they do not work, that their presence violates the principles of social justice, in effect – that "the Polish family is worse off", etc..;
- Disinformation instrumentalises all matters related to the dissimilarity of cultural codes: starting with language, references to symbols and traditions, references to religion, different family models, ending – with attitudes towards electronic media and trust or distrust of online content. In the disinformation space, the possibility of characterising a group – as different from the basic one living in a given area – creates a good launching pad for spreading falsehoods and hatred.

5. Recommendations for public policy and social action opposing disinformation

Recommendations for actions and political, practical solutions aimed at creating short-term as well as long-term conditions for implementing the goals of "Hospitable Poland" require a kind of implementation test. With variable scenarios for the influx of refugees from Ukraine – both in terms of size, structure and length of stay in Poland, conditions such as:

- Potential for opportunities (but also their risks) for cooperation between governmental, local and civil institutions;
- The nature of the legal and financial rules and their dependence on national and European regulations, and the possibilities of funding from various sources for all projects and programmes supporting Ukrainians in Poland and building Polish-Ukrainian relations;
- The state of the social climate, i.e. factors supporting the persistence of an aura of openness and solidarity in a large part of society (temporary and directional improvement of social capital), and factors that may become igniters of conflicts and social tensions around the stay of Ukrainians in Poland, which may be fostered by the high susceptibility of a part of society to disinformation, hate speech and polarisation.

Recommendations for specific actions can be divided into two categories:

- Measures to limit the scale and scope of disinformation;
- Actions to limit the achievement of disinformation objectives.

Measures to limit coverage, while necessary, will only yield partial results. Even with the greatest involvement of social media platforms and administrations, hateful and disinformative content will continue to appear on social media.

More effective, albeit difficult, politically challenging for parties with nationalist leanings and requiring long-term and consistent action, is to counteract the aims of disinformation (experts from the Rand Corporation also write about this). One can think of this course of action as a vaccine. In the absence of vulnerability to disinformation, no amount of disinformation will shake the 'health' of citizens.

Measures to limit the scale and scope of disinformation

1. Monitoring

Disinformation – even if it exists in a latent phase or in a currently small scale of influence – can be quickly activated, move to an increasing scale of influence on large social groups, thanks to the personalisation of messages and their micro-addressability (use of algorithms), which increases effectiveness. Vulnerability to different disinformation plots in different environments may prove crucial – falsified information and manipulation most often corresponds to the emotions and attitudes of specific social groups.

Therefore, monitoring not only the potential for disinformation – content that divides society – but also groups of possible broadcasters seems particularly important. They are present in social media – Facebook, Twitter, Messenger, Telegram, but also in many portals (e.g. the far-right eMission TV) and in comments posted under publications or TV and radio stations operating locally.

One needs to be particularly alert to the potential for disinformation and conflict in all the areas that the 'Hospitable Poland' report describes, among all the recommendations made and policies and solutions suggested. Conflict igniters can be present in any area (education, health, labour market, etc.), anything can become disinformation material. It is and will also be important to imagine very broadly what could function (what problem, what niche of Polish-Ukrainian relations, what action) as a potential fuse, generating an explosion of social tension, undermining the relationship between Poles and Ukrainians, and thus hindering the goals of "Hospitable Poland".

While the task force of the European External Action Service carries out continuous monitoring of systemic Russian disinformation, analysis of internal disinformation is carried out selectively by the media, civil society and some government agencies. **Countering anti-Ukrainian disinformation will require more support for independent monitoring centres and better coordination of their activities. It should be considered whether government agencies**, i.e. the ABW, RCB, or national strategic communication units (in Poland – a group in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) **should be more active in this field, alongside civil society and the EEAS**. The effects of monitoring should be available to the media.

In addition, the EEAS Task Force should be significantly strengthened – financially and in terms of staff – so that its analyses are EU-wide and available in all languages.

2. Improved content moderation

The European Commission should ensure that all EU citizens are treated equally to US citizens. A symbol of unequal treatment can be found in the Meta that is Facebook and Instagram. Even though English-speaking users make up only 9% of users, 87% of the pool for content moderation is allocated to them. Facebook distributes the remaining 13% to moderation in other languages – so it is hard to expect equal efficiency. This is an area for the European Commission to intervene strongly and force digital platforms to be more responsible in countering disinformation.

In addition, platforms should provide an open collection of verified content with verdicts. Currently, social media, if they engage in disinformation activities, do so in an inconsistent and overly truncated manner. Legislators at the EU level should propose to the digital giants to create a common library of disinformation content, so that every EU citizen has the chance to see content labelled as disinformation and the justification. At the same time, platforms creating such a database could exchange information speeding up the process of fighting disinformation. An example of a similar and well-functioning solution is the library of political advertisements on Facebook, where it is possible to verify all advertisements of political parties by country and time of broadcast.

The European Union should also quickly implement the so-called Digital Services Act, which will allow platforms and administrations to better cooperate in crisis situations.

3. Stronger legal responses

Disinformation about people from Ukraine largely inspires hate speech, which is punishable by law. In practice, it is extremely rare for prosecutors and police to take action against those sowing hate speech, even when it is obvious. The government does not have much influence on social media platforms, but it definitely has more influence on the creators of disinformation and hate speech. On YouTube, we can easily find creators promoting hate speech against Ukrainians – state services have the right tools to monitor the web and take real action against those sowing hatred in the virtual world. At present, the system does not work, actions are taken only against the biggest and loudest creators – who turn their online actions into actions in reality (e.g. Alexander Yablonovsky). Once the existing legal mechanisms to combat hate speech start to work – the sense of complete impunity will be broken.

There is also a need to reactivate the human rights team under the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, which, among other things, dealt systemically with issues concerning the integration of people of other origins.

Measures to limit the achievement of disinformation objectives

Successfully countering the targets of disinformation will require action primarily offline, rather than on social media itself. If we treat disinformation as a social phenomenon, as we tried to demonstrate in the introduction, then countering it should primarily involve offline actions to integrate and build an open society.

4. **Media education for people from Poland and Ukraine**

Universal media education in schools, especially regarding social media, should not be politically controversial. Such classes, currently run by NGOs, not only teach and immunize against disinformation, but also – in the long term – prevent radicalisation and allow for an understanding of other perspectives. **There is a need to strengthen the organisations providing such classes and to scale up their activities. An appropriate revision of the core curriculum is also possible.**

In this context, it is worth noting how important grassroots initiatives are to spread education related to coping with increased disinformation. On the initiative of demagog.pl – a "Code of Good Practice" (20.04.2022) signed by many universities, communities, research centres was created. A number of organisations, including demagog.pl and Keyboard Warriors teach media competence. Also well-written and clearly illustrated is the guide-book published by the Orange Foundation by Anna Mierzyńska "Disinformation. How To Protect Yourself From It'.

5. **Government administration to undertake strategic communication about war refugees from Ukraine**

In the face of war and the refugee crisis, communications from the government and the administration concerning people from Ukraine should be thoroughly assessed for disinformation potential. All significant communications from the government administration should be reviewed by a single decision-making centre. Similarly, pro-refugee oriented ruling party and democratic opposition parties should assess the costs, for people from Ukraine, of possible open political disputes over public policies concerning refugees.

6. **To nuance the image of war refugees and consolidate good associations**

Presenting people from Ukraine only as having a refugee experience reinforces the donor-recipient relationship and leads to stereotyping of all people from Ukraine. Presenting people from Ukraine in the totality of their experiences and achievements can help to break down such a dichotomous relationship. **Hate speech and misinformation are based on stereotypes, so weakening the latter will benefit integration processes. A positive role can be played by the media, social organisations, governmental and local administration departments dealing with communication (e.g. conducting social campaigns broadening the image of people from Ukraine) and culture (e.g. organising festivals of Ukrainian culture, promoting the participation of Ukrainian artists in festivals of Polish culture or introducing refugee characters in TV series).**

7. **Education and action for multiculturalism**

The experience of multiculturalism is an important part of Poland's history, as well as an everyday reality for those living on the border. Acceptance of multiculturalism does not have to mean giving up one's own culture at the same time. While the **actions of the current government to promote multicultural education seem unrealistic, such actions may be taken by local governments, in cooperation with social organisations, e.g. by organising**

school classes, sports activities, etc. On the other hand, it will also be important in countering disinformation to strengthen the integration processes of people from Ukraine, which may translate into a reduction of intercultural tensions and thus reduce the potential for disinformation. It will be important for people from Ukraine to acquire language and cultural skills quickly (more on this in Chapters 4 and 8).

8. **Fostering a spirit of solidarity**

After months of providing support, Polish citizens may feel tired of the situation and even frustrated by the attitudes of war refugees. **Local governments can play a positive role in sustaining the spirit of solidarity, especially on an emotional level. Local authorities can use customary celebrations (town/municipality festivities, harvest festivals, etc.) to provoke attitudes of pride in the assistance provided by local residents.** At the same time, this message should be nuanced (see above) and take into account the heroic attitude of the Ukrainian army and society in defending the country and Europe.

The Catholic Church, whose influence is concentrated especially in smaller towns, can play an important role.

9. **Embedding Ukrainian people in local communities**

Support for people from Ukraine in the first weeks and months of the war was largely grassroots. As a result, refugees were welcomed into homes and began to function in local communities. Hosts also became advocates for war refugees, which arguably helped to reduce misinformation and hate speech. Local governments and central administrations should promote such solutions. At the same time, systemic soft measures, e.g. the creation of caregiver groups for specific Ukrainian persons, are needed to avoid individual host fatigue; similar measures can also be taken by employers.

10. **Reducing fields of conflict**

As disinformation seeks to exacerbate polarisation, countering it can involve reducing the fields of potential conflict. For example, concerns about people from Poland being displaced by people from Ukraine can be reduced by making public data on vacancies in Polish companies and identifying success stories resulting from the influx of labour. Similar measures can address other identified fields of conflict.

6. Effects of implementing the recommendations

Whether war refugees from Ukraine stay in Poland for a long time or return after a few months, their stay in Poland will be accompanied by tensions. The aim of the measures presented here is not to counteract the actual challenges and problems that may arise. Instead, we propose a series of actions that could lead to a situation where the response to the challenges is proportionate to their scale, rather than exaggerated or even inspired, as is often the case in social media. Above all, the proposed inclusive actions will allow citizens and nationals to see the person and not the refugee. Promoting the individual and his or her experiences will hinder polarisation, stereotyping and thus reduce hate speech and vulnerability to misinformation.

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MACIEJ BUKOWSKI, Editor of the „Hospitable Poland 2022+" report

Doctor of Economics, President of the Management Board of WiseEuropa. Research fellow at the University of Warsaw. From 2006 to 2013 President of the IBS Foundation. Co-author of numerous Polish strategic documents (e.g. *Hausner Plan*, *Poland 2030 – development challenges*, *Long-term Strategy of National Development until 2030 (Poland 2030 – the third wave of modernity*). Manager of projects and numerous commentaries and press articles on, inter alia, macroeconomics, energy policy, innovation, pension system or labour market.

AGNIESZKA CHŁOŃ-DOMIŃCZAK

Professor at the Warsaw School of Economics. Pro-rector for science, Director of the Institute of Statistics and Demography at the Warsaw School of Economics, member of the Committee on Demographic Sciences at the Polish Academy of Sciences. She is the leader of the Polish research group "Research on health, ageing and processes of retirement in Europe", and heads the Polish team of National Transfer Accounts. In 2008-2009, she was Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; she also sat on the Supervisory Board of the Social Insurance Institution and was a member of the Financial Supervision Commission. From 2007 to 2009, she was Vice-Chair of the Social Protection Committee of the European Council and, until mid-2009, also a member of the OECD Committee on Employment, Labour and Social Policy. From 2010 to 2017, at the Educational Research Institute, she managed projects related to the preparation of the implementation of the Polish Qualifications Framework. Her research interests include demography, pension systems, labour market, social policy, health and education. At SGH, she lectures in the areas of pension economics, social statistics, economic and social policy. She is currently involved in two international research projects.

IWONA CIEĆWIERZ

Expert on public consultations and cooperation with local governments, sociologist, facilitator and mediator, consultant for election campaigns, trainer of Oxford debate. At WiseEuropa, she works with local governments and supports them in carrying out public consultations on space planning. She has worked for many years with the alumni network of the School of Leaders Foundation, taking care of its development and providing educational programmes for local government leaders. She started her collaboration with the School of Leaders in 2010 with the Your Vote, Your Choice campaign. She then worked on pro-frequency -campaigns in the presidential, parliamentary and local government elections. Co-author and coordinator of Poland's first City Leaders School, she advises local governments. She is a scholarship holder of the US Department of State – Leadership in Local Government, a graduate of the XXII Civil Society Leaders School and the School of Moderators. She created the Municipal Communication Model on the local government-residents line and the Middle Cities Leadership School Model. Member of the Social Dialogue Committee at the National Chamber of Commerce.

MACIEJ DUSZCZYK, Editor of the „Hospitable Poland 2022+" report

Professor, pro-rector for Academic Affairs at the University of Warsaw from 2016 to 2020. Researcher at the Centre for Migration Research and the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. Chairman of the Council of the University of Gdansk for the term of office 2021-2024. Member of the Scientific Policy Committee from 2014-2016 and 2020-2021 (Chairman October 2015-March 2016 and June-December 2020). Between 2008 and 2011 member of the team of strategic advisors to the Prime Minister, and between 2012 and 2014 leading the substantive work of the team for the development of Polish migration policy in the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland. Between 2014 and 2015, visiting professor at the Martin Luther University in Halle-Wittenberg and the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena. Head of grants funded, among others, by the National Science Centre and the Polish-German Foundation for Science. Scholarship holder of, inter alia, the Jean Monnet Project, the Carl Duisburg Gesellschaft and the Committee for Scientific Research.

OLGIERD ROMAN DZIEKOŃSKI

Architect, urban planner. More than 30 years of experience in planning, designing and managing urban development. Co-author of the First Prize of the UIA Competition for the New Belgrade in 1986. Deputy Mayor of the City of Warsaw in 1990-1994 and 1999-2000. Co-founder of the Warsaw self-government. Chairman of the Board of the Municipal Development Agency (ARKA), which he co-organised, 1994-1999 a joint initiative of the government and local government and the EU on local planning and development.

Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Regional Development and Construction; 2000-2001, architecture, construction, building supervision and surveying. International expert on US AID and EU programmes, Development Director of RTI Polska; 2001-2007, worked in Bulgaria, Romania, Kosovo and Syria under the EU-MAM programme. Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Infrastructure; 2007-2010, architecture, construction, spatial management and real estate, construction supervision. Secretary of State in the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland; 2010-2015, coordination of the work of the President's advisors, Public Debate Forum, innovation, economy, local government and spatial governance issues. Currently Manager of the Regiogmina Project, Plenipotentiary of the Management Board of the Kuyavian-Pomeranian Voivodeship for Economic Development, Member of the Supervisory Board of TARR, Member of the Programme Council of the Foundation for the Development of Local Democracy.

TOMASZ GAJDEROWICZ

Doctor of Economics. Assistant Professor at the Department of Macroeconomics and -Foreign Trade Theory of the Faculty of Economic Sciences of the University of Warsaw, consultant of the World Bank, expert at the Labour Market Research Centre of the University of Warsaw. Vice-President of the Board of the Evidence Institute Foundation. He has participated in numerous projects on researching preferences towards education and employment and on ways of stimulating specific efforts in both areas. He specialises in the implementation of modern micro-econometric methods for the analysis of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in education and work. The research area in which he is the author of innovative methodological solutions and publications covers the processes of accumulation and utilisation of human capital in the economy, i.e. the area of the interface between the education sector and the labour market. In addition to his fascination with 'soul-searching' methods, he is an aeroplane pilot and a diving enthusiast..

MARTA GORCZYŃSKA

Human rights lawyer specialising in the protection of the rights of migrants. For the last 10 years she has been involved in the non-governmental environment, especially the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. She provides legal assistance to people with refugee experience, monitors compliance with the law at the Polish borders and advocates for a human rights-based approach to migration. She has worked as a country expert for UNHCR. She is a doctoral student at the University of Warsaw.

HALINA GRZYMAŁA-MOSZCZYŃSKA

PhD in psychology, employee of the Jagiellonian University and Ignatianum Academy in Krakow. She led and co-led two editions – in Krakow and London – of workshops for Polish women teachers in the UK, as part of the Summer Academy of Intercultural Communication organised by the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Jagiellonian University. Since 1998 she has been conducting research in the field of cultural psychology with a special focus on the psychology of migration. This includes a cult of Poles going abroad and foreigners coming to Poland. She also conducts research into the problems of cultural adaptation in Poland of children from Polish families returning from emigration. Recently, she and her team have been conducting research on the contacts of Poles with the Norwegian health service and the experiences of Polish families with Barnevernet. She has published a number of papers on psychological aspects of migration in Polish and international publications.

MACIEJ JAKUBOWSKI

Economist and sociologist, assistant professor at the Faculty of Economic Sciences of the University of Warsaw, President of the Board of the Evidence Institute Foundation, former Deputy Minister of Education (2012-2014). Previously, he worked on the management team of the PISA survey at the OECD headquarters in Paris. He has worked as a consultant with the World Bank and the UNDP. He has conducted research at the University of Pittsburgh in the USA, Ludwig Maximilian University in Germany and the European University Institute in Italy. He is a co-author of the educational value-added method in Poland, author and co-author of several books, dozens of research reports and scientific articles. In his scientific work, he has mainly analysed the impact of changes in educational policy on students' progress.

PAWEŁ KACZMARCZYK

Professor at Warsaw University, works at the Faculty of Economic Sciences and directs the Migration Research Centre. His research interests are mainly determinants and consequences of labour migration, attitudes towards migrants, migration policies, migration research methodology, labour market economics and population processes. He researches the reality of migration and tries to participate in the political debate on mobility (in the past he was a member of the Team of Strategic Advisors to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland).

WITOLD KLAUS

DPhD (hab) of legal sciences, professor at the Institute of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences (head of the Department of Criminology and the Centre for Migration Law Research) and researcher at the Centre for Migration Research of the University of Warsaw; criminologist, migration researcher, social activist; Member of the Board of the Association for Legal Intervention (2005-2019 President), member of the Migration Research Committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences (term 2019-2022) and the Committee of Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences (2020-2023 term), scholarship holder of the Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science, the British Academy and the US government, graduate of the School of Human Rights of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights; author of numerous works on criminology, victimology, human rights, migration and refugees.

ADAM KOZIERKIEWICZ

Graduate of the Faculty of Medicine of the Medical University of Krakow and the School of Public Health of the Jagiellonian University and the Jagiellonian University, as well as foreign courses (Harvard University School of Public Heath, Boston MA, Semmelweis University, Budapest). He worked at the Institute of Public Health, Collegium Medicum, Jagiellonian University from 1997 to 2008, where he obtained his doctoral degree. He has authored and co-authored numerous publications (articles and books) in the field of health care, health economics and health care information systems. In addition to his academic work, he was Director of the Department of Informatics at the Ministry of Health and the Centre for Health Information Systems (1998-2001), and since 2002 he has been involved in consulting and training activities in the health care sector; in the field of organisation, health economics, statistics and information systems for such institutions as ministries of health of various countries, the European Commission, the European Investment Bank, the World Bank, national and foreign universities.

IULIIA LASHCHUK

PhD in Philosophy, researcher on women's migration, activist for migration and integration. She defended her PhD with distinction at the University of Warsaw in 2021. Research interests: categories of otherness and alienation and their immanent relationship to exclusion, gender relations in the nation-state, women's migration, issues of identity, belonging and diversity, ethical dimensions of dignity. Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence, collaborates with the University of Warsaw, Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz and the WiseEuropa Foundation.

Since 2011 she has been involved in non-formal education in Ukraine and Poland and works with children and young people as an educator. Co-founder of the Ukrainian House in Warsaw.

RADOMIR MATCZAK

PhD in economic sciences, worked for 20 years in public administration, mainly local government. He specialises in regional policy issues, EU Cohesion Policy, public governance, institutional reforms, Baltic cooperation and green transformation. He conducts advisory and research activities, cooperating, among others, with the Association of Polish Cities and the SWPS University. He is a graduate of the Economic and Social College of the Warsaw School of Economics and the Faculty of Management and Economics of the Gdansk University of Technology

JACEK MICHAŁOWSKI

Psychologist and psychotherapist, activist and employee of the non-governmental sector, civil servant. In the past, among others, Head of the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland, Programme Director of the Polish-American Freedom Foundation, Director General of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Director of the Office of Studies and Analyses of the Chancellery of the Polish Senate. Currently, among others, lecturer at Collegium Civitas and animator of the social initiative 30th Year of Freedom. Collaborator with the democratic opposition in communist Poland and member of the first Solidarity movement (1980). Member of the Club of Catholic Intelligentsia (KIK) in Warsaw since 1975.

JAKUB MICHAŁOWSKI, Initiator of the „Hospitable Poland 2022+" project

Manager with many years of experience working at the interface of business, administration and NGOs in the areas of public policy and social dialogue, sustainable development and management optimisation. In 2008-2011, member of the Team of Strategic Advisers to the Prime Minister. Between 2011-2017 manager at PwC and Deloitte in the area of Public Sector & Sustainability. Later, he served as policy manager in start-ups and NGOs, among others. For years associated with the Club of Catholic Intelligentsia in Warsaw

IGNACY NIEMCZYCKI

Specialist in communications and European affairs. Former civil servant and then journalist covering EU affairs. President of the Prof. Bronisław Geremek Foundation. Served as corporate communications director at IKEA Retail in Poland. Graduate of Bocconi University (management) and Lancaster University (sociology). A lifelong vegetarian, animal lover and, more recently, a farmer in the Masuria region.

ROBERT PATER

Doctor of social sciences in the discipline of economics and finance, Professor, Head of the Department of Economics and Finance at the University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszów. Specialist in macroeconomics and applied econometrics with particular application to the job vacancy and labour demand market. Co-convener of 30 research projects, including several international ones on the labour market. Since 2004, he has conducted regular surveys of job vacancies under the title Job Vacancy Barometer. In 2017-2019, he led the project entitled Method of continuous monitoring of educational mismatch on the Polish labour market at a detailed level, funded by the DIALOG programme of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. He cooperates with the Investment and Economic Cycles Office in Warsaw. Subject matter expert at the Educational Research Institute in Warsaw. Since 2020, he has been leading a research team whose aim is to provide information for the preparation by the Ministry of Education and Science of the annual Forecast of Demand for Employees in Industry Education Occupations on the National and Provincial Labour Market..

OLEKSANDR PUSTOVYI

Historian, teacher. Consultant on education of pupils with migration experience at the Warsaw Centre of Educational and Social Innovation and Training. Director of the Ukrainian Saturday School for Ukrainian citizens, advisor of the Warsaw Ukrainian School of the Our Choice Foundation. Teacher of history at Primary School No. 141 in Warsaw, teacher of Ukrainian history and culture at the Inter-school Teaching Point for the Ukrainian Minority in Warsaw. Member of the team of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine to work on the state curriculum foundations in the field of civic and historical education. Awarded the 'Exemplary in Education' honour decoration by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine.

MICHAŁ SĘK

Researcher and project coordinator, at the Prof. Bronisław Geremek Foundation. Deals with issues related to hate speech in social media. Former employee of the Polish Academy of Sciences, where he dealt with the impact of systemic solutions on conflict resolution in multi-ethnic societies. A geographer by training, specialising in regional development. An expert on urban issues, he is a member of the editorial board of City Magazine. In his free time, he is interested in Indonesia and enjoys climbing.

FILIP SZULIK-SZARECKI

Coordinator of the Keyboard Warriors project, fact-checker and communications specialist. Urban activist, previously worked as a reporter at Polskie Radio and social media manager at Wirtualna Polska. Graduate of Collegium Civitas and the In.Europa Academy.

RAFAŁ TRZECIAKOWSKI

He has analytical experience in a wide range of macro and microeconomic issues, including public finance, migration economics and the housing market. He has an open doctoral thesis at the Warsaw School of Economics in the area of the impact of decentralisation on the fiscal sustainability of local authorities, in which he received a grant from the National Science Centre. He graduated in economics and economic analysis of law from the Warsaw School of Economics. He was a scholarship holder at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in the USA and Fudan University in Shanghai. He is a co-organiser of the Panel of Polish Economists and a member of the Society of Polish Economists. Previously with WISE and FOR, and currently with the Deloitte Economic Analysis Team.

JĘDRZEJ WITKOWSKI

President of the Board of the Centre for Civic Education (CEO) – the largest Polish NGO working in the field of education. He has worked with the CEO since 2005 and has been its President since 2018. Educational expert, PhD in sociology and political science. He deals, among others, with strategies for bottom-up change in schools, development of future competences and civic and political education. Author of publications, programmes and -educational materials. Graduate of the Leadership Academy for Poland.

JERZY WIŚNIEWSKI

A mathematics teacher before joining the Ministry of Education in 1990, where he worked intermittently until 2017. He headed the departments responsible for strategic planning, international cooperation and coordination of the use of EU structural funds. He served as Director General of the Ministry in 1998 during the preparation and implementation of the systemic reform of Polish education. He has cooperated with the Council of Europe Chairman of the Education Committee), UNESCO, the World Bank, the European Commission and its agencies ETF and Cedefop, and the OECD. He is the Vice-Chairman of the Council of the European Institute for Education and Social Policy and a member of the Council of the Education for Democracy Foundation.

JAN JAKUB WYGNAŃSKI

Sociologist, graduate of the University of Warsaw, scholarship holder at Yale University. Democratic opposition activist in the 1980s. Secretary to Henryk Wujec. Participant in the Round Table Talks. One of the animators of the NGO movement in Poland from the early 1990s. Co-founder, among others, of the NGO Data Bank run by the Klon/Jawor Association and the All-Poland Federation of Non-Governmental Organisations. Researcher of civil society, volunteering and philanthropy in Poland. Founder and currently President of the Board of the STOCZNIA Foundation. Co-founder of the Civic Fund raising funds for initiatives protecting the democratic order in Poland. A columnist for the Więź quarterly. Winner of, among others, the Andrzej Bączkowski Award, Totus Tous Award, Father J. Tischner Award, awarded the Knight's and Officer's Crosses of Polonia Restituta, Senior Ashoka Fellow. Married with 3 children. Lives in Warsaw.

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WiseEuropa is an independent think-tank specialising in macroeconomics, economic, European and foreign policy..

WiseEuropa's mission is to improve the quality of national and European policies and the economic environment by basing them on sound economic and institutional analyses, independent research and policy impact assessments. WiseEuropa engages citizens, entrepreneurs, experts and public policy makers from Poland and abroad in a common reflection on the modernisation of Poland and Europe and their role in the world. WiseEuropa aims to work for an active and engaged role for Poland in the open, sustainable and democratic development of Europe. WiseEuropa's key task is to stimulate and inspire public debate on the future of Poland and Europe.

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