Poland’s ability to minimise the costs of Russia’s rising unpredictability will be affected both by the disintegration process in the Western bloc and the EU and by domestic policy turbulence in Poland – stated Adam Balcer (WiseEuropa) and Piotr Buras (ECFR) in the „Russia 2030” Policy Paper published by the ECFR under the Russia 2030 project.
As Russian domestic and foreign policy has evolved towards revisionism and an inclination to use military force, the concerns of Poland have been validated, which Warsaw voiced at a time when many other partners viewed Russia as the next candidate for successful transformation and Europeanisation. The vindication is a bitter one: in the coming years, confronting the new-old Russia will be for Poland not an exercise in theory of international relations but a struggle in which key security interests are at stake.
In fact, Poland perceives the threat from Russia’s militarism and neo-imperialism as genuine, and as potentially going beyond the mere mid-level conflict scenario that Vladimir Putin needs to divert Russian society from its domestic problems and galvanise support for the regime. Polish political elites will prepare for a “war as diversion” as the most likely risk for the next few years, but they will also keep the “major war” option in the back of their minds.
Poland belongs to the group of European Union member states that will be most affected by an aggressive Russian foreign policy. Poland has a direct border with the Russian exclave, Kaliningrad Oblast, which because of its strategic location will remain the most militarised region in Europe. At the same time, Russia sees Kaliningrad as a vulnerable outpost because it is surrounded by the most “hawkish” NATO member states (Lithuania and Poland). If the Kremlin were to decide to have a local, short war with NATO, the Baltic Republics would be among the most obvious targets for Russian military aggression. And if the conflict were to escalate, Russia would probably want to neutralise Poland by occupying the Polish-Lithuanian border region (the Suwałki corridor) located between Kaliningrad and Belarus. Poland has the largest demographic, military, and economic potential of the countries on NATO’s eastern flank and is thus perceived as Russia’s main rival in the region. It also has the structural economic capacity to increase its power substantially. According to IMF projections, Polish GDP (PPP) is currently three and half times smaller than Russia’s. However, by 2030, this gap could decrease to a proportion of two-to-one in favour of Russia. Moreover, Poland is likely to maintain its military spending at its current high level (at least 2 percent of GDP) or even to beef it up, since there is a rare consensus on the issue among the deeply divided Polish political elites. The Polish armed forces are undergoing a long-term and comprehensive modernisation process, which will in the next decade substantially enhance their military capabilities. Poland is also the main promoter of regional security cooperation on the North-South Axis from Scandinavia through the Baltic Republics, Romania, and Ukraine to Turkey.
The challenge by Russia in the Eastern Neighbourhood will affect Poland’s policies in multiple ways, beyond the military dimension. Ukraine remains a strategic issue for Poland – not just because of the need for stabilisation at Poland’s eastern frontier, but also because a well-governed and strong Ukraine would be an important ally that would change Warsaw’s strategic outlook. And energy policy remains a contentious issue, especially with regard to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project; if the pipeline becomes operational after 2019, it could be a geopolitical game-changer in the next decade, increasing Moscow’s leverage in Eastern Europe. Historically, Russia’s fate has been intertwined with Poland’s security mostly in negative terms, and this is very unlikely to change in the next 15 years. Over the past 25 years, Poland has answered the Russian challenge by a decisive turn to the West, involving NATO and EU integration and building trust-based relations with its Western allies.
In the period until 2030, the key questions for Poland will be whether this political and institutional framework will be (and will be considered as) sufficient to protect Poland’s interests, and whether Poland remains a partner to be reckoned with by other EU and NATO member states.
